Suffolk County District Attorney (Alfred Croce and Marion Tang of counsel), for appellant. David Mansfield, for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Justice Court of the Town of Southampton, Suffolk County (Gary J. Weber, J.), dated May 12, 2022. The order granted defendant's motion to vacate a judgment of that court rendered June 10, 2003 convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of failure to stop at a stop sign.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, defendant's motion to vacate the judgment of conviction is denied, and the judgment of conviction is reinstated.

In October 2002, defendant was charged with failure to stop at a stop sign (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1172 [a]). Upon defendant's plea of guilty to the charge, a judgment of conviction was entered on June 10, 2003. On November 24, 2021, defendant moved to vacate the judgment of conviction pursuant to CPL 440.10 (1) (g). In an affirmation in support of the motion, defense counsel asserted that defendant's driver's license had been revoked in connection with another driving incident; that, due to defendant's driving record, defendant's application for relicensing would be denied pursuant to 15 NYCRR 136.5, regulations adopted by the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles in 2012; and that vacating the judgment of conviction for failure to stop at a stop sign would reduce the number of points on defendant's driving record and thus could allow defendant to apply for a license with a problem driver restriction. Defense counsel [*2]argued that defendant was entitled to relief under CPL 440.10 (1) (g), alleging that the 2012 relicensing regulations and the decision by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Acevedo v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. (29 NY3d 202 [2017]), which upheld the validity of those regulations, constituted newly discovered evidence. Defense counsel also contended that the judgment of conviction should be vacated due to the "severe collateral consequences of [the] conviction," i.e., the potentially permanent revocation of defendant's driver's license. In opposition, the People asserted, among other things, that defendant was barred from raising a newly discovered evidence claim pursuant to CPL 440.10 (1) (g) because he had pleaded guilty, and that the collateral consequence of a lifetime license revocation is not a proper basis to invalidate a guilty plea. By order dated May 12, 2022, the Justice Court granted defendant's motion, stating that "it appears that the Defendant was not represented by counsel at the time of the plea."

We find that the Justice Court erred in granting the motion. First, we note that the fact that defendant was not represented by counsel when he pleaded guilty is not, in itself, a ground to vacate the ensuing judgment of conviction (see CPL 170.10 [3] [c]; [6]; People v Farinaro, 36 NY2d 283, 285 [1975]; People v Russo, 149 AD2d 255, 257 [1989]; People v Villegas, 2002 NY Slip Op 50647[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2002]). Moreover, because defendant pleaded guilty, he cannot prevail on any claim of newly discovered evidence pursuant to CPL 440.10 (1) (g) (see People v Tiger, 32 NY3d 91, 99 [2018]; People v Elie, 50 Misc 3d 134[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50037[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2016]). In any event, the collateral consequence of a lifetime license revocation does not invalidate defendant's guilty plea (see People v Maggio, 210 AD3d 798, 799-803 [2022]; People v DiTore, 209 AD3d 665, 667 [2022]).

Accordingly, the order is reversed, defendant's motion to vacate the judgment of conviction is denied, and the judgment of conviction is reinstated.

GARGUILO, P.J., EMERSON and DRISCOLL, JJ., concur.