Defendant, charged with Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree, in violation of Penal Law § 240.30(2),^[FN1] moves to dismiss, claiming that the People improperly superseded and that, alternatively, the Information is facially insufficient. For the reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss is DENIED.^[FN2] I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

According to the accusatory instrument, defendant telephoned the complainant, her aunt, three times on a single day. In each call, defendant threatened to harm the complainant or her family.

Defendant was arraigned on February 21, 2014, on a Misdemeanor Complaint that charged her with one count of Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree, in violation of Penal Law §§ 240.30(1)(a). The Court set bail and adjourned the case for conversion.

On February 26, 2014, People filed the Supporting Deposition of the complainant. Defendant ultimately posted bail and, after motion practice, the Court ordered a Huntley/Dunaway hearing. On June 9, 2014, the People orally moved to add one count of Penal Law § 240.30(2) and to dismiss the count charging the defendant with violating § 240.30(1)(a), in light of People v. Golb, __N.E.3d__, 2014 WL 1883943 (2014), which held that § 240.30(1)(a) is unconstitutional. The Court granted both motions.

Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss on July 25, 2014. The People responded On August 18, 2014, and the matter has been sub judice since then.

The Misdemeanor Complaint, sworn out by Detective Ronald Bronaugh on February 20, 2014, provides as follows:

I am further informed by Ms. Rodriguez that she recognized the caller's voice to be that of the defendant.

Defendant first claims that the People improperly filed a superseding information in this case, in violation of CPL § 170.65(2). However, the factual premise of this argument is incorrect. The People did not supersede here, they amended. Specifically, they moved to add one count of Penal Law § 240.30(2), then moved to dismiss the count charging § 240.30(1)(a). Given this, the Court will treat defendant's motion as one asserting that the § 240.30(2) count was improperly added.

Criminal Procedural Law § 100.45(3) permits the amendment of the accusatory part of an accusatory instrument prior to trial or the entry of a guilty plea "by addition of a count charging an offense supported by the allegations of the factual part of such information and/or any supporting depositions which may accompany it." That is what occurred here. And, since outlined below, the facts alleged in the instrument make out a facially sufficient prima facie case of a violation of § 240.30(2), that charge was properly added.

The allegation that defendant repeatedly telephoned the complainant and threatened to harm her and her family makes out a facially sufficient prima facie case of a violation of § 240.30(2).

The prima facie case requirement does not necessitate that the information allege facts that would prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Jennings, 69 NY2d 103, 115, 512 N.Y.S2d 652, 657, 504 N.E.2d 1079, 1084 (1986). Rather, the Information need only contain allegations of fact that "give an accused sufficient notice to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense." People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360, 717 N.Y.S2d 88, 91, 740 N.E.2d 233, 236 (2000). A court reviewing for facial insufficiency must subject the allegations in the Information to a "fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading," id., assume that those allegations are true, and consider all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them. CPL §§ 100.40, 100.15; People v Jackson, 18 NY3d 738, 747, 944 N.Y.S2d 715, 721-22, 967 N.E.2d 1160, 1166-67 (2012). See also Casey, 95 NY2d at 360, 717 N.Y.S2d at 91, 740 N.E.2d at 236.

The version of 240.30(2) applicable here made it a Class A Misdemeanor to, "with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person," make "a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues, with no purpose of legitimate communication." This section criminalizes those telephonic communications that lack any "expression of ideas or thoughts other than threats and/or intimidating or coercive utterances." People v. Shack, 86 NY2d 529, 538, 658 N.E.2d 706, 712, 634 N.Y.S.2d 660, 666 (1995). Indeed, the phrase " no legitimate purpose' means the absence of a reason or justification to engage someone, other than to hound, frighten, intimidate or threaten." People v. Stuart, 100 NY2d 412, 428, 797 N.E.2d 28, 41, 765 N.Y.S.2d 1, 14 (2003).

Determining whether an information charging a violation of § 240.30(2) sufficiently pleads the "no legitimate purpose" element requires an examination of the context, timing and number of telephone calls, their content, if any, and whether those calls continued after a demand that they cease. See People v. Mitchell, 24 Misc 3d 1249(A), 899 N.Y.S.2d 62 (Crim Ct Bronx County 2009) (information facially sufficient; defendant called complainant 45 times in a single day, and left 10 threatening messages); People v. Bamba, 15 Misc 3d 1122(A), 841 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Crim Ct New York County) (2007) (three calls to complainant made early in the morning and late at night on same day that complainant told him not to call made out prima facie case that calls lacked legitimate purpose); People v. Coyle, 186 Misc 2d 772, 719 N.Y.S.2d 818 (Dist Ct Nassau County 2000) (repetition and tone of calls, and fact that they continued after complainant told defendant to stop, sufficiently pleads the "no legitimate purpose" element); cf. People v. Thompson, 28 Misc 3d 483, [*3]905 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Crim Ct Kings County 2010) (information that simply alleged that defendant repeatedly called complainant during a range of dates was insufficient; no allegation as to the number of calls, their frequency or timing, or that complainant told defendant to stop).Here, based on the timing, frequency and content of the calls, the Information makes out a prima facie case that defendant placed the calls to the complainant with no legitimate purpose other than to threaten her. Defendant called the complainant three times on the same day, and each call contained a threat of harm to the defendant or her family. One of the calls occurred in the middle of the night, while the other two occurred within minutes of each other later that same afternoon. The Court also notes the impact that these calls had on the complainant. The last of the calls came less than twenty minutes after the second, and the complainant received it while at a police precinct. There is a reasonable inference that the complainant was in the precinct so that she could file a police report about the defendant's recent behavior. In their totality, then, these facts make out a prima facie case of a violation of § 240.30(2).

Finally, the Court agrees with the People that this case is highly similar to People v. Liberato, 180 Misc 2d 199, 689 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Crim Ct NY County 1999), where an Information alleging five threatening calls over a four-day period made out a prima facie case under § 240.30(2). There, as here, the "statements alleged in the ... accusatory instrument appear ato contain only threats and intimidating utterances." Id. Accordingly, here, as in Liberato, the Information is facially sufficient.C. Conclusion

The Count alleging a violation of § 240.30(2) was properly added, and the Information is facially sufficient. The motion to dismiss is accordingly denied.

The motion to dismiss is denied.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.