Stevens & Traub PLLC, New York, NY (Peter P. Traub of counsel), for appellant.

Law Office of Daniel J. McCarey, LLC, New York, NY, for respondents.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Thomas E. Walsh II, J.), dated October 2, 2017. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

On June 7, 2014, the plaintiff allegedly was injured while playing basketball on an outdoor basketball court maintained by the defendants when he was caused to trip and/or slip and fall into a chainlink fence along the end line of the court. The fence was located between the backboard and its supporting post, which post had been installed beyond the end line and outside of the basketball court. The plaintiff commenced this personal injury action against the defendants, claiming, inter alia, that the basketball court was defective, in that the fence was placed too close to the court in contravention of accepted industry standards. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and argued, among other things, that the action was barred by the doctrine of primary assumption of risk. The Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion, and the plaintiff appeals. We affirm insofar as appealed from.

Under the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, "by engaging in a sport or recreational activity, a participant consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from such participation" (Morgan v State of New York, 90 NY2d 471, 484 [1997]; see Custodi v Town of Amherst, 20 NY3d 83, 88 [2012]; Zachary G. v Young Israel of Woodmere, 95 AD3d 946, 946 [2012]). "Risks inherent in a sporting activity are those which are known, apparent, natural, or reasonably foreseeable consequences of the participation" (Mamati v City of N.Y. Parks & Recreation, 123 AD3d 671, 672 [2014]; see Morgan v State of New York, 90 NY2d at 484).

Assumption of risk is not an absolute defense but a measure of the defendant's duty of care (see Turcotte v Fell, 68 NY2d 432, 439 [1986]). If the risks are known by or perfectly obvious to the player, he or she has consented to them and the defendant has discharged its duty of care by making the conditions as safe as they appear to be (see id. at 439; Brown v City of New York, 69 AD3d 893, 893 [2010]).

The defendants made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law based upon the doctrine of primary assumption of risk by demonstrating that the proximity of the fence to the court was open and obvious, and thus, the risk of collision with the fence was inherent in playing on that court (see Trevett v City of Little Falls, 6 NY3d 884, 885 [2006]; Perez v New York City Dept. of Educ., 115 AD3d 921, 922 [2014]; Ribaudo v La Salle Inst., 45 AD3d 556, 557 [2007]; Reynolds v Jefferson Val. Racquet Club, 238 AD2d 493, 494 [1997]; see also Sykes v County of Erie, 94 NY2d 912 [2000]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the placement of the fence created a risk beyond those inherent to the sport of basketball, as there was no evidence in the record that the location of the fence violated "prevailing industry standards" relating to basketball courts (Kazlow v City of New York, 253 AD2d 411, 411 [1998] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Perez v New York City Dept. of Educ., 115 AD3d at 922; Ribaudo v La Salle Inst., 45 AD3d at 557; but see Greenburg v Peekskill City School Dist., 255 AD2d 487, 488 [1998]).

Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Mastro, J.P., Austin and Miller, JJ., concur.