Petitioner, Ralph Devito, commenced this Article 78 proceeding against respondents, Nancy Chaffetz, as Commissioner of the City of New York Civil Service Commission (CSC), William Bratton, as the Police Commissioner of the City of New York, the New York Police Department (NYPD), and the City of New York. Respondent NYPD disqualified petitioner from consideration for the position of police officer and notified petitioner of its determination by letter dated June 25, 2013. Petitioner was disqualified because he failed to meet the NYPD's psychological standards. Petitioner's psychological evaluation revealed that petitioner's "characteristics [were] incompatible with the unique demands and stress of employment as a New York City Police Officer." (Verified Pet., Exhibit B ¶ 4.) Petitioner appealed the decision on July 12, 2013, to the CSC. The CSC affirmed petitioner's disqualification and notified petitioner on August 20, 2014. On December 15, 2014, petitioner commenced this Article 78 proceeding to annul the CSC's decision affirming his disqualification.

Petitioner argues that respondents' decisions were arbitrary and capricious, irrational, and made in bad faith. Respondents argue that the petition is time-barred by the four-month statute of limitations applicable to all Article 78 proceedings. Respondents also argue that the decisions to disqualify petitioner were medically justified and were neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Petitioner's Article 78 proceeding is not time-barred. An Article 78 proceeding "shall not be used to challenge a determination which is not final or can be adequately reviewed by appeal to a court or to some other body or officer." (CPLR 7801 [1].) Also, "a proceeding against a body or officer must be commenced within four months after the determination to be reviewed becomes final and binding upon the petitioner." (CPLR 217.) The CSC's August 20, 2014, decision was final and binding on petitioner. Because petitioner commenced this proceeding on December 15, 2014, the petition is within the four-month period and is timely.

Respondents' disqualification of petitioner was not arbitrary and capricious. An appointing authority like the NYPD "has wide discretion in determining the fitness of candidates. This discretion is particularly broad in the hiring of law enforcement officers, to whom high standards may be applied." (Matter of Verme v Suffolk County Dept. of Civ. Serv., 5 AD3d 498, 498 [2d Dept 2004].) Courts may not interfere with this broad discretion unless there is no rational basis for the authority's action or the action is arbitrary and capricious. (Id.) An action is arbitrary and capricious when it "is without sound basis in reason and is generally taken without regard to the facts." (Matter of Pell v Bd. of Educ. of Union Free Sch. Dist., 34 NY2d 222, 230-31 [1974].)

The NYPD had a rational basis to disqualify petitioner. Pursuant to his pre-employment psychological examination, petitioner interviewed with the NYPD's Psychological Services Section psychologist, Emily K. Dearden. Dr. Dearden determined that petitioner was "psychologically unsuitable for police work due to concerns regarding his stress tolerance, anxiety, and poor credibility." (Resp. Verified Ans., Exhibit 3 at 3.) Dr. Dearden also determined that petitioner "has a documented history of poor tolerance to stress and anxiety that continues to the present time." (Id.) Dr. Dearden further noted that petitioner was neither forthcoming nor honest during the examination,and that this made it "impossible to trust him when he state[d] that he is now ready to handle the extremely stressful position of Police Officer." (Id.) Dr. Dearden also noted that in 2009 another NYPD staff psychologist, Paulette Kliminski, Ph.D., determined that petitioner was psychologically unsuitable for police work because of similar concerns. (Id.) On June 21, 2013, a rejection review evaluator, Edward Fitzsimmons, Ph.D., the NYPD's Department Supervising Psychologist, reviewed and confirmed Dr. Dearden's decision to disqualify petitioner. Thus, respondents' decision to disqualify petitioner was reasonably supported by Dr. Dearden's evaluation and Dr. Fitzsimmons' review.

The CSC reasonably affirmed the NYPD's decision to disqualify petitioner. On July 12, 2013, the CSC acknowledged receipt of petitioner's appeal. On appeal, Robert Daley, Ph.D. —petitioner's doctor — evaluated petitioner. Dr. Daley concluded that petitioner was psychologically fit to be a police officer. (Verified Pet., Exhibit E at 3.) After receiving Dr. Daley's evaluation, respondents forwarded Dr. Dearden's evaluation along with Dr. Daley's to an outside psychologist, Robert S. Arko, Ph.D., for review. Dr. Arko found that petitioner's [*2]evaluations indicate "vulnerability to the stress of police work." (Resp. Verified Ans., Exhibit 11.)

Respondents' decision to rely on the conclusions of their doctors rather than the conclusions of petitioner's doctor was neither arbitrary nor capricious. When medically evaluating candidates, "the appointing authority is entitled to rely upon the findings of its own medical personnel, even if those findings are contrary to those of professionals retained by the candidate." (City of New York v New York City Civil Serv. Commn., 61 AD3d 584, 584-585 [1st Dept 2009].) Once a court finds a rational basis that supports the appointing authority's conclusion, the judicial function is exhausted. (Id.) In relying on its own doctors' evaluations, respondents' decision was neither irrational nor arbitrary. (See Matter of Winnegar v County of Suffolk, 13 AD3d 382, 382 [2d Dept 2004]; Matter of Doe v New York City Police Dept., 39 Misc 3d 1229 [A], *1, 2013 NY Slip Op 50801 [U], *1, 2013 WL 2169691, at *1 [Sup Ct, NY County 2013] ["[T]here was a rational basis to support the disqualification after an extensive appeal process in which copious documentation was submitted and petitioner was examined by both private and NYPD mental health professionals."].)

Respondents relied on the medical opinions of three different doctors — Dr. Dearden, Dr. Fitzsimmons, and Dr. Arko — all of whom concluded that petitioner is psychologically unqualified to handle the stress of a police officer. The doctors' conclusions were based on petitioner's responses and psychological assessments. Thus, the CSC reasonably determined that Dr. Daley's findings were an insufficient basis to overturn the NYPD's decision. The NYPD, as the appointing agency, relied on its own professionals' findings. It was neither arbitrary nor capricious for the NYPD and CSC to rely on its own doctors rather than petitioner's doctor. Like the parties in Matter of Doe, petitioner had an extensive appeals process, and respondents relied on medical evaluations provided by its doctors. The medical conclusions of the NYPD doctors provided a sufficient basis to support the CSC's rational decision to disqualify petitioner. Because the CSC's decision was rational, this court may not interfere with the decision.

Therefore, respondents' disqualification of petitioner's candidacy for the job of police officer was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that upon the foregoing papers, petitioner's verified petition is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that respondents must serve a copy of this order with notice of entry on petitioner and on the County Clerk's Office, which is directed to dismiss the petition.

This opinion is the court's decision and order.