Wisell & McGhee, LLP, Kew Gardens, NY (John T. Wisell of counsel), for appellant.

Vigorito, Barker, Patterson, Nichols & Porter, LLP, New York, NY (Joshua R. Cohen of counsel), for respondents.

In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Catherine Rizzo, J.), dated October 11, 2022. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to compel the defendants to allow the plaintiff's expert to extract the plaintiff's metadata or electronic audit trail of his own medical records from the defendants' electronic medical records.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

On September 21, 2021, the plaintiff moved, inter alia, to compel the defendants to allow the plaintiff's expert to extract the plaintiff's metadata or electronic audit trail of his own medical records from the defendants' electronic medical records. In an order dated October 11, 2022, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion, finding that "it appears that the plaintiff is in receipt of the plaintiff's metadata/electronic audit trail" based on the searches already "run by the defendants." The plaintiff appeals.

CPLR 3101 (a) directs that generally "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof" (Forman v Henkin, 30 NY3d 656, 661 [2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]). "The words, 'material and necessary,' are . . . to be interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity" (Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406 [1968]; see Vargas v Lee, 170 AD3d 1073, 1075 [2019]). "Accordingly, in this context, the word 'necessary' means needful and not indispensable" (Vargas v Lee, 170 AD3d at 1075 [alterations, emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted]). "Similarly, in this context, if there is any possibility that the information is sought in good faith for possible use as evidence-in-chief or for cross-examination or in rebuttal, it should be considered matter 'material' in the action" (id. [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted]).

Nonetheless, "although broad," the right to disclosure "is not unlimited" (Forman v Henkin, 30 NY3d at 661). Thus, "competing interests must always be balanced; the need for discovery must be weighed against any special burden to be borne by the opposing party" (Vargas [*2]v Lee, 170 AD3d at 1076 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Forman v Henkin, 30 NY3d at 662).

"The supervision of discovery is generally left to the trial court's broad discretion" (D'Alessandro v Nassau Health Care Corp., 137 AD3d 1195, 1196 [2016] [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Hamed v Alas Realty Corp., 209 AD3d 628, 629 [2022]). "The Supreme Court's discretion is broad because it is familiar with the action before it, and its exercise should not be disturbed on appeal unless it was improvidently exercised" (Hamed v Alas Realty Corp., 209 AD3d at 629 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Vargas v Lee, 170 AD3d at 1076).

The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in determining that the requested materials were material and necessary within the meaning of CPLR 3101 (a) (see Vargas v Lee, 170 AD3d at 1075). However, unlike in Vargas v Lee, here, the defendants "substantiate[d] [their] claim" that the requested audit trails "had already been provided," which the court credited (id. at 1077; see Harms v TLC Health Network, 215 AD3d 1295, 1296 [2023]). Thus, under the circumstances of this case, in which the defendants provided three rounds of responsive material to the plaintiff's demand while under the court's supervision, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to compel the defendants to allow the plaintiff's expert to extract the plaintiff's metadata or electronic audit trail of his own medical records from the defendants' electronic medical records.

In light of the foregoing, we need not reach the defendants' remaining contention. Brathwaite Nelson, J.P., Wooten, Ford and Taylor, JJ., concur.