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For February 2, 2018 through February 8, 2018, the following preliminary appeal
statements were filed:
BAKER v LISCONISH (156 AD3d 1324):
4th Dept. App. Div. order of 12/22/17; modification with dissents; sua sponte
examination whether the order appealed from finally determines the action within the
meaning of the Constitution; Motor Vehicles--Owners's Consent to Use of Vehicle--
Whether triable issue of fact exists as to defendant Lisconish's permissive use of
defendant Santo Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc. (Santo)'s vehicle--Vehicle and
Traffic Law § 388; respondeat superior liability; summary judgment; Supreme Court,
Oswego County, granted Santo's summary judgment motion, dismissed the complaint as
to Santo, and denied the cross motions of plaintiff and Lisconish for summary judgment
on the issue of permissive use; App. Div. modified by denying Santo's summary judgment
motion, reinstated the complaint against Santo, and affirmed as modified.
MANKO v LENOX HILL HOSPITAL (2012 NY Slip Op 65522[U]): ( 2012 NY Slip Op
65523[U]): ( 2012 NY
Slip Op 76155[U]): (
2012 NY Slip Op 84496[U]): ( 2013 NY Slip Op 72395[U]):
2nd Dept. App. Div. orders of 2/28/12, 6/14/12, 9/14/12 and 5/1/13; denial of
various motions except motion to enlarge time to perfect appeal; sua sponte examination
whether the orders appealed from finally determine the action within the meaning of the
Constitution and whether a substantial constitutional question is directly involved to
support an appeal as of right; Appeal--Appellate Division--Denial of motions seeking
various relief; App. Div. (2/28/12 order), among other things, denied as unnecessary a
motion for leave to appeal from a 10/7/11 order of Supreme Court, Kings County;
(6/14/12 order) denied appellant's motion, among other things, to direct respondent to
retain and preserve appellant's medical records, bills and x-rays for the years 2002-2003,
pending hearing and determination of appeals from three Supreme Court orders; (9/14/12
order) granted appellant's motion to enlarge the time to perfect an appeal from the 10/7/11
Supreme Court order; and (5/1/13 order) denied appellant's motion, among other things,
to reinstate an appeal from the 10/7/11 Supreme Court order.
For February 9, 2018 through February 15, 2018, the following preliminary appeal
statements were filed:
ADAMO v CITY OF ALBANY (156 AD3d 1017):
3rd Dept. App. Div. order of 12/7/17; affirmance; sua sponte examination whether
a substantial constitutional question is directly involved to support an appeal as of right;
Contracts--Breach or Performance of Contract--Whether amended complaint stated a
claim that defendant City of Albany (the City) breached collective bargaining agreements
with police officer unions purportedly granting union retirees and their spouses, including
plaintiffs, reimbursement of Medicare Part B premiums; motions and orders--motion to
dismiss--whether Supreme Court erred by considering the City's affidavit without treating
the City's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3211
(c); Supreme Court, Albany County, granted defendant City's motion to dismiss the
amended complaint and dismissed the amended complaint; App. Div. affirmed.
HYRA, MATTER OF v JACOBELLIS (148 AD3d 710):
2nd Dept. App. Div. order of 3/1/17; affirmance; sua sponte examination whether
a substantial constitutional question is directly involved to support an appeal as of right;
Proceeding Against Body or Officer--Mandamus--Whether CPLR article 78 proceeding,
which sought to compel respondent Justice of the Carmel Town Court to reinstate certain
criminal charges formerly pending in that court, was properly dismissed as time barred;
alleged equal protection violation and deprivation of the right to the effective assistance
of counsel; Supreme Court, Putnam County, denied the petition and dismissed the CPLR
article 78 proceeding; App. Div. affirmed.
MASON H., MATTER OF (154 AD3d 1129):
3rd Dept. App. Div. order of 10/19/17; affirmance; leave to appeal granted by
Court of Appeals, 1/16/18; Rule 500.11 review pending; Parent, Child and Family--
Termination of Parental Rights--Whether petitioner failed to meet its burden of proof that
respondent abandoned the subject child; petitioner's only witness addressed respondent's
failure to communicate with the child, but not whether respondent had any direct contact
with the child; Social Services Law § 384-b; Family Court, Broome County, granted
petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b, to
adjudicate the subject child to be abandoned by respondent, and terminated respondent's
parental rights; App. Div. affirmed.
McCULLOCH, MATTER OF v MELVIN H. (156 AD3d 1480):
4th Dept. App. Div. order of 12/22/17; dismissal of appeal; sua sponte examination
whether a substantial constitutional question is directly involved to support an appeal as
of right; Appeal--Academic and Moot Questions--Whether the Appellate Division
properly dismissed the appeal as moot; constitutional law--due process of law--whether
respondent was denied right to due process; mental health--whether respondent was
denied meaningful representation in proceeding seeking permission to administer
medication to respondent over his objection; Supreme Court, Oneida County, granted
petitioner's application for authorization to administer medication to respondent over his
objection; App. Div. dismissed the appeal as moot.
For February 16, 2018 through February 22, 2018, the following preliminary appeal
statements were filed:
JACOBI, MATTER OF v TAX APPEALS TRIBUNAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (156 AD3d 1154):
3rd Dept. App. Div. order of 12/21/17; confirmation of determination; sua sponte
examination whether a substantial constitutional question is directly involved to support
an appeal as of right; Motor Vehicles--Revocation or Suspension of Operator's
License--CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul a determination of the Tax
Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York sustaining a notice of proposed driver's
license suspension referral imposed under Tax Law article 8; whether Tax Law §
171-v, which allows for the suspension of a taxpayer's driver's license based on
past-due tax liabilities, violates the due process clause inasmuch as it does not take
into account taxpayer's inability to pay; whether petitioner was deprived of due
process where Department of Taxation and Finance did not act on petitioner's offer
in compromise before license suspension took effect; App. Div. confirmed a
determination of respondent Tax Appeals Tribunal sustaining a notice of proposed
driver's license suspension referral imposed under Tax Law article 8, and dismissed the
CPLR article 78 petition.
For February 23, 2018 through March 1, 2018, the following preliminary appeal
statements were filed:
ALVAREZ (OMAR), PEOPLE v (2017 NY Slip Op 87246[U]):
1st Dept. App. Div. order of 9/28/17; denial of writ of error coram nobis; leave to
appeal granted by Wilson, J., 2/8/18; Crimes--Right to Counsel--Effective
Representation--Whether appellate counsel's deficient performance, including
failing to request that the Appellate Division reduce defendant's sentence in the
interest of justice, deprived defendant of the effective assistance of counsel; App.
Div. denied defendant's application for a writ of error coram nobis.
PEOPLE ex rel. JONES v LEE (158 AD3d 887):
3rd Dept. App. Div. order of 2/1/18; affirmance; sua sponte examination whether a
substantial constitutional question is directly involved to support an appeal as of right;
Habeas Corpus--When Remedy Available; Supreme Court, Ulster County, in a
proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 70, denied petitioner's application for a writ of
habeas corpus.
MATTER OF MANN, AN ATTORNEY (ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE FOR
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; MANN) (157 AD3d 1160):
3rd Dept. App. Div. order 1/18/18; sua sponte examination whether a substantial
constitutional question is directly involved to support an appeal as of right; Attorney and
Client--Disciplinary Proceedings--Censure; claimed due process violations and
unconstitutionality of Judiciary Law § 90 and 22 NYCRR 1200.7 (New York Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.7); App. Div. granted petitioner Grievance Committee's motion
to confirm the Referee's report, denied respondent's cross motion to disaffirm the report,
deemed established respondent's professional misconduct as set forth in the petition of
charges, and censured respondent.
MATTER OF EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ASBESTOS LITIGATION (TERWILLIGER, v
BEAZER EAST, INC.) (150 AD3d 1617):
4th Dept. App. Div. order of 5/5/17; reversal; leave to appeal granted by Court of
Appeals, 2/15/18; Products Liability--Exposure to Toxic Substances--Injuries to
decedent exposed to asbestos and coke oven emissions while employed at the
Bethlehem Steel plant--whether the coke oven batteries constructed at the
Bethlehem Steel plant were "products" subject to products liability theories rather
than structures resulting from performance of a contract for construction services;
negligence--duty to warn about product hazards; summary judgment; Supreme
Court, Erie County, denied the motion of defendant Honeywell International, Inc.,
successor in interest to the Wilputte Coke Oven Division of Allied Chemical Corporation
(Honeywell), for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it; App. Div.
reversed, granted defendant Honeywell's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the
complaint against it.
For March 2, 2018 through March 8, 2018, the following preliminary appeal statements
were filed:
MADISON COUNTY INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, MATTER OF v STATE
OF NEW YORK AUTHORITIES BUDGET OFFICE (151 AD3d 1532):
3rd Dept. App. Div. order of 6/29/17; affirmance; leave to appeal granted by Court
of Appeals, 2/20/18; Counties--Industrial Development Agency--Whether petitioner
industrial development agency had authority to form a local development
corporation (see N-PCL 1411; Public Authorities Law § 2) as a subsidiary under
General Municipal Law § 858; interpretation of "necessary or convenient" clause of
General Municipal Law § 858 (17); Supreme Court, Albany County, dismissed
petitioners' application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a
determination of respondents refusing to recognize petitioner Madison Grant Facilitation
Corporation as a subsidiary of petitioner Madison County Industrial Development Agency
and requiring petitioner Madison Grant Facilitation Corporation to file separate budget,
annual and audit reports; App. Div. affirmed.
QUEENS BRANCH OF THE BHUVANESHWAR MANDIR, INC. v SHERMAN (156 AD3d 658):
2nd Dept. App. Div. order of 12/6/17; affirmance; sua sponte examination whether
a substantial constitutional question is directly involved to support an appeal as of right
and whether the order appealed from finally determines the action within the meaning of
the Constitution; Religious Corporations--Elections--Membership requirement to
vote for Board of Trustee candidates for Queens Branch of Bhuvaneshwar Mandir
(Mandir)—whether membership in the Mandir is based on religious criteria or
resolvable on neutral principles of law and reference to the secular provisions of the
Mandir's internal documents; claimed violation of First Amendment of the U. S.
Constitution; Supreme Court, Queens County, among other things, granted that branch
of plaintiffs' motion which was to confirm the results of a 5/31/15 election in which their
slate of candidates was elected as members of the Board of Trustees of plaintiff Queens
Branch of the Bhuvaneshwar Mandir, Inc., and denied that branch of defendants' cross
motion seeking a judgment pursuant to CPLR 3001 declaring that its slate of candidates
won the election; App. Div. affirmed.
RKEIN (HASSAN), PEOPLE v (152 AD3d 434):
1st Dept. App. Div. order of 7/13/17; affirmance; leave to appeal granted by
Rivera, J., 2/22/18; Crimes--Justification--Whether trial court properly denied
defendant's request for a justification charge regarding second-degree assault
count; defendant struck unarmed initial aggressor in head with pint glass; Supreme
Court, New York County, convicted defendant of assault in the second and third degrees,
and sentenced him, as a second felony offender, to an aggregate term of five years; App.
Div. affirmed.