Michael J. Miller, Miller Place, NY, for appellant.

Somer & Heller, LLP, Commack, NY (Barbara Hutter and Jeffrey T. Heller of counsel), for respondent.

In an action, inter alia, for a judgment declaring that a contract for the sale of real property is unenforceable, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Robert F. Quinlan, J.), dated October 8, 2022. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment declaring the contract unenforceable, and denied that branch of the defendant's cross-motion which was for summary judgment on his counterclaim for specific performance of the contract.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

In February 2017, the plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, for a judgment declaring that a contract for the sale of real property is unenforceable. The defendant answered and asserted counterclaims, among other things, for specific performance of the contract. The plaintiff moved, inter alia, for summary judgment declaring the contract unenforceable. The defendant cross-moved, among other things, for summary judgment on his counterclaim for specific performance of the contract. In an order dated October 8, 2022, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment declaring the contract unenforceable, and denied that branch of the defendant's motion which was for specific performance of the contract. The defendant appeals.

Where a contract's material terms are not reasonably definite, the contract is unenforceable (see Toobian v Golzad, 193 AD3d 778, 782 [2021]; 443 Jefferson Holdings, LLC v Sosa, 174 AD3d 486, 487 [2019]). " 'To be enforceable, a contract for the sale of real property must be evidenced by a writing sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds' " (443 Jefferson Holdings, LLC v Sosa, 174 AD3d at 487, quoting O'Hanlon v Renwick, 166 AD3d 890, 891 [2018]; see General Obligations Law § 5-703 [2]). The statute of frauds provides that "[a] contract . . . for the sale, of any real property, or an interest therein, is void unless the contract or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, is in writing, subscribed by the party to be charged, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing" (General Obligations Law § 5-703 [2]).

"To satisfy the statute of frauds, a memorandum, subscribed by the party to be [*2]charged, must designate the parties, identify and describe the subject matter, and state all the essential terms of a complete agreement" (Best Global Alternative, Ltd. v FCIC Constr. Servs., Inc., 170 AD3d 1101, 1103 [2019]; see TR-One, Inc. v Lazz Dev. Co., Inc., 95 AD3d 1303 [2012]). " '[T]he writing must set forth the entire contract with reasonable certainty so that the substance thereof appears from the writing alone' " (Cohen v Holder, 204 AD3d 973, 975 [2022] [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Nesbitt v Penalver, 40 AD3d 596, 598 [2007]).

"Parol evidence—evidence outside the four corners of the document—is admissible only if a court finds an ambiguity in the contract" (Schron v Troutman Sanders LLP, 20 NY3d 430, 436 [2013]; see Del Vecchio v Del Vecchio, 219 AD3d 572, 575 [2023]). "Whether or not a writing is ambiguous is a question of law to be resolved by the courts" (Hanover Ins. Co. v Catlin Specialty Ins. Co., 218 AD3d 754, 755 [2023] [internal quotation marks omitted]). "[T]he description of real property in a contract of sale 'need not be as detailed and exact as the description in a deed' " (Del Pozo v Impressive Homes, Inc., 95 AD3d 1268, 1271 [2012], quoting Elias v Serota, 103 AD2d 410, 416 [1984]). " 'Only reasonable certainty, not absolute certainty, as to the terms of the agreement is required' " (Del Pozo v Impressive Homes, Inc., 95 AD3d at 1271, quoting Matter of Licata, 76 AD3d 1076, 1077 [2010]). "Where the property is described with such definiteness and exactness as will permit it to be identified with reasonable certainty, 'parol evidence would then be admissible to enable the court to identify precisely the property to which the contract relates' " (Del Pozo v Impressive Homes, Inc., 95 AD3d at 1271, quoting Boyajian v Casey, 52 AD2d 1014, 1014 [1976]).

Here, the plaintiff demonstrated her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence establishing that the contract lacked a material term. The description of the property was not sufficiently definite and exact to permit the property to be identified with reasonable certainty in satisfaction of the statute of frauds (see Total Telcom Group Corp. v Kendal on Hudson, 157 AD3d 746, 747 [2018]). In opposition, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the precise location of the property cannot be ascertained by extrinsic evidence (see Del Pozo v Impressive Homes, Inc., 95 AD3d at 1271). For the same reasons, the defendant failed to meet his prima facie burden on that branch of his cross-motion which was for summary judgment on his counterclaim for specific performance of the contract.

The defendant's remaining contentions are improperly raised for the first time on appeal (see Christiana Trust v Leriche, 219 AD3d 564, 567 [2023]). Connolly, J.P., Genovesi, Warhit and Wan, JJ., concur.