Appeal from an order of the District Court of Suffolk County, First District (Stephen M. Behar, J.), entered March 5, 2007. The order granted defendant's motion to dismiss the information.

Order affirmed.

Defendant was charged with criminal contempt in the second degree (Penal Law § 215.50 [3]). He moved to dismiss the information on the ground that it was jurisdictionally defective in that, inter alia, it failed to allege that he had knowledge of the protective order he was charged with violating. Defendant argued further that the factual allegations contained in the information and the supporting deposition did not establish that the incident occurred at the victim's place of employment in contravention of the order of protection, but rather that the incident occurred at defendant's workplace. The court below granted defendant's motion to dismiss the information on the ground that the allegations contained in the victim's supporting deposition established that the victim went to defendant's place of employment. The court found that defendant's presence at his own place of employment did not violate the order of protection. In our opinion, the order granting defendant's motion to dismiss should be affirmed, but for reasons different than those stated below.

An information must establish, through nonhearsay allegations, every element of the offense charged and defendant's commission thereof (CPL 100.15, 100.40 [1]; People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133 [1987]). This requirement is jurisdictional and nonwaivable, except as to hearsay objections, which must be preserved by appropriate motion before trial (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354 [2000]). The essential elements of the crime of criminal contempt in the second degree, as charged herein, are that a lawful order of the court was in effect and was clearly expressed, that defendant had knowledge of the order of protection and that defendant [*2]intentionally disobeyed it (Matter of McCormick v Axelrod, 59 NY2d 574, 583 [1983]). The factual portion of the instant information and supporting deposition fail to contain any allegation that defendant was served with the order of protection, that he was present in court when it was issued or that he signed the order of protection (see People v Inserra, 4 NY3d 30, 33 [2004]). We note that a certified copy of the order of protection was not annexed to the information (see People v Konieczy, 2 NY3d 569 [2004]). There was, thus, no allegation from which it can be inferred that defendant had knowledge of the order of protection. The omission in this case was not a hearsay pleading error, but rather was an omission of a factual allegation establishing an element of the offense charged. Therefore, the information must be dismissed as jurisdictionally defective (see Penal Law § 215.50 [3]; People v Inserra, 4 NY3d at 33; People v Simeon, NYLJ, Mar. 31, 1997 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists]; People v Jean-Mary, NYLJ, Mar. 21, 1995 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists], lv denied 86 NY2d 782 [1995]; see also People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133 [1987], supra).

In view of the foregoing determination, we pass upon no other issue.

McCabe, J.P., Tanenbaum and Scheinkman, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: April 21, 2008