Appeal from an order of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Howard S. Miller, J.), dated October 19, 2004. The order denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment without prejudice to renewal upon proper proof of medical necessity.

Order unanimously reversed without costs, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment granted and matter remanded to the court below for the calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney's fees.

In this action to recover first-party no-fault benefits for medical services provided to its assignor, plaintiff established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by proof that it submitted a claim, setting forth the fact and the amount of the loss sustained, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law §
5106 [a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]; Damadian MRI in Elmhurst v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Misc 3d 128[A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51700[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists]). Contrary to the motion court's determination, plaintiff was not required to submit a physician's affidavit to establish medical necessity as part of its prima facie case, since medical necessity is established in the first instance by proof of submission of the claim form (see Park Neurological Servs. P.C. v GEICO Ins., 4 Misc 3d 95 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2004]). Defendant timely denied the claim on the ground of lack of medical necessity based on a peer review report appended to plaintiff's moving papers, wherein the peer reviewer stated, inter [*2]alia, that "a review of the records reveals no evidence of a thorough physical examination and history having been performed by the referring doctor," and that "[u]ntil such pertinent information is made available for my review reimbursement cannot be suggested."

Where an insurer's denial is based on a peer review, which concludes that there was no medical necessity due to "the lack of sufficient information" upon which the reviewer could make such determination, it fails to set forth an adequate factual basis and medical rationale and is thus deficient (see Park Neurological Servs. P.C. v GEICO Ins., 4 Misc 3d at 96-97), without a showing that defendant sought to obtain such information by means of a request pursuant to the verification procedures (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [b]; 65-3.6 [b]; A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 6 Misc 3d 133[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50114[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). However, "[w]here . . the [peer review] report clearly indicates that the pertinent physician's reports and other documentation had been requested and provided for the purpose of conducting a peer review, and the conclusion of lack of medical necessity is based on the peer reviewer's opinion, in effect, that there was no substantiation in the reports and documents reviewed of medical necessity for the . . . medical treatment provided, the defendant insurer is not obligated to seek further verification . . . and such peer review is sufficient to raise an issue of fact precluding summary judgment in favor of [a] plaintiff [provider]" (Amaze Med. Supply Inc. v Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., 7 Misc 3d 128[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50452[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]).

In the instant case, the denial of claim form was, in effect, based on the lack of sufficient information, which, in the absence of a showing by defendant that it availed itself of the claim verification procedures for the purpose of conducting the peer review, precludes defendant from asserting the defense of lack of medical necessity (A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 6 Misc 3d 133[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50114[U], supra; Park Neurological Servs. P.C. v GEICO Ins., 4 Misc 3d 95, supra; cf. [*3]
Amaze Med. Supply Inc. v Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., 7 Misc 3d 128[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50452[U], supra).

Accordingly, the order is reversed, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted and the matter is remanded to the court below for the calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney's fees pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (a) and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
Decision Date: March 3, 2006