The People, as limited by their briefs, appeal from so much of an order of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Ralph A. Fabrizio, J.), entered on or about January 25, 2013, as granted that branch of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the count of the accusatory instrument charging defendant with driving while impaired.

Per Curiam.

Order (Ralph A. Fabrizio, J.), entered on or about January 25, 2013, insofar as appealed from, reversed, on the law and the facts, motion denied, the count of the accusatory instrument charging defendant with driving while impaired is reinstated, and the matter remanded for further proceedings thereon.

The sole count of the accusatory instrument at issue on this appeal is driving while impaired (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[1]), a traffic infraction which, as defendant concedes, triggers no statutory speedy trial rights under CPL 30.30 (see People v Gonzalez, 168 Misc 2d 136, 137 [1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 936 [1996]). Nor did the allegations set forth in defendant's motion papers establish a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial (see People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442 [1975]). Although the 21-month delay here involved was not insubstantial, the record indicates that much of the delay resulted from court congestion and defendant's motion practice or
unavailability. Of the limited delay attributable to the People none of it "appear[s] to have been a deliberate attempt by the prosecution to hamper the [defendant] in the preparation of his defense" (People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d at 446; see People v Polite, 16 Misc 3d 18, 19 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 849 [2007] see also People v Marino, 6 AD3d 214 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 643 [2004]). Moreover, defendant was incarcerated for only a few days before he was released on bail, and made no showing that his ability to defend was prejudiced by the delay in prosecution (see People v Williams, 284 AD2d 221 [2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 926 [2001] People v Polite, 16 Misc 3d at 19). While defendant's present loss of driving privileges may well be a relevant factor in evaluating his constitutional speedy trial claim (compare Taranovich at 445, 446, with People v Persaud, 21 Misc 3d 522, 526 [2008] see also People v Vernace, 96 NY2d 886, 888 [2001]), we find it insufficient, on this record and without more, to warrant the drastic measure [*2]of dismissal of the accusatory instrument, bearing in mind that the operation of a motor vehicle is a privilege and not a right (see People v Stock, 88 Misc 2d 1058, 1060 [1976]).

We have considered and rejected defendant's remaining point.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
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Decision Date: April 29, 2014