People v Wells (Diane) |
2010 NY Slip Op 50393(U) [26 Misc 3d 143(A)] |
Decided on March 11, 2010 |
Appellate Term, First Department |
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, New
York County (Ellen M. Coin, J.), rendered October 5, 2006, after a jury trial, convicting her of
assault in the third degree, and imposing sentence.
Per Curiam.
Judgment of conviction (Ellen M. Coin, J. and jury), rendered October 5, 2006, reversed, on the law and the facts, and the matter remanded for a new trial.
The court erred in delivering a consciousness-of-guilt charge concerning the defendant's
conduct in allegedly refusing to accompany the injured complainant (defendant's mother) and the
complainant's hired caregiver to the hospital the day after the alleged incident. While it may be,
as the People argue, that the conduct attributed to defendant was unusual or "odd," it hardly
constituted the kind of behavior traditionally associated with consciousness of guilt (see e.g.
People v Cintron, 95 NY2d 329, 332 [2000][flight]; People v Moses, 63 NY2d 299,
308 [1984] [false statements or alibis]; People v Alexander, 37 NY2d 202, 204 [1975]
[abandonment or concealment of evidence]).
On this record, and particularly considering the People's own evidence demonstrating the
defendant's reclusive nature and her prior strained relationship with the complainant, no
reasonable inference could be drawn from the defendant's inaction that she was manifesting an
awareness of guilt. "[T]oo many other explanations for defendant's refusal or disinclination to
[join the caregiver in bringing the complainant to the hospital] render it quite speculative as
proof from which the fact of a guilty conscience may be deduced" (People v Feldman,
296 NY 127, 137 [1947]; see also People v Bennett, 79 NY2d 464, 470-471 [1992]). Nor
can it be said, in the context of this trial, that the erroneous charge was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. In light of our remand for a new trial, we do not address defendant's remaining argument.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
Decision Date: March 11, 2010