Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County (Frank P. Nervo, J.), rendered May 23, 2009, convicting her, upon a plea of guilty, of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree, and imposing sentence.

Per Curiam.

Judgment of conviction (Frank P. Nervo, J.), rendered May 23, 2009, affirmed.

We find unavailing defendant's challenge to the facial sufficiency of the accusatory instrument charging her with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511[1][a]; CPL 100.15). The underlying misdemeanor complaint alleged that, at a specified time and location, defendant was operating a motor vehicle; that a computer check of records of the Department of Motor Vehicles revealed that her license had been suspended for failure to pay assessments for prior traffic violations; that six points were charged against her driving record during a period of 18 months; and that a notice was sent to defendant's last known address directing her to pay the minimum assessment amount. These factual allegations were sufficient, for pleading purposes, to establish reasonable cause to believe that defendant was driving "while knowing or having reason to know" that her license was suspended (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511[1][a]; see People v Mayes, 19 Misc 3d 48, 50 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 936 [2008]; People v Brown, 15 Misc 3d 1143[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51129[U] [2007]).

The sentence imposed in connection with defendant's plea bargain was neither harsh nor excessive (see People v Fair, 33 AD3d 558 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 945 [2007]; People v Johnson, 28 Misc 3d 140[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51550[U] [2010]). "Having received the benefit of [her] bargain, defendant should be bound by its terms" (People v Felman, 141 AD2d 889, 890 [1988], lv denied 72 NY2d 918 [1988]; see People v Fair, 33 AD3d at 558).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
Decision Date: July 15, 2011