In this summary holdover proceeding the Respondent defaulted and an inquest was held on February 28, 2007. The proceeding is based on the termination of a non-regulated month-to-month tenancy. The premises are not subject to any rent regulation, and while the subject building is a multiple dwelling it contains less than six residential units. At inquest Petitioner established all allegations in the petition, except for the allegation in paragraph "7" of the petition. Paragraph "7" of the Petition reads as follows "The premises are a multiple dwelling. Multiple Dwelling No. :305693, Agent: Michael Nairne Address: 1 Washington Square Village, New York, New York 10012."

At the inquest Petitioner did not have a copy of the certified multiple dwelling registration, and asked that the Court take Judicial notice of the HPD computer records indicating that the premises had a valid Multiple Dwelling registration on file. The Court did reference the HPD website, which indicated that no registration had been filed since December 5, 1995. Petitioner requested that the Court reserve decision on the Inquest and that the record be kept open for the submission of a certified multiple dwelling registration ("MDR"), which the petitioner did submit shortly thereafter. The certified MDR indicated that the registration had been filed subsequent to the commencement of both the proceeding and the inquest in this matter.

The question thus presented for the Court is must a petitioner allege and establish compliance with MDR requirements in order to state and prove a cause of action for possession in a summary holdover proceeding? As further discussed below, the Court holds based upon recent appellate authority, that it is not necessary for a landlord to allege or prove compliance with MDR requirements in a summary holdover proceeding, which is not rent based and where the only relief sought by the landlord is a judgment of possession.

Requirements regarding the registration of multiple dwellings and the consequences of failing to adhere to these requirements are found in Multiple Dwelling Law  325(2), the [*2]Administrative Code of the City of New York  27-2107(b) and in the Uniform Rules for the New York City Civil Court, 22 NYCRR 208.42 (g).

Previously there was ample case law holding that complaince with MDR requirements were a necessary element that must be alleged and established in holdover proceedings brought pursuant to RPAPL 711. See e.g. Mandel v. Pitkowsky, 102 Misc 2d 478, affd. 76 AD2d 807(1st Dept., 1980); Rosgno Realty v. Braymen, 70 Misc 2d 808 (App. Term, 1st Dept., 1972); Manabhal v. Talavera, N.Y.L.J. Aug. 18, 1993, p.24, col. 3, (Civ. Ct., Kings County).

However, more recently there has been a move away from this interpretation. In Chan v. Adossa, 195 Misc 2d 590 (App. Term, 2nd Dept., 2003), the Appellate Term held ".. (i)t is clear that the requirement that a petition brought pursuant to RPAPL 711 include the MDR allegation was not intended to and cannot affect the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, particularly with respect to holdover proceedings." The Appellate Term further held:

In sum, the language and history of the MDL and Code provisions and of court rule, and the legislative intent which underlies these provisions, leads us to conclude that these provisions were designed only to implement the rent sanction for the lack of a proper MDR statement and not to render such a statement a jurisdictional prerequisite to all RPAPL proceedings. We recognize that our reasoning might well lead to the further conclusion that these provisions not only were not intended to add a jurisdictional prerequisite but also were not intended to add an element to the claim for possession in non-rent based proceedings, only to the claim for rent and/or use and occupancy.

Id. at 612-613.

More recently, in Czerwinski v. Hayes, 8 Misc 3d 89 (App. Term, 2005), the Appellate Term extended its holding from Chan v. Adosa, supra, and held that the "the owner of an unregistered multiple dwelling may maintain a holdover proceeding and may recover possession in such a proceeding where the ground for recovery is not rent-based, although no ancillary money judgment may be sought or awarded." Id. at 94. Czerwinski overruled prior cases holding to the contrary, and referenced the Court of Appeals decision in Matter of Blackgold Realty Corp. v. Milne, 69 NY2d 719 (1987) as further support for the reasoning outlined in its decision.

Thus in the case at bar, petitioner was not required to plead or prove compliance with the registration requirements for multiple dwellings, and the fact that premises was not registered at the time the proceeding was commenced, or at the time of inquest is no bar to the award of a judgment of possession to Petitioner. Therefor after inquest the Court finds that petitioner is entitled to a final judgment of possession as against Cynthia Perkins a/k/a Cynthia Daniels as well as forthwith issuance of the warrant of eviction.This constitutes the decision and order of this Court. [*3]

Dated: March 5, 2007

Brooklyn, New York

_______________________

Hon. Sabrina B. Kraus

J.H.C.