Matter of Kritzia B. v Onasis P. |
2014 NY Slip Op 00428 [113 AD3d 529] |
January 23, 2014 |
Appellate Division, First Department |
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
In the Matter of Kritzia B., Respondent, v Onasis P., Appellant. |
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Law Offices of Olu Jaiyebo, New York (Olu Jaiyebo of counsel), for
respondent.
Order, Family Court, Bronx County (Alma Cordova, J.), entered on or about August 14, 2012, which, after a hearing, found that respondent committed the family offense of harassment in the first or second degree, and granted an order of protection directing respondent to observe certain conditions of behavior for a period not in excess of two years, unanimously modified, on the law, to vacate the finding of harassment in the first degree, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.
Petitioner established by a fair preponderance of the evidence that respondent committed acts warranting an order of protection in her favor (see Family Ct Act § 832). She established that respondent engaged in a course of conduct alleged in the petition, involving calling, texting and following petitioner over a period of time and appearing outside her house in the early morning hours, that constituted harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26 [3]). The sheer number of calls respondent made provides a reasonable basis on which to infer that he intended to annoy or alarm petitioner (see People v Tiffany, 186 Misc 2d 917, 919 [Crim Ct, NY County 2001]) and that the calls did not serve a legitimate purpose other than to hound her (see People v Stuart, 100 NY2d 412, 428 [2003]).
However, the record does not support the alternate finding of first-degree harassment, since there is no evidence that respondent engaged in a course of conduct or repeatedly committed acts that placed petitioner "in reasonable fear of physical injury" (Penal Law § 240.25; see People v Demisse, 24 AD3d 118 [1st Dept 2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 833 [2006]). Indeed, the court did not find that respondent's acts placed petitioner in fear of physical injury.
In the absence of a clear abuse of discretion, we defer to the trial court's determination of [*2]the permissible scope of cross examination of petitioner (see People v Aska, 91 NY2d 979 [1998]).
We have considered respondent's remaining contentions and find them unavailing. Concur—Tom, J.P., Acosta, Andrias, Freedman and Feinman, JJ.