Department of Hous. Preservation & Dev. of the City of N.Y. v 532-536 W. 143rd St. Realty Corp. (2005 NYSlipOp 51246(U))

Department of Hous. Preservation & Dev. of the City of N.Y. v 532-536 W. 143rd St. Realty Corp.

2005 NYSlipOp 51246(U)

Decided on August 5, 2005

Appellate Term, First Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Department of Housing Preservation And Development of the City of New York,NY County Clerk's #570419/04 Petitioner-Appellant,

against

532-536 West 143RD Street Realty Corp., Respondent, -and- STEVEN GREEN, Respondent-Respondent.

Petitioner Department of Housing Preservation and Development of the City of New York appeals from an order of the Civil Court, New York County, entered March 9, 2004 (Kevin C. McClanahan, J.) which granted a motion by respondent Steven Green to vacate a default judgment to the extent of setting the matter down for a traverse on the issue of service.

Order entered March 9, 2004 (Kevin C. McClanahan, J.) reversed, with $10 costs, [*2]and respondent Green's motion to vacate the default judgment is denied.

No basis is shown to vacate the March 31, 2000 default judgment issued against respondent Green in this enforcement proceeding brought by the petitioning agency (DHPD) to compel a cure of housing code violations. Jurisdiction over respondent Green — the registered managing agent of the subject West 143rd Street building premises — was validly obtained through the process server's repeated, but unsuccessful attempts at personal service, followed by substituted service upon respondent at both the business and home addresses specified by him on the property registration statement on file with petitioner (see CCA 110[m][2]). Having affirmatively provided petitioner with statutorily required contact addresses (see Administrative Code of the City of NY, § 27-2098[3]) and having taken no steps to amend the registration information (Code § 27-2100), respondent may not now be heard to argue that service at the registered addresses was improper (see generally, Toure v Harrison, 6 AD2d 270, 271 [2004]). Further, it does not inure to respondent's benefit that he improperly referenced a post-office box in lieu of a business address in the requisite registration statement (see Goldstein v Perez, 133 Misc 2d 303 [1986]). Although personal service at the post-office box was, as respondent now puts it, "destined to fail," that circumstance was of respondent's own making and does not serve to invalidate the statutorily authorized method of service used here by petitioner. Nor has respondent demonstrated a meritorious defense sufficient to vindicate his long-standing default.

We note finally that the order directing a hearing on the jurisdiction issue is appealable as of right (see General Elec. Co. v Rabin, 177 AD2d 354, 356-357 [1991]).

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.
Decision Date: August 05, 2005