Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Suzanne M. Mondo, J.), rendered December 13, 2006. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree.

Judgment of conviction reversed on the law and accusatory instrument dismissed.

Following a nonjury trial, defendant was convicted of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [2] [a] [iv]). During the People's case-in-chief, the trial court admitted into evidence, with no objection from defense counsel, defendant's five-page driving abstract; three orders of suspension, dated October 2, 2003; and a certification of defendant's driving abstract signed by Sharon Greene, the principal clerk of certified documents for the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). At the close of the People's case, defense counsel moved for a trial order of dismissal on the ground that the evidence was legally insufficient, arguing that the People failed to establish that defendant knew, or had reason to know, that his license was suspended, a necessary element of the offense charged (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [1] [a]).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish defendant's guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the offense of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree. Although the aforementioned documents were admitted into evidence without objection from defendant, the People were still required to prove that defendant knew, or had reason to know, that his license was suspended. In order to do so, the People sought to establish that the suspension orders were properly mailed to defendant, so that they could then invoke the presumption that the orders were received by defendant (see e.g. [*2]Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 [2001]). However, the testimony on behalf of the People by a New York City employee of the DMV, demonstrated that said employee had no personal knowledge whatsoever of the procedures of the Albany DMV office which handled the mailing of suspension orders. Consequently, the People failed to provide sufficient proof regarding the DMV's standard office practice or procedure designed to ensure that the suspension orders were properly addressed and mailed (see Residential Holding Corp. at 680), did not establish that the suspension orders were mailed to defendant, and failed to prove that defendant knew, or had reason to know, that his license was suspended, as required by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 (1) (a). Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is reversed and the accusatory instrument is dismissed (see CPL 470.20 [2]).

Pesce, P.J., Weston Patterson and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: January 30, 2009