Lavallee Law Office, PLLC (Keith A. Lavallee of counsel), for appellant. Suffolk County Traffic Prosecutor's Office (Justin W. Smiloff of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, Suffolk County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency (John Marks, J.H.O.), rendered November 4, 2020. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of speeding, and imposed sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Defendant was charged with speeding (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 [b]) and, in three other accusatory instruments, with three other violations. Defendant was arraigned in February 2020. At the beginning of a nonjury trial held in November 2020, defense counsel orally moved to dismiss the charges, alleging that the People had failed to provide discovery material at least 15 days prior to trial as required under CPL 245.20 (1). The District Court denied defendant's motion and, following the trial, found defendant guilty of speeding and two other charges. Defendant has filed a notice of appeal from only the judgment convicting him of speeding.

We find no merit to defendant's contention that the District Court erred in denying his oral motion to dismiss. Effective January 1, 2020, article 245 replaced article 240 of the Criminal Procedure Law and provides for "automatic" disclosure by the People to the defendant of "all items and information that relate to the subject matter of the case" that are in the People's possession or control (CPL 245.20 [1]). Subsequently, effective May 3, 2020, CPL 245.10 (1) (a) was amended to expressly extend the prosecution's discovery obligation under CPL 245.20 (1) to cases involving traffic infractions and require that such obligation be performed as soon as [*2]practicable, but not later than 15 days before the trial (see CPL 245.10 [1] [a] [iii]). CPL 245.80 (1) (a) provides, "[w]hen material or information is discoverable under this article but is disclosed belatedly, the court shall impose an appropriate remedy or sanction if the party entitled to disclosure shows that it was prejudiced. Regardless of a showing of prejudice the party entitled to disclosure shall be given reasonable time to prepare and respond to the new material." Prior to these amendments in 2020, this court had held, citing former section 240.20 (1) of the CPL then in effect, that the defendant "was not entitled to discovery because she was prosecuted on a simplified traffic information charging her with a mere traffic infraction" (People v Scott, 10 Misc 3d 137[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 52138[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005]; see People v Navon, 73 Misc 3d 136[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 51070[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2021]). Even assuming, without deciding, that CPL article 245 is applicable to this case, we conclude that defendant's oral motion was properly denied, as defendant failed to establish that he was entitled to any remedy for the People's alleged failure to comply with their discovery obligations. Defendant failed to make any showing that he was prejudiced by the People's alleged failure to provide discovery material at least 15 days prior to trial and never requested additional time to prepare or respond to the material provided on the date of the trial.

Contrary to defendant's contention, we find that the evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt of speeding beyond a reasonable doubt. The ticketing officer testified that he was trained to visually estimate the speed of a moving vehicle to within five miles per hour of its actual speed and that he observed defendant traveling at 100 miles per hour in a 55-mile-per-hour speed zone. Testimony by an officer qualified to estimate vehicle speeds to such a degree of accuracy is, standing alone, sufficient to support a speeding conviction where, as here, the variance between the officer's estimate of the speed of defendant's vehicle and the maximum permissible speed is "sufficiently wide so that [the factfinder] may be certain beyond a reasonable doubt that . . . defendant exceeded the permissible limit" (People v Olsen, 22 NY2d 230, 232 [1968]; see People v Maltez, 73 Misc 3d 126[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 50876[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2021]; People v Tamberlane, 72 Misc 3d 128[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 50592[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2021]; People v Tsys, 29 Misc 3d 143[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 52213[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2010]). Moreover, the officer's visual estimate was corroborated by the reading of a properly calibrated radar device, which measured defendant's speed at 99 miles per hour (see People v Dusing, 5 NY2d 126 [1959]; Maltez, 2021 NY Slip Op 50876[U]; People v Nelson, 56 Misc 3d 129[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50851[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2017]; see also People v Knight, 72 NY2d 481, 488 [1988]).

Furthermore, upon the exercise of our factual review power (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]), while according great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witness, hear his testimony, observe his demeanor, and assess his credibility (see People v Lane, 7 NY3d 888, 890 [2006]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]), we conclude that defendant's conviction of speeding was not against the weight of the [*3]evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 643-646 [2006]).

Finally, as the duration of the suspension of defendant's license has expired, we do not reach any issue with respect thereto (see People v Nicholson, 31 AD3d 468, 469 [2006]; Tamberlane, 2021 NY Slip Op 50592[U]; People v Brucelis, 59 Misc 3d 132[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 50471[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2018]). While defendant also contends that the $500 fine imposed—which is less than the maximum fine authorized for the offense (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 [h] [1] [iii])—was excessive, we find that the fine was neither harsh nor excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80, 85 [1982]) and that no extraordinary circumstances exist that warrant a modification of the sentence in the interest of justice (see People v McCants, 73 AD3d 1086 [2010]).

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

GARGUILO, P.J., DRISCOLL and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur.