[*1]
World Realty Corp. v Consumer Sales, Inc.
2005 NY Slip Op 51696(U) [9 Misc 3d 136(A)]
Decided on October 20, 2005
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on October 20, 2005
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT: October 20, 2005 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK APPELLATE TERM : 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS PRESENT : RUDOLPH, P.J., ANGIOLILLO and COVELLO, JJ.
2004-979 S C

WORLD REALTY CORP., Respondent,

against

CONSUMER SALES, INC., Tenant, -and- RAYMOND RUSCITO, SR., Appellant.


Appeal by tenant Raymond Ruscito, Sr. from an order of the District Court, Suffolk County (P. Hensley, J.), entered August 10, 2004, which, in effect, denied a motion to enforce a stipulation of settlement in a commercial nonpayment summary proceeding and which declared that landlord "is entitled to a return of its $6,800 check" held by its attorney in escrow.


Order modified by providing that the motion is denied without prejudice to renewal in a proper forum and by striking the declaration that landlord "is entitled to a return of its $6,800 check" held in escrow; as so modified, affirmed without costs.

The parties settled this commercial nonpayment proceeding via a so-ordered stipulation which required, inter alia, that if tenants surrendered the premises broom clean by a date certain, landlord's check for $6,800, held in escrow by landlord's attorney, would be released to tenants. Tenants surrendered the premises three days late and without leaving the exterior grounds broom clean, and landlord withheld the check. Tenants then moved to enforce the stipulation, arguing that landlord had consented to the delay and that, at most, the noncompliance with the broom clean provision was de minimis. After a hearing, the court found that landlord consented to a [*2]surrender delay, but that tenants' noncompliance with the remaining provision was so material as to entitle landlord to a return of the check held in escrow, and declared as much in its order. Tenant Raymond Ruscito, Sr. appeals.

Pursuant to article 6, section 16, subdivision (d) of the New York State Constitution, the jurisdiction of the District Court cannot be "in any respect greater than the jurisdiction" of the New York City Civil Court. "Except for proceedings for the enforcement of housing standards (CCA 110 [a] [4]; 203 [o]) and applications for certain provisional remedies (CCA 209 [b]), the New York City Civil Court may not grant injunctive relief" (Broome Realty Assoc. v Sek Wing Eng, 182 Misc 2d 917 [App Term, 1st Dept 1999]; see Lencal Realty Corp. v Benn, 1 Misc 3d 134[A], 2003 NY Slip Op [*3]
51640[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). Inasmuch as an order directing landlord's attorney to release the funds being held in escrow would have been equitable and injunctive in nature (Stanton v Miller, 58 NY 192, 200 [1874]; Iervolino v Best Built Homes Holding Corp., 56 Misc 2d 343 [1968]; 55 NY Jur 2d, Escrows § 40; see Wren Props. of Nassau v Taveras, NYLJ, Oct. 4, 1999 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]) and not within the limited equitable and injunctive powers of the Civil Court (Goldstein v Stephens, 118 Misc 2d 614 [App Term, 1st Dept 1983]; see North Waterside Redevelopment Co. v Febbraro, 256 AD2d 261 [1st Dept 1998]; Bennigan's of New York, Inc. v Great Neck Plaza, L.P., 223 AD2d 615 [2d Dept 1996]; 19 W. 45th Realty v Darom Elec. Corp., 233 AD2d 184 [1st Dept 1996]; Parker v Rich, 140 AD2d 177 [1st Dept 1988]; Matter of Hellman v Ploss, 46 AD2d 658 [2nd Dept 1974]; Hotel New Yorker Pharmacy v New Yorker Hotel Corp., 40 AD2d 967 [1st Dept 1972]; 1 Carmody-Wait 2d § 2:161; but see Pik Record Co. v Eckstein, 226 AD2d 122 [1st Dept 1996] [allowing the relief without discussing the issue of subject matter jurisdiction]; Future 40th St. Realty v Mirage Night Club, 2002 NY Slip Op 50243[U] [App Term, 1st Dept] [same]), the order would not have been within the jurisdiction of the District Court to make. Tenant is therefore limited to seeking to enforce the stipulation in a court that has equitable jurisdiction or seeking money damages for breach of the stipulation (e.g.
Takayama v Schaefer, 240 AD2d 21 [1998], revg on other grounds NYLJ, July 11, 1996 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]; see generally 105 NY Jur 2d, Trial § 262).

Since the court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the motion, it should not have reached the merits of the motion. To the extent that the court declared that landlord was entitled to the return of the check held in escrow, such declaration was beyond the powers of the court to make (CPLR 3001; see Feierstein v Moser, 306 AD2d 27 [1st Dept 2003]).

Rudolph, P.J., Angiolillo, J., concur.

Covello, J., taking no part.
Decision Date: October 20, 2005