Kenneth J. Ready, Mineola, NY (Michelle S. Russo of counsel), for appellant.

Dorf & Nelson LLP, Rye, NY (Jonathan B. Nelson and Jessica J. Kastner of counsel), for respondent.

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for negligence and breach of implied warranties, the defendant Wales-Darby, Inc., appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Joan B. Lefkowitz, J.), dated May 17, 2022. The order denied that defendant's motion to vacate (1) so much of an order of the same court dated January 8, 2020, as granted that branch of the plaintiff's unopposed motion which was for leave to enter a default judgment against it, and (2) a judgment of the same court (Charles D. Wood, J.) dated December 9, 2021, which, upon the order and after an inquest on the issue of damages, is in favor of the plaintiff and against it in the total sum of $976,883.19.

Ordered that the order dated May 17, 2022, is modified, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the motion of the defendant Wales-Darby, Inc., which was to vacate the judgment dated December 9, 2021, and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion and directing a new inquest on the issue of damages; as so modified, the order dated May 17, 2022, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

In December 2018, the plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, the defendant Wales-Darby, Inc. (hereinafter Wales-Darby), inter alia, to recover damages for negligence and breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose stemming from the installation of an allegedly defective heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning unit in the plaintiff's home. Wales-Darby was served with the summons and complaint but did not answer. The plaintiff moved, inter alia, for leave to enter a default judgment against Wales-Darby. Wales-Darby did not oppose the motion. In an order dated January 8, 2020, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for leave to enter a default judgment against Wales-Darby. After an inquest on the issue of damages, the court issued a judgment dated December 9, 2021, in favor of the plaintiff and against Wales-Darby in the total sum of $976,883.19.

Thereafter, Wales-Darby moved pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) and in the interest of justice to vacate the order dated January 8, 2020, and the judgment. In an order dated May 17, 2022, the Supreme Court denied the motion. Wales-Darby appeals.

[*2] "A party seeking to vacate a default in opposing a motion must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious opposition to the motion" (Logan v 250 Pac., LLC, 210 AD3d 1064, 1066 [2022]; see Kyung Aye Yoon v Haktung Lam, 222 AD3d 959 [2023]). To successfully oppose a motion for leave to enter a default judgment based on a failure to appear or timely serve an answer, a defaulting defendant must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the delay and the existence of a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see Sharestates Inv., LLC v Hercules, 166 AD3d 700, 701 [2018]; Gomez v Gomez-Trimarchi, 137 AD3d 972, 973 [2016]). The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse is addressed to the sound discretion of the motion court (see JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Baptiste, 188 AD3d 848 [2020]).

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in determining that Wales-Darby failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for its default in opposing the plaintiff's motion, inter alia, for leave to enter a default judgment against it (see Uceta v Sherwood, LLC, 189 AD3d 1114 [2020]; Zovko v Quittner Realty, LLC, 162 AD3d 1102 [2018]; Spitzer v Landau, 104 AD3d 936, 936-937 [2013]). In view of the lack of a reasonable excuse, it is unnecessary to consider whether Wales-Darby demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious defense to the plaintiff's motion (see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Krebs, 219 AD3d 1417, 1420 [2023]; Byung Ha Lee v Mascarenas, 219 AD3d 928, 929 [2023]; Yaghmour v Mittal, 208 AD3d 1283, 1287-1288 [2022]).

" 'CPLR 5015 (a) does not provide an exhaustive list as to when a default judgment [or order] may be vacated, and a court may vacate its own judgment [or order] for sufficient reason and in the interests of substantial justice' " (JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Dev, 176 AD3d 691, 692 [2019], quoting 40 BP, LLC v Katatikarn, 147 AD3d 710, 711 [2017]; see Matter of Phillips, 163 AD3d 821, 823-824 [2018]; Hudson City Sav. Bank v Cohen, 120 AD3d 1304, 1305 [2014]). "[T]his power is not plenary and should only be exercised to grant relief where a judgment [or order] was taken through fraud, mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Hyun Jung Kim, 189 AD3d 1673, 1674-1675 [2020]; see Matter of McKenna v County of Nassau, Off. of County Attorney, 61 NY2d 739, 742 [1984]). Here, Wales-Darby contends that the judgment should be vacated in the interest of justice, as the award of damages constituted an undeserved windfall that far exceeded the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff. The record reflects very little as to what occurred at the inquest or how the Supreme Court arrived at an award in the principal sum of more than $600,000. Moreover, the record reflects that Wales-Darby attempted to appear at and participate in the inquest, but was not permitted to do so because its counsel was not admitted to practice in New York. Under the unique and unusual circumstances of this case, we conclude that vacatur of the judgment is warranted in the interests of substantial justice, and a new inquest on the issue of damages should be held.

Wales-Darby's remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination. Connolly, J.P., Chambers, Genovesi and Love, JJ., concur.