Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Mary R. O'Donoghue, J.), rendered February 15, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of disorderly conduct. The appeal from the judgment of conviction brings up for review an order of the same court dated January 28, 2011 denying, among other things, the branch of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the accusatory instrument as facially insufficient.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is reversed, on the law, and the accusatory instrument is dismissed.

Defendant was charged with three counts of aggravated harassment in the second degree—one in violation of Penal Law § 240.30 (1) (a), one in violation of Penal Law § 240.30 (1) (b), and one in violation of Penal Law § 240.30 (2)—as well as with one count of harassment in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 240.26 (1). The factual portion of the accusatory instrument alleged that defendant had called the complainant and stated that "if he and his client continue to try and take money from the defendant's wife that he would hurt them." Defendant moved to, among other things, dismiss the accusatory instrument as facially insufficient and the People opposed the motion. In an order dated January 28, 2011, the Criminal Court denied this branch of defendant's motion. On February 15, 2011, defendant, through his counsel, pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct (Penal Law § 240.20) in full satisfaction of the charges. On appeal, defendant challenges the accusatory instrument's facial sufficiency.

At the outset, we note that, as defendant did not waive prosecution by information, the facial sufficiency of the accusatory instrument must be reviewed according to the requirements of an information (see CPL 100.10 [1]; 170.65 [1], [3]; People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 228 [2009]; People v Weinberg, 34 NY2d 429, 431 [1974]; People v Chan, 36 Misc 3d 44, 46 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]). An information is sufficient on its face if it contains nonhearsay factual allegations of an evidentiary nature which establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof (see CPL 100.15 [3]; 100.40 [1]; People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 679 [1999]; People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 136—137 [1987]). Such a challenge to the facial sufficiency of the instrument is jurisdictional and, thus, is not forfeited by a defendant's guilty plea (see People v Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100, 103 [2010]; People v Lucas, 11 NY3d 218, 220 [2008]; People v Konieczny, 2 NY3d 569, 573 [2004]), with the exception of any alleged hearsay defect which is nonjurisdictional and does not survive a guilty plea (see People v Keizer, 100 NY2d 114, 122-123 [2003]).

In People v Golb (23 NY3d 455 [2014]), the Court of Appeals found Penal Law

As to the remaining count of aggravated harassment in the second degree, in violation of Penal Law § 240.30 (2), the mere recitation in the accusatory instrument that the telephone call allegedly made by defendant to the complainant "had no legitimate purpose of communication," without providing a basis for such an allegation, does not establish this element of the offense (see People v Singh, 1 Misc 3d 73 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2003]). Thus, the information was legally insufficient to charge the offense of aggravated harassment in the second degree (see CPL 100.15 [3]; 100.40 [1]).

As to the charge of harassment in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 240.26 (1), the factual allegations contained in the accusatory instrument, standing alone, could not reasonably be construed to establish a genuine and immediate threat of physical contact to the complainant (see People v Todaro, 26 NY2d 325, 330 [1970]; People v Shehabeldin, 39 Misc 3d 149[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50942[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]). Thus, the information was legally insufficient to charge the offense of harassment in the second degree (see CPL 100.15 [3]; 100.40 [1]).

Consequently, the information, in its entirety, was legally insufficient. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is reversed and the accusatory instrument is dismissed.

Pesce, P.J., Solomon and Elliot, JJ., concur.