Appeal from an order of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Steven M. Jaeger, J.), entered August 6, 2004. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the motion by defendants Randee J. Stern and Lindsey D. Stern for summary judgment.

Order reversed without costs, motion by defendants Randee J. Stern and Lindsey D. Stern for summary judgment dismissing the complaint granted and complaint dismissed as against all defendants.

Defendants Randee J. Stern and Lindsey D. Stern moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff failed to satisfy the threshold requirement of suffering a serious injury under Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Said defendants submitted affirmations from two doctors who examined the plaintiff on their behalf approximately two years after the accident and found that there was full range of motion in plaintiff's lumbar and cervical spine. The physicians stated that plaintiff's injuries were resolved. This shifted the burden to plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact (see Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955 [1992]).

The plaintiff s opposition failed to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact. [*2]The affirmation of his treating physician was insufficient for this purpose, since it referred to findings made during an examination which was performed immediately after the accident, and did not indicate that the findings expressed therein were based upon any recent examination of the injured plaintiff (see Kauderer v Penta, 261 AD2d 365 [1999]; see also Young v Gonzalez, 19 AD3d 408 [2005]). His affirmation summarizing his findings following his recent examination of plaintiff, performed 2 1/2 years after the accident, did not present a qualitative assessment of plaintiff's condition which had an objective basis and did not compare his limitations of motion of his lumbosacral and cervical spines to the normal function, purpose and use thereof (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345, 350 [2002]). Moreover, plaintiff ended his treatment approximately six months after the accident, and provided no adequate explanation as to why he failed to pursue any treatment for his injuries during the subsequent two-year period (Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566 [2005]). It is noted that plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact as to whether he suffered a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature which prevented him from performing substantially all of the material acts which constituted his usual and daily activities for not less than 90 days during the 180 days following the accident (Rosenbaum v City of New York, 282 AD2d 514 [2001]). Plaintiff testified at his examination before trial that he missed only four to six weeks of work as a result of the accident and did not miss any time from school.

Finally, it is noted that an appellate court may search the record and grant summary judgment in favor of a party even in the absence of an appeal by that party with respect to a cause of action or issue that is the subject of the motion before the court (Dunham v Hilco Constr. Co., 89 NY2d 425 [1996]; Merritt Hill Vineyards v Windy Hgts. Vineyard, 61 NY2d 106 [1984]; Urias v Orange County Agric. Socy., 7 AD3d 515
[2004]; Novoselov v Rizzo, 6 Misc 3d 132[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50104[U] [App Term, 2d
& 11th Jud Dists]). In the case at bar, defendants Montanino and Klein also moved for
summary judgment. A search of the record reveals that said defendants' moving [*3]
papers present the identical issue raised by the appellants in the court below and on this appeal. Consequently, summary judgment is granted in their favor as well and the complaint is dismissed as against all defendants.

Rudolph, P.J., McCabe and Lippman, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 27, 2006