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For January 10, 2020 through January 16, 2020, the following preliminary appeal statements were filed:

MOORE, PEOPLE ex rel. v SUPERINTENDENT OF COLLINS CORRECTIONAL FACILITY:
4th Dept. App. Div. order of 12/18/19; denied writ of habeas corpus; sua sponte examination of whether any basis exists for an appeal as of right; Habeas Corpus--When Remedy Available; App. Div., inter alia , denied petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus and dismissed the petition.

NYCTL, 1998-2 TRUST AND THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON v GOUDEN; POSAR:
Supreme Court, Queens County, orders of 10/18/19 and 11/19/19; sua sponte examination of whether, with regard to each appellant: the appellant is a party aggrieved with the meaning of CPLR 5511; the appeal is timely taken; and a direct appeal lies of right; Appeals--appealable paper; Supreme Court, Queens County, among other things (1)(a) granted judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215 in favor of plaintiffs; (b) appointed a referee pursuant to RPAPL 1321(1) to ascertain and compute the amount due plaintiffs; (c) amended the caption; and (d) severed and strike defendant Serio and the remaining defendants sued as John Does; (2) denied the motion of non-party Posar for various reliefs, including for leave to intervene and for various declaratory reliefs unrelated to this action; (3) denied the motions of non-party Posar because Posar has no standing and the reliefs sought are incomprehensible; (4) among other things, referred the action to a referee, and (5) denied the motion of defendant Gouden because Gouden defaulted and did not first move to vacate the default and the relief sought is incomprehensible.

MATTER OF BABY BOY W. (170 AD3d 538):
1st Dept. App. Div. order of 3/19/19; affirmance; sua sponte examination of whether the order appealed from finally determines the proceeding and whether a substantial constitutional question is directly involved to support an appeal as of right; Parent, Child and Family--Abused or Neglected Child; Family Court, New York County, based upon a fact-finding determination that mother neglected the child, placed the child with the Commissioner of the Administration of Children's Services until the next permanency hearing and directed the mother to engage in services; App. Div. affirmed the order of fact-finding of Family court, and dismissed the appeal from the order of disposition of the same court as moot.

For January 17, 2020 through January 23, 2020, the following preliminary appeal statements were filed:

ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CO., LLC v PERVU:
Supreme Court, Otsego County order of 11/1/19 and 10/24/19; discharging receiver; sua sponte examination of whether appellants are parties aggrieved (CPLR 5511) and whether there is any basis for an appeal as of right; Appeal; Supreme Court, among other things, appointed referee and deemed in default all non-appearing and non- answering defendants.

SHAH v STATE OF NEW YORK (178 AD3d 871):
2nd Dept. App. Div. order of 12/11/19; dismissal; sua sponte examination whether the order appealed from finally determines the action within the meaning of the Constitution and whether a substantial constitutional question is directly involved to support an appeal as of right; State--Court of Claims--Whether the Court of Claims providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of claimant's motion which was for leave to file a late claim; Court of Claims denied claimant's motion for leave to reargue defendant's motion to dismiss, which was granted in an order of that court (9/1/17), or alternatively, for leave to file a late claim pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 10(6); App. Div. dismissed the appeal from so much of the order as denied that branch of the claimant's motion which was for leave to reargue, affirmed the order insofar as reviewed, and awarded one bill of costs to defendant.

ZERVOS v TRUMP (171 AD3d 110):
1st Dept. App. Div. order of 3/14/19; affirmance; leave to appeal granted by App. Div., 1/7/20; Constitutional Law--Supremacy Clause--Whether the Supremacy Clause (U.S. Constitution, article VI, cl 2) provides blanket immunity to the President of the United States from having to defend against a civil damages action brought in state court; plaintiff commenced defamation action alleging that when defendant was a presidential candidate, he wrongly smeared plaintiff by claiming that her allegations of sexual misconduct against him were lies; Supreme Court, New York County, denied defendant's motion to dismiss the defamation complaint or in the alternative to stay the action, and denied his special motion to strike the complaint under California's anti-SLAPP statute; App. Div. affirmed.