Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Miriam Cyrulnik, J., on dismissal motion; Alexander Jeong, J., at trial and sentencing), rendered August 19, 2008. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of attempted assault in the third degree and harassment in the second degree. The appeal from the judgment brings up for review an order denying defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument pursuant to CPL 30.30 (1) (b).

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Defendant was charged in a single accusatory instrument with assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00 [1]), attempted assault in the third degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.00 [1]), menacing in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.15) and harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]). The charges of assault in the third degree and menacing in the third degree were later dismissed because the People failed to convert the accusatory instrument to an information with respect to said charges in a timely manner. Following a nonjury trial, defendant was convicted of the remaining two charges.

Section 100.40 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Law states that an information is sufficient on its face when it substantially conforms to the requirements of CPL 100.15, the factual allegations (together with any supporting depositions which may accompany it) provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged in the accusatory part, and the non-hearsay allegations of the factual part of the information and/or of any supporting depositions establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and defendant's commission thereof. The law does not require that the most precise words or phrases which most clearly express the thought be contained in an information, but only that the crime be alleged and the specifics set forth so that a defendant can prepare himself for trial and will not be tried again for the same offense (see People v Konieczny, 2 NY3d 569, 575 [2004]; People v Zambounis, 251 NY 94 [1929]).
After reviewing both pages of the supporting deposition, we find defendant's contention, that the information was facially insufficient because he was not adequately
named in the supporting deposition, to be without merit. When read together, both pages of the [*2]supporting deposition clearly identify defendant.

Furthermore, upon a review of the record, we find that defendant was not denied his statutory right to a speedy trial (CPL 30.30 [1] [b]). Since defendant was charged with at least one misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months and was not charged with a felony, the People were required to be ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of the action (CPL 30.30 [1] [b]). The criminal action was commenced for speedy trial purposes on March 5, 2007, the day on which the accusatory instrument was filed. Defendant was arraigned on the same day, and the minutes indicate that the case was adjourned to March 27, 2007 so that the People could convert the accusatory instrument to an information. Thus, the 22-day adjournment from March 5, 2007 to March 27, 2007 was chargeable to the People.

On March 27, 2007, the Criminal Court noted that the supporting deposition submitted by the People only converted the charges of attempted assault in the third degree and harassment in the second degree. The People declared readiness on the partially converted accusatory instrument, and the court adjourned the case to April 25, 2007 so that the People could fully convert the accusatory instrument. Defendant's assertion for the first time on appeal that this adjournment was chargeable to the People is unpreserved (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71, 78 [1995]).

On the next adjourned date, April 25, 2007, the People requested an adjournment. When the court suggested May 30, 2007 as the adjourned date, defense counsel stated that he was unavailable on May 30, 2007 and requested a further adjournment to June 4, 2007. The People correctly contend that they are only chargeable with 35 days of this adjournment (see People v Williams, 32 AD3d 403 [2006]).

On June 4, 2007, the court dismissed the charges of assault in the third degree and menacing in the third degree, as the People had never converted the accusatory instrument to an information with respect to those charges. The court adjourned the case to July 10, 2007 for trial on the remaining charges. Since the People had previously declared readiness as to the remaining charges, this adjournment, made for court scheduling purposes, and the next adjournment from July 10, 2007 to September 10, 2007, resulting from the fact that there were no parts available for trial, were not chargeable to the People (cf. People v Brown, 69 AD3d 871 [2010]).

On September 10, 2007, the People requested a one-week adjournment, and the court adjourned the case to October 9, 2007. Since the People only requested a one-week adjournment, they are only chargeable with seven days of this adjournment (see Williams, 32 AD3d at 404-405). The next adjournment, from October 9, 2007 to October 11, 2007, was made at defendant's request and, as a result, is not chargeable to the People (see CPL 30.30 [4] [b]).

On October 11, 2007, the court noted that a Russian interpreter was not available and adjourned the case to October 18, 2007. The time period during which an interpreter is not present is not chargeable to the People "because the assignment of an interpreter is the responsibility of the court and not the People' (People v Park, 168 Misc 2d 342, 344-345 [1995]" (People v Chen Lu, 25 Misc 3d 299, 305 [Crim Ct, Richmond County 2009]). On October 15, [*3]2007, defendant moved to dismiss the information pursuant to CPL 30.30 (1) (b).

As we find only 64 days chargeable to the People, it is our view that the Criminal Court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the information pursuant to CPL 30.30 (1) (b).

Defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 491-492 [2008]; People v Williams, 38 AD3d 925 [2007]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1973]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt, of attempted assault in the third degree and harassment in the second degree and to disprove defendant's defense of justification beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, N.Y.S.2d 480 [2007]), we accord great deference to the fact-finder's opportunity at the trial to view the witnesses, hear their testimony, observe their demeanor and assess their credibility (see People v Lane, 7 NY3d 888, 890 [2006]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

The Criminal Court admitted, on the ground that the statements were excited utterances, hearsay testimony of Officer Vitale concerning statements made to him by the complainant to the effect that defendant had hit her. While defendant correctly argues that the statements were not excited utterances (see People v Porco, 71 AD3d 791 [2010]), we find that any error in admitting that testimony was harmless (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [1975).

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Weston, J.P., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: June 29, 2010