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For August 2, 2013 through August 8, 2013, the following preliminary appeal statements were filed:

GONNARD, MATTER OF v GUIDO (108 AD3d 709):
2nd Dept. App. Div. order of 7/24/13; affirmance; sua sponte examination whether the appeal from the Family Court order entered 12/21/12 is timely, whether that order finally determines the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution, and whether a direct appeal from that order lies pursuant to CPLR 5601(b)(2); PARENT, CHILD AND FAMILY - CUSTODY - WHETHER FAMILY COURT ERRED IN GRANTING MOTHER'S PETITION FOR A CHANGE OF LEGAL AND RESIDENTIAL CUSTODY OF THE PARTIES' CHILD - ATTORNEYS' FEES; Family Court, Westchester County, among other things, granted mother's petition to modify a prior custody order so as to award the mother sole legal and residential custody of the subject child, and awarded attorneys' fees to mother in an amount to be determined; App. Div. affirmed.

GRUBSTEIN (HOWARD), PEOPLE v (37 Misc 3d 142[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 52285[U]):
App. Term 9th and 10th Judicial Districts order of 12/10/12; reversal; leave to appeal granted by Read, J., 7/26/13; CRIMES - PLEA OF GUILTY - MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA TO DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED (DWI) ON THE GROUND, AMONG OTHERS, THAT THE COURT DID NOT ADVISE THE SELF- REPRESENTED DEFENDANT THAT A SUBSEQUENT DWI OFFENSE COULD BE CHARGED AS A FELONY - MOTION TREATED AS A MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UNDER CPL 440.10 - WHETHER THE APPELLATE TERM ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT CPL 440.10 (2) (c) APPLIED TO BAR DEFENDANT'S CLAIM BECAUSE OF HIS FAILURE TO CHALLENGE THE PLEA ON DIRECT APPEAL; Justice Court, Town of Tuxedo, Orange County, granted defendant's motion to vacate a judgment convicting defendant, upon his guilty plea, of driving while intoxicated; App. Term reversed, and denied defendant's motion to vacate the judgment of conviction.

HAHN, MATTER OF v WILLIAMS (107 AD3d 1346):
3rd Dept. App. Div. judgment of 6/27/13; sua sponte examination whether a substantial constitutional question is directly involved to support an appeal as of right; LICENSES - FIREARMS - CHALLENGE TO DETERMINATION REVOKING PETITIONER'S PISTOL PERMIT UPON THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER'S DEMEANOR IN THE COURTROOM DEMONSTRATED THAT HE DID NOT POSSESS THE TEMPERAMENT, DEMEANOR AND JUDGMENT NECESSARY TO HAVE SUCH A PERMIT - ALLEGED VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S RIGHTS UNDER THE SECOND AMENDMENT OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION; App. Div. confirmed respondent's determination revoking petitioner's pistol license.

JEFFERSON v STUBBE (107 AD3d 1424):
4th Dept. App. Div. order of 6/7/13; affirmance; sua sponte examination whether the order appealed from finally determines the action within the meaning of the Constitution and whether a substantial constitutional question is directly involved to support an appeal as of right; COSTS - POOR PERSONS - CHALLENGE TO APPELLATE DIVISION ORDER THAT AFFIRMED A SUPREME COURT ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED AS A POOR PERSON, UPON THE GROUND THAT THE ACTION DOES NOT HAVE "ARGUABLE MERIT"; Supreme Court, Monroe County, denied plaintiff's motion for permission to proceed as a poor person; App. Div. affirmed.

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY v ALLIANZ (104 AD3d 581):
1st Dept. App. Div. order of 3/26/13; modification; leave to appeal granted by App. Div., 7/23/13; INSURANCE - DISCLAIMER OF COVERAGE - WHETHER THE DUTY TO DISCLAIM AS SOON AS REASONABLY POSSIBLE SET FORTH IN INSURANCE LAW § 3420(d) APPLIES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROPERTY DAMAGE CLAIMS - WHETHER THE APPELLATE DIVISION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT EXISTED AS TO WHETHER INSURERS WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO DISCLAIM COVERAGE BASED UPON THE INSUREDS' LATE NOTICE OF AN OCCURRENCE; Supreme Court, New York County, upon renewal, granted so much of the motions for summary judgment by defendants American Reinsurance Company, Century Indemnity Insurance Company and the Northern Assurance Company of America as sought a declaration that they have no duty to defend or indemnify plaintiffs regarding environmental damage claims on the Bay Shore manufactured gas plant site, due to plaintiffs' failure to provide timely notice under the respective policies, but denied the motions as to the Hempstead manufactured gas plant site; App. Div. modified to deny the motions as to the Bay Shore manufactured gas plant site and vacate the declaration.

MALDONADO (JOSE), PEOPLE v (100 AD3d 657):
2nd Dept. App. Div. order of 11/7/12; affirmance; leave to appeal granted by Lippman, Ch. J., 8/6/13; CRIMES - MURDER - DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER - WHETHER LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTED DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER WHERE THERE WAS TESTIMONY THAT DEFENDANT TRIED TO AVOID HURTING ANYONE WHEN ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE FROM POLICE AND WAS REMORSEFUL AFTERWARD; Supreme Court, Kings County, convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of murder in the second degree, unlawful fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle in the first degree, and grand larceny in the fourth degree, and imposed sentence; App. Div. affirmed.

MANGANO v STATE OF NEW YORK (107 AD3d 956):
2nd Dept. App. Div. order of 6/26/13; reversal; sua sponte examination whether a substantial constitutional question is directly involved to support an appeal as of right; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - HOME RULE POWERS - METROPOLITAN COMMUTER TRANSPORTATION MOBILITY TAX LAW (MTA EMPLOYER TAX LAW) (CHAPTER 25, PART C, § 1 OF THE LAWS OF 2009)(TAX LAW ARTICLE 23) - WHETHER THE APPELLATE DIVISION CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE MTA EMPLOYER TAX LAW IS A SPECIAL LAW SERVING A SUBSTANTIAL STATE CONCERN, SO THAT A HOME RULE MESSAGE WAS NOT REQUIRED BEFORE ITS ENACTMENT; Supreme Court, Nassau County, in an 8/23/12 order, among other things, granted the motions of certain plaintiffs for summary judgment on the complaint to the extent of declaring Tax Law article 23 unconstitutional and denied the cross motions of certain defendants for summary judgment declaring Tax Law article 23 constitutional and, in a 10/1/12 judgment, declared that Tax Law article 23 is unconstitutional; App. Div. reversed the judgment, denied the motion of certain plaintiffs for summary judgment on the complaint, granted those branches of the cross motions that were for summary judgment declaring that Tax Law article 23 is constitutional, modified the Supreme Court order accordingly, and declared that Tax Law article 23 is constitutional.

MYERS (ARIEL), PEOPLE v (105 AD3d 1250):
3rd Dept. App. Div. order of 4/25/13; affirmance; leave to appeal granted by Garry, J., 6/21/13; Rule 500.11 review pending; CRIMES - EVIDENCE - PRIOR BAD ACTS - WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE TESTIMONY REGARDING PRIOR UNCHARGED CRIME, UNDER THE "IDENTITY" EXCEPTION SET FORTH IN MOLINEUX; County Court, Rensselaer County, convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of assault in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree; App. Div. affirmed.

SCHENK v STATEN ISLAND UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL (108 AD3d 661):
2nd Dept. App. Div. order of 7/17/13; affirmance; sua sponte examination whether the order appealed from finally determines the action within the meaning of the Constitution and whether a substantial constitutional question is directly involved to support an appeal as of right; JUDGMENTS - DEFAULT JUDGMENT - VACATUR - WHETHER THE APPELLATE DIVISION ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT SUPREME COURT PROVIDENTLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION, IN EFFECT, TO VACATE AN ORDER ENTERED ON HER DEFAULT BECAUSE SHE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE A POTENTIALLY MERITORIOUS OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION BY CERTAIN DEFENDANTS TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO CPLR 3126; Supreme Court, Richmond County, denied plaintiff's motion denominated, among other things, as one for leave to reargue; App. Div. affirmed.

For August 9, 2013 through August 15, 2013, the following preliminary appeal statements were filed:

ALLEN (TERRELL), PEOPLE v (105 AD3d 754):
2nd Dept. App. Div. order of 4/3/13; modification; leave to appeal granted by Lippman, Ch. J., 7/25/13; CRIMES - VERDICT - DUPLICITY - WHETHER THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL ALLOWED THE JURY TO CONVICT DEFENDANT OF A CRIME DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE FOR WHICH HE WAS INDICTED - WHETHER A DUPLICITY ERROR THAT IS NOT OBVIOUS ON THE FACE OF THE INDICTMENT MUST BE PRESERVED FOR APPELLATE REVIEW; Supreme Court, Queens County, convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of murder in the second degree, attempted murder in the second degree, two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and menacing in the second degree, and sentenced him to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 25 years to life on the conviction of murder in the second degree, a determinate term of imprisonment of 25 years followed by a period of 5 years of postrelease supervision on the conviction of attempted murder in the second degree, to run consecutively with the sentence imposed upon the conviction of murder in the second degree and concurrently with the sentences imposed upon the convictions on all other counts, determinate terms of imprisonments of 15 years followed by a period of 5 years of postrelease supervision on the convictions of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, to run concurrently with the sentences imposed upon the convictions of all other counts, and a definite term of imprisonment of one year on the conviction of menacing in the second degree, to run concurrently with the sentences imposed upon the convictions of all other counts; App. Div. modified by directing that all the terms of imprisonment shall run concurrently with each other.

BRANIC INTERNATIONAL REALTY CORP. v PITT (106 AD3d 178):
1st Dept. App. Div. order of 4/16/13; reversal; leave to appeal granted by App. Div., 8/6/13; LANDLORD AND TENANT - RENT REGULATION - STATUS OF PERSON ELIGIBLE FOR SUBSIDIZED HOUSING BENEFITS ("ELIGIBLE PERSON") AND PLACED IN A HOTEL ROOM PURSUANT TO AGREEMENT BETWEEN HOTEL OWNER AND MUNICIPAL SERVICES AGENCY, WHICH THEREAFTER EXPIRED - WHETHER ELIGIBLE PERSON WAS A "PERMANENT TENANT" OF HOTEL WITHIN THE MEANING OF RENT STABILIZATION CODE (9 NYCRR 2520.6[j]) SOLELY BECAUSE HE CONTINUOUSLY RESIDED IN HOTEL ROOM FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS - WHETHER AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER AND MUNICIPAL SERVICES AGENCY WAS A LEASE THAT EXEMPTED THE HOTEL ROOM FROM THE RENT STABILIZATION CODE (9 NYCRR 2520.11[b]); Civil Court, New York County, granted respondent's motion for summary judgment dismissing the petition and denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment on its claim for possession; App. Term reversed, denied respondent's motion and granted petitioner's motion; App. Div. reversed, granted respondent's motion and denied petitioner's motion.

KORELIS v CONRIV REALTY CORP.:
Supreme Court, New York County stipulation of 9/4/96; sua sponte examination whether appellant is an aggrieved party within the meaning of CPLR 5511, the 9/4/96 stipulation of settlement is an appealable paper within the meaning of CPLR 5512(a), the appeal was timely taken, and any basis exists for a direct appeal from the stipulation of settlement pursuant to CPLR 5601(b)(2); STIPULATIONS - STIPULATION IN OPEN COURT - CHALLENGE TO STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT ENTERED IN OPEN COURT; 9/4/96 Stipulation of Settlement entered on the record before Supreme Court, New York County.