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For May 2, 2014 through May 8, 2014, the following preliminary appeal statements were filed:

DIAL, MATTER OF v RHEA (111 AD3d 720):
2nd Dept. App. Div. order of 11/13/13; affirmance; leave to appeal granted by App. Div., 4/29/14; LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - FOUR-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - CHALLENGE TO TERMINATION OF SECTION 8 SUBSIDY - WHETHER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGINS TO RUN UPON A SECTION 8 BENEFICIARY'S RECEIPT OF A NOTICE OF DEFAULT LETTER ONLY WHERE THE NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY STRICTLY COMPLIES WITH THE THREE-STEP NOTICE PROCEDURE SET FORTH IN THE FIRST PARTIAL CONSENT JUDGMENT IN WILLIAMS v NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTH. (SDNY 1984); Supreme Court, Kings County, granted a CPLR article 78 petition, annulled a determination terminating petitioner's benefits under section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, directed reinstatement of petitioner's subsidy retroactive to 9/1/07, directed the payment of any rent subsidy amount that was not issued because of the termination, and denied motion by the Chairman of the New York City Housing Authority to dismiss the petition on the ground that the proceeding was time- barred; App. Div. affirmed.

KIMMEL v STATE OF NEW YORK (115 AD3d 1323):
4th Dept. App. Div. order of 3/28/14; affirmance; sua sponte examination whether the App. Div. order entered 3/28/14, which remitted the matter to Supreme Court to determine the amount of reasonable attorney's fees and disbursements to be awarded to plaintiff and her former counsel in defending the appeal, finally determines the action within the meaning of the Constitution; STATE - EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT (EAJA) (CPLR ARTICLE 86) - WHETHER PREVAILING PARTY IN A SEX DISCRIMINATION ACTION FOR MONEY DAMAGES AGAINST THE STATE IS ELIGIBLE TO RECOVER ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES UNDER THE EAJA; Supreme Court, Monroe County, denied those parts of the motions of plaintiff and her former counsel for attorneys' fees and expenses pursuant to CPLR article 86 and granted the motions of defendants to quash the subpoenas duces tecum issued to their attorneys; App. Div. reversed that part of the 5/18/09 Supreme Court order denying those parts of the motions of plaintiff and plaintiff's former counsel for attorneys' fees and expenses pursuant to the EAJA, denied defendants' motions to quash subpoenas duces tecum in part, directed defendants to produce only those documents pertaining to them, and remitted to Supreme Court to determine whether plaintiff and/or her former counsel are entitled to fees and expenses under the EAJA and, if so, the reasonable amount of those fees and expenses; Supreme Court awarded attorneys' fees and expenses to plaintiff and former counsel for plaintiff; App. Div. affirmed and remitted to Supreme Court to determine the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees and disbursements to be awarded to plaintiff and former counsel in defending the appeal.

RIDGE v GOLD (115 AD3d 1263):
4th Dept. App. Div. order of 3/21/14; reversal with dissents; sua sponte examination whether the order appealed from finally determines the action within the meaning of the Constitution and whether any cross claims by or against defendant are pending; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL - PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD FINDING AS TO CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP - IDENTITY OF ISSUE - WHETHER THE APPELLATE DIVISION ERRED IN AWARDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT CONTRACTOR ON THE GROUND THAT THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD DETERMINED THAT NO ACCIDENT OCCURRED AND THAT SUCH DETERMINATION WAS ENTITLED TO COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT; Supreme Court, Erie County, denied defendant Braymiller's motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint and the separate motion by defendants Alice Gold and Susan Griesman for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint; App. Div. reversed the order insofar as appealed from, granted defendant Braymiller's motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint, and dismissed plaintiff's complaint as against Braymiller.

WISOFF v CITY OF SCHENECTADY, NEW YORK (116 AD3d 1187):
3rd Dept. App. Div. order of 4/10/14; affirmance; sua sponte examination whether so much of the App. Div. order as affirms the Supreme Court order denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration finally determines the action within the meaning of the Constitution and whether a substantial constitutional question is directly involved to support an appeal as of right; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE - WHETHER THE RENTAL CERTIFICATE ORDINANCE IN THE SCHENECTADY CITY CODE VIOLATES AN OWNER OF RENTAL PROPERTY'S RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM UNWARRANTED AND UNREASONABLE SEARCHES UNDER NY CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, § 12; Supreme Court, Schenectady County, among other things, granted defendant's cross motion for summary judgment declaring the Rental Certificate Ordinance in the Code of the City of Schenectady constitutional under Article I, section 12 of the New York State Constitution; Supreme Court then denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration; App. Div. affirmed.

WRIGHT (HOWARD S.), PEOPLE v (115 AD3d 1257):
4th Dept. App. Div. order of 3/21/14; affirmance with dissents; leave to appeal granted by Fahey, J., 4/28/14; CRIMES - MURDER - SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE - WHETHER EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH INTENTIONAL MURDER - CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; CLAIMED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT - STATEMENTS MADE BY PROSECUTOR DURING OPENING STATEMENT AND SUMMATION CONCERNING DNA EVIDENCE; CLAIMED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL - DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENTS; Supreme Court, Monroe County, convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of murder in the second degree; App. Div. affirmed.

For May 9, 2014 through May 15, 2014, the following preliminary appeal statements were filed:

ACA FINANCIAL GUARANTY CORP. v GOLDMAN, SACHS & CO. (106 AD3d 494):
1st Dept. App. Div. order of 5/14/13; reversal with dissents; leave to appeal granted by App. Div., 5/1/14; FRAUD - FRAUD IN INDUCEMENT - ALLEGATION THAT PLAINTIFF WAS FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED TO ISSUE A FINANCIAL GUARANTY FOR A PORTION OF AN INVESTMENT BY MISREPRESENTATION THAT A NONPARTY HEDGE FUND WAS TAKING A LONG POSITION IN THE INVESTMENT WHEN SUCH FUND ACTUALLY WAS A SHORT SELLER - WHETHER THE APPELLATE DIVISION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILED TO ESTABLISH JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE PLAINTIFF DID NOT PLEAD THAT "IT EXERCISED DUE DILIGENCE BY INQUIRING ABOUT THE NONPUBLIC INFORMATION REGARDING THE HEDGE FUND WITH WHICH IT WAS IN CONTACT PRIOR TO ISSUING THE FINANCIAL GUARANTY, OR THAT IT INSERTED THE APPROPRIATE PROPHYLACTIC PROVISION TO ENSURE AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF MISREPRESENTATION"; Supreme Court, New York County, denied defendant's motion to dismiss causes of action for fraudulent inducement and fraudulent concealment; App. Div. reversed, granted defendant's motion to dismiss the causes of action for fraudulent inducement and fraudulent concealment and directed the clerk to enter judgment dismissing the first amended complaint.

BROWN & BROWN, INC. v JOHNSON (115 AD3d 162, 115 AD3d 175):
4th Dept. App. Div. orders of 2/7/14; modification; leave to appeal granted by App. Div., 5/2/14; EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS - RESTRICTIVE COVENANT IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT - CLAIMED BREACHES OF NONSOLICITATION AND NONINDUCEMENT CLAUSES OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT - WHETHER THE FLORIDA CHOICE-OF-LAW CLAUSE IN THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT IS "TRULY OBNOXIOUS" TO NEW YORK PUBLIC POLICY AND UNENFORCEABLE - WHETHER NONSOLICITATION CLAUSE COULD BE PARTIALLY ENFORCED; Supreme Court, Erie County, granted, in part, defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing part of the first cause of action, dismissing the second and third causes of action, and denied the motion as to the fourth cause of action; App. Div. modified by granting that part of defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint with respect to the non-solicitation covenant in the first cause of action and denying the remainder of the motion.

CANDINO, MATTER OF v STARPOINT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT (115 AD3d 1170):
4th Dept. App. Div. order of 3/21/14; reversal with dissents; Rule 500.11 review pending; SCHOOLS - NOTICE OF CLAIM - LATE NOTICE - VIRUS ALLEGEDLY CONTRACTED AT SCHOOL WRESTLING TOURNAMENT - WHETHER THE APPELLATE DIVISION ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT CLAIMANT FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT SCHOOL RESPONDENTS HAD "ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE" OF THE ESSENTIAL FACTS CONSTITUTING HIS CLAIM; Supreme Court, Erie County, granted claimant's application for leave to serve a late notice of claim; App. Div. reversed, denied claimant's application pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e(5) for leave to serve a late notice of claim.

CASSATA v STATE OF NEW YORK (115 AD3d 1209):
4th Dept. App. Div. order of 3/21/14; reversal; sua sponte examination whether a substantial constitutional question is directly involved to support an appeal as of right; JUDGES - JUDICIAL SALARIES - PAY DISPARITY BETWEEN MUNICIPALITIES IN SAME COUNTY - WHETHER THE APPELLATE DIVISION ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT A RATIONAL BASIS EXISTS FOR THE SALARY DISPARITY BETWEEN TONAWANDA CITY COURT AND BUFFALO CITY COURT JUDGES SET FORTH IN JUDICIARY LAW § 221-i, AND THAT THE STATUTE THEREFORE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS OF A TONAWANDA CITY COURT JUDGE; Supreme Court, Niagara County, among other things, granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and declared that the pay disparity between City Court judges in the City of Buffalo and the City of Tonawanda, as set forth in Judiciary Law § 221-i, violates plaintiff's equal protection rights, and denied the cross motion for summary judgment by defendants State of New York and the Comptroller of the State of New York; App. Div. reversed, denied plaintiff's motion, granted the cross motion by the State of New York and the Comptroller of the State of New York insofar as they seek a declaration in their favor, and declared that the salary disparity between City Court judges in Buffalo and Tonawanda, set forth in Judiciary Law § 221-i, is constitutional.

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, MATTER OF v NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION (111 AD3d 737):
2nd Dept. App. Div. order 11/13/13; modification; leave to appeal granted by Court of Appeals, 5/1/14; ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION - STATE POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM PERMIT - STATEWIDE GENERAL PERMIT FOR STORM WATER DISCHARGES FROM MUNICIPAL SEPARATE STORM SEWER SYSTEMS - WHETHER THE APPELLATE DIVISION CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE GENERAL PERMIT AT ISSUE DOES NOT VIOLATE 33 USC § 1342 (a) (1), 33 USC § 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii), ECL 17-0805 (1) (a) (ix), ECL 17-0808 (3) (c), ECL 17-0811(5), ECL 17-0813, OR 6 NYCRR 750-1.14; App. Div., in a hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding to review a determination of NYS DEC approving the issuance of state pollutant discharge elimination system general permit GP-0-10-002 for storm water discharges from municipal separate storm sewer systems, and an action for a judgment declaring that state pollutant discharge elimination system general permit GP-0-10-002 is contrary to certain state and federal laws, (1) affirmed so much of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, order and judgment entered 1/10/12, as amended 4/18/12, as was in favor of respondent/defendant NYS DEC and against petitioners/plaintiffs, in effect, declaring that the general permit did not fail to ensure that small municipalities monitored their storm water discharges and, thus, was not in violation of 33 USC § 1318(a), and did not fail to provide for public hearings on proposed storm water management plans and proposed watershed improvement strategies and, thus, was not in violation of 33 USC § 1251(e); (2) reversed so much of the order and judgment, 1/10/12, as amended 4/18/12, as was in favor of petitioners/plaintiffs and against respondent/defendant, denied that branch of the petition which was to annul the determination; and (3) remitted the matter to Supreme Court for entry of an appropriate amended judgment dismissing the proceeding and declaring, among other things, that the general permit did not create an impermissible self-regulatory system that failed to ensure that small municipalities reduced their pollutant discharges to the "maximum extent practicable," as required by 33 USC § 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) and ECL 17-0808 (3) (c), did not fail to specify compliance schedules with respect to effluent limitations and water quality standards, as required by 6 NYCRR 750-1.14, and did not unlawfully fail to provide an opportunity for public hearings on proposed notices of intent before they were submitted to it, as required by 33 USC § 1342(a)(1) and ECL 17-0805 (1) (a) (ix).

155 WEST 21ST STREET, LLC, MATTER OF v McMULLAN (112 AD3d 526):
1st Dept. App. Div. order of 12/19/13; affirmance; leave to appeal granted by Court of Appeals, 5/6/14; Rule 500.11 review pending; ATTORNEY AND CLIENT - FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT - WHETHER THE APPELLATE DIVISION ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONERS AND THEIR ATTORNEY ENGAGED IN FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT WARRANTING THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS BY INITIATING A SPECIAL PROCEEDING AT SUPREME COURT PURSUANT TO RPAPL 881 FOR AN ORDER GRANTING THEM A LICENSE TO PASS THROUGH CERTAIN PROPERTY ON THE SAME DAY THAT THE APPELLATE DIVISION DENIED THEIR MOTION TO VACATE A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PENDING RESOLUTION OF THEIR APPEAL OF THE SUPREME COURT ORDER PRELIMINARILY ENJOINING THEM FROM ENTERING THAT PROPERTY; Supreme Court, New York County, denied respondent McMullan's cross motion for sanctions; App. Div. reversed, granted respondent McMullan's motion for sanctions, with sanctions to be imposed upon petitioners and their counsel in the amount of $10,000 each, and awarded reasonable attorneys' fees to respondent McMullan, payable by petitioners and their counsel, in the amount to be determined on remand; Supreme Court awarded attorneys' fees against petitioner; App. Div. affirmed.

PEOPLE ex rel. DeLIA, ON BEHALF OF S.S. v MUNSEY (117 AD3d 84):
2nd Dept. App. Div. order of 3/19/14; reversal; sua sponte examination whether a substantial constitutional question is directly involved to support an appeal as of right and whether the issues presented have become moot; HABEAS CORPUS - INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT - PATIENT'S RIGHT TO IMMEDIATE RELEASE WHERE HOSPITAL FILES AN INVOLUNTARY RETENTION APPLICATION AFTER EXPIRATION OF THE INITIAL RETENTION PERIOD - WHETHER MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 33.15(b) REQUIRES SUPREME COURT TO CONDUCT AN EXAMINATION INTO PATIENT'S ALLEGED MENTAL DISABILITY AND RETENTION BEFORE GRANTING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN A PROCEEDING BROUGHT PURSUANT TO CPLR ARTICLE 70; Supreme Court, Queens County, in a habeas corpus proceeding brought under CPLR article 70 by the Mental Hygiene Legal Service on behalf of a person admitted to Holliswood Hospital as an involuntary patient, in effect, granted the writ, without a hearing, and directed that the patient be released; App. Div. reversed.

SOWELL, MATTER OF v FISCHER (116 AD3d 1308):
3rd Dept. App. Div. order of 4/24/14; affirmance; sua sponte examination whether a substantial constitutional question is directly involved to support an appeal as of right; PRISONS AND PRISONERS - DISCIPLINE OF INMATES - WHETHER SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE DECISION OF THE HEARING OFFICER TO REMOVE PETITIONER FROM HIS TIER III PRISON DISCIPLINARY HEARING; DUE PROCESS; CLAIMED BIAS OF HEARING OFFICER; Supreme Court, Albany County, dismissed petitioner's CPLR article 78 application to review respondent's determination finding petitioner guilty of violating certain prison disciplinary rules; App. Div. affirmed.

STATE OF NEW YORK, MATTER OF v ROBERT F. (113 AD3d 691):
2nd Dept. App. Div. order of 1/15/14; affirmance; leave to appeal granted by Court of Appeals, 5/6/14; CRIMES - SEX OFFENDERS - CIVIL COMMITMENT OR SUPERVISION - WHETHER SUPREME COURT ERRED BY PERMITTING THE STATE'S EXPERT TO PROVIDE REBUTTAL TESTIMONY AT A DISPOSITIONAL HEARING VIA TWO-WAY VIDEO CONFERENCE - WHETHER THE HEARING COURT IS REQUIRED TO MAKE A FINDING OF "GOOD CAUSE" OR "EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES" BEFORE PERMITTING A REBUTTAL WITNESS TO TESTIFY VIA TWO-WAY VIDEO CONFERENCE INSTEAD OF IN PERSON; Supreme Court, Kings County, in a proceeding pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 10 for the civil management of Robert F., upon a finding, made after a jury trial, that Robert F. suffers from a mental abnormality as defined in Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03(i), and upon a determination, made after a dispositional hearing, that he is a dangerous sex offender requiring civil confinement, in effect, granted the petition and directed that Robert F. be committed to a secure treatment facility for care, treatment, and control until such time as he no longer requires confinement; App. Div. affirmed.