The following papers were considered in connection with the plaintiff's order to show cause dated January 12, 2021, and the defendant's cross motion dated March 8, 2021:

Upon the foregoing papers, the decision and order of the Court is as follows:

The Court need not rehash the protracted history of this litigation, which is thoroughly set forth in an opinion by Presiding Justice Scheinkman of the Appellate Division, Second Department in Kaufman v Kaufman, (189 AD3d 31 [2d Dept. 2020]) (hereinafter the 2020 Appellate Division Order).

The plaintiff now moves for an order, (1) granting the plaintiff leave to enter a money judgment against the defendant for all sums due and owing to her for interim maintenance and child support, and granting the plaintiff execution therefor; (2) pursuant to DRL § 245 and Judiciary Law § 753 et seq., adjudging the defendant in contempt for his willful, deliberate and ongoing violations of his court-ordered obligations to pay interim maintenance and child support pursuant to a so-ordered stipulation entered June 23, 2011, and an order of the Supreme Court (Lawrence H. Ecker, J.) dated February 29, 2016, and, thereupon, granting and issuing a final order of commitment with leave to purge; (3) pursuant to DRL § 244-a, awarding the plaintiff the continued, accumulated arrears of the defendant, plus interest, to be incorporated in this motion up to and including the date of the decision; (4) sanctioning the defendant pursuant to DRL §§ 244-b and 244-c; (5) directing the defendant to transfer to the plaintiff the amount of $2,347,065.25, within 30 days of a decision on this motion; (6) compelling the defendant to post $5,000,000 in escrow within 30 days of a decision on this motion as partial security for the equitable distribution still owed to the plaintiff in accordance with the 2020 Appellate Division Order; (7) reappointing Klein Leibman & Gresen, LLC as the neutral accountants to facilitate discovery, and conduct tracing, identification and valuation of the marital estate to be equitably divided in accordance with the 2020 Appellate Division Order; (8) directing that all fees associated with the reappointment of Klein Leibman & Gresen, LLC be paid by the defendant, subject to reallocation; (9) appointing a special master to supervise the production of discovery and authorizing the special master to report to the Court with respect to any issues surrounding discovery; (10) directing that all fees associated with the special master be paid by the defendant, subject to reallocation; (11) granting the plaintiff's request to "so order" certain subpoenas duces tecum attached as Exhibit A; and, (12) granting the plaintiff interim counsel fees in the sum of not less than $500,000, to be paid by the defendant within 30 days of a decision on this motion (see NYSCEF No. 6).

In a supporting affidavit, the plaintiff avers, among other things, that the defendant stopped paying interim maintenance in April 2018 and currently owes $340,000 in arrears. She asserts that the defendant's obligation to pay $10,000 per month in interim maintenance never [*2]terminated since she has not yet received $5 million in hand in non-retirement assets. The plaintiff also contends that between the period of April 2018 and October 2020, the defendant paid the amount of only $3,646 per month in basic child support and owes $113,119 in child support arrears. She notes that in a decision dated February 29, 2016, the Court (Lawrence H. Ecker, J.) (hereinafter the third decision), determined that the defendant's basic child support obligation was $3,646 per month, however, "in the event [Plaintiff] does not receive her distributive award within thirty (30) days of service upon defendant of the Judgment of Divorce, with notice of entry, defendant shall continue to pay basic child support to Plaintiff of $7,295 per month ... during such time as there are two unemancipated children." The plaintiff asserts that "[t]his did not happen" and that "the defendant unilaterally reduce[d] child support."

By notice of cross motion dated March 8, 2021, the defendant cross-moved for an order, (1) appointing Gerald A. Defeo, CPA as the neutral certified public accountant to perform the necessary work upon remittitur; (2) granting leave to conduct disclosure, including but not necessarily limited to serving discovery demands upon the plaintiff, as well as any relevant subpoena duces tecum and depositions with respect to the plaintiff's finances; (3) reinforcing and directing that all disclosed information upon remittitur designated confidential or highly confidential shall be subject to the parties' March 2012 Confidentiality Agreement; (4) pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(a) for an award of costs and attorney's fees; and, (5) granting the defendant leave to submit an additional affirmation of counsel detailing the total counsel fees necessitated by this application and in opposition to the plaintiff's order to show cause.

In a supporting affidavit, the defendant contends that it is the "[p]laintiff's intentionally litigious approach, and willingness to lie and deceive over the last ten years [that has] forced [him] to expend a staggering amount of financial and emotional resources." He asserts that the plaintiff "has already likely received all (or virtually all) of the entirety of her equitable distribution award mandated by the Appellate Division based upon its findings." The defendant contends that his obligation to pay $10,000 per month in interim maintenance terminated as of March 2018, upon the plaintiff's receipt of $5 million in equitable distribution from non-retirement assets, which includes "advances of non-retirement assets that she received during this case." The defendant also argues that contrary to the plaintiff's "tortured interpretation . . . the Second Department did not direct a retroactive obligation for [him] to pay child support per the so-ordered pendente lite stipulation dated June 23, 2011." He further asserts that a finding of contempt would be improper since he has complied with all of his obligations under the judgment of divorce.

In reply, the plaintiff argues that the reason the Court decided that interim maintenance may not terminate before she receives $5,000,000 in hand in non-retirement assets was "to provide [her] with a sum of money that [she] could invest, which would earn investment income at a reasonable interest rate and eliminate the need for continued spousal maintenance." She insists that there is no language in the 2020 Appellate Division Order stating that advance equitable distribution payments made prior to the third decision "counted toward the $5 million sum." The plaintiff also contends that due to the defendant's improper reduction of his child support obligation between the period of April 2018 and October 2020, she has been forced to utilize a substantial portion of her advances on equitable distribution to pay for half of all add-on [*3]expenses for the parties' children.

Pursuant to this Court's directive during a court conference held on April 12, 2021, the parties' provided supplemental memoranda "solely on the issue of prejudgment interest and how that impacts the request for subpoenas for discovery" (NYSCEF Doc # 68, p. 36).

The Court disagrees with the plaintiff's contention that she is entitled to an award of child support arrears at this juncture. The 2020 Appellate Division Order set aside the child support determinations made by the Supreme Court on the ground that it "failed to make appropriate findings as to the parties' respective combined incomes and the current needs and expenses of the children" (Kaufman v Kaufman, 189 AD3d at 72). The Appellate Division remitted the matter "for further proceedings" and directed that, "[i]n the meantime, the parties shall abide by the child support provisions of the so-ordered stipulation dated June 23, 2011" (id. at 73) (emphasis added). Pursuant to the so-ordered stipulation dated June 23, 2011 (hereinafter the June 2011 stipulation), the defendant was required to pay to the plaintiff interim child support in the amount of $7,295.00.

Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the plain language set forth in the 2020 Appellate Division Order does not support the conclusion that upon remittal, she is entitled to an award of child support arrears for the period between April 2018 and October 2020, when the defendant paid the amount of only $3,646 per month in basic child support. Rather, the Appellate Division made clear that the Court must conduct "an evidentiary hearing . . . regarding the defendant's child support obligation" (Kaufman v Kaufman, 189 AD3d at 73), and ordered that "pending a new determination on the issue of child support, the parties shall abide by the child support provisions of the so-ordered stipulation dated June 23, 2011" (id. at 78) (emphasis added). Neither the word "pending," nor the phrase "in the meantime," connote that the determination was intended to be applied retroactively. Furthermore, the mere fact that the Appellate Division denied the defendant's subsequent motion, inter alia, to clarify the 2020 Appellate Division Order does not establish that he "failed in the Second Department [] to establish that the support provision was prospective only."

Accordingly, to the extent that the first and third branches of the plaintiff's motion seek a money judgment against the defendant for child support arrears and an award of continued, accumulated child support arrears pursuant to DRL § 244-a, those branches are denied.

It bears noting that in an order dated August 25, 2020, the Court Attorney Referee agreed with the plaintiff that pursuant to the third decision, the defendant, "having failed to pay the distributive award within 30 days of service of the Judgment, is required to pay $7,295 per month in child support as long as there are two unemancipated children," and directed the defendant "to pay child support in the sum of $7,295 per month until the emancipation of at least one child" and "to pay all arrears due and owing to plaintiff . . . in the sum of $105,821.00." The defendant filed an appeal and, significantly, in a decision and order dated December 4, 2020, the Appellate Division stayed enforcement of the August 25, 2020 order pending hearing and determination of the appeal from that order. Thus, under these circumstances, to the extent that the second and fourth branches of the plaintiff's motion seek to adjudge the defendant in [*4]contempt for willfully violating the child support provisions of the June 2011 stipulation and the third decision, and to sanction the defendant pursuant to DRL §§ 244-b and 244-c, for the accumulation of interim maintenance ^[FN1] and child support arrears equivalent to or greater than the amount of support due for four months, those branches are denied.

The Court agrees with the plaintiff's contention that the defendant prematurely terminated his obligation to pay interim maintenance in the amount of $10,000 per month and that she is entitled to an award of maintenance arrears. In the third decision, the Supreme Court declined to award permanent maintenance to the plaintiff, reasoning that she was going to receive the amount of $5,159,039 ^[FN2] , based on her one-half share of bank accounts and brokerage and investment accounts ^[FN3] , and additional monies from distributions of other assets. The Court highlighted that in the plaintiff's statement of proposed disposition filed in April 2013, the plaintiff sought "maintenance of $12,500 per [month], non-taxable for eight years from the entry of the Judgment of Divorce or until [she] received 'the first $5.5 million of liquid distributive award'" based on her reasoning that "each $1 million she received would generate $30,000 (i.e., a 3% return), and that she required $150,000 per annum."

The Court then determined that "[i]n view of the foregoing . . . defendant's maintenance obligation shall terminate effective the date plaintiff receives in hand at least $5,000,000 in post-tax (i.e. non-retirement funds) assets" and "[u]ntil that time, defendant shall make a monthly payment to plaintiff in the amount of $10,000, to be credited against her entitlement to equitable distribution." The Court emphasized that its determination was based on, among other things, "the substantial distributive award," "[the plaintiff's] pre-trial Statement of Proposed Disposition, [*5]the 4 ½ years of maintenance she has received amounting to over $700,000 to date, the ability of plaintiff to become self-supporting, and to generate income from the liquid distributive award" (emphasis added).

On appeal, the Appellate Division, in the 2020 Appellate Division Order, held that the Court erred in directing that the $10,000 monthly payments be treated as a credit against her equitable distribution award and declined to increase the amount of maintenance by $2,500 per month, but otherwise did not disturb the Court's maintenance determination (Kaufman v Kaufman, 189 AD3d at 86-87).

This Court did not preside over the prior proceedings in this case, having been assigned this matter following the retirement of Justice Ecker. The third decision does not explicitly state whether advance equitable distribution payments made prior to the date thereof are to be included or excluded in calculating whether the plaintiff has received $5 million in hand in non-retirement assets for purposes of terminating the defendant's $10,000 per month payment obligation. However, this Court finds that the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the plain language of the third decision supports the plaintiff's position that the advance equitable distribution payments made prior to the date thereof were not be included in such calculation.

As stated supra, the Court anticipated that the plaintiff was going to receive an equitable distribution award of at least the sum of $5,159,039, and highlighted that its maintenance determination was based, in part, on the plaintiff's ability to generate income from the distributive award. The Court also relied, in part, on the plaintiff's statement of proposed disposition, wherein she indicated that she required $150,000 per year to become self-supporting, and requested maintenance "until [she] received 'the first $5.5 million of liquid distributive award,'" based on her reasoning that "each $1 million she received would generate $30,000 (i.e., a 3% return)." Importantly, when the Court issued the third decision, it was aware that the $1.1 million advance equitable distribution payment made to the plaintiff pursuant to the June 2011 stipulation could not generate income to her since the vast majority of those funds were used by the plaintiff to purchase a residence. Similarly, with respect to the $453,915 advance equitable distribution payment made to the plaintiff in December 2014, representing her remaining share of the net proceeds from the sale of the marital residence, the Court noted in the third decision that those funds were used by the plaintiff to pay counsel fees. Thus, the defendant's contention that he was permitted to unilaterally terminate his maintenance payments to the plaintiff as of April 2018, is rejected.

Accordingly, to the extent that the first and third branches of the plaintiff's motion seeks leave to enter a money judgment against the defendant in the amount of $340,000, plus continued, accumulated maintenance arrears pursuant to DRL § 244-a, and interest from the date of the filing of the motion, those branches are granted.

A motion to punish a party for civil contempt is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court (see Cover v Cover, 173 AD3d 970, 971 [2d Dept. 2019]). "In order to establish civil contempt, the following elements must be established: 'First, it must be determined that a lawful [*6]order of the court, clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate, was in effect. Second, it must appear, with reasonable certainty, that the order has been disobeyed. Third, the party to be held in contempt must have had knowledge of the court's order . . . . Fourth, prejudice to the right of a party to the litigation must be demonstrated'" (Toranzo v Toranzo, 185 AD3d 621, 623 [2d Dept. 2020], quoting El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 26 NY3d 19, 29 [2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Rhodes v Rhodes, 169 AD3d 841, 843 [2019]). "The burden of proof is on the proponent of the contempt motion, and the contempt must be established by clear and convincing evidence" (Massimi v Massimi, 56 AD3d 624, 624 [2d Dept. 2008]; see Bennet v Liberty Lines Tr., Inc., 106 AD3d 1038 [2d Dept. 2013]). "Once the movant establishes a knowing failure to comply with a clear and unequivocal mandate, the burden shifts to the alleged contemnor to refute the movant's showing, or to offer evidence of a defense, such as an inability to comply with the order" (El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 114 AD3d at 17). A hearing is required if the papers in opposition raise a factual dispute as to the elements of civil contempt, or the existence of a defense (see Lundgren v Lundgren, 127 AD3d 938, 941 [2d Dept. 2015]; El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 114 AD3d at 17).

The Court finds that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant disobeyed a "lawful order of the court, clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate" (Latterman v Latterman, 174 AD3d 518, 519 [2d Dept. 2019]; see Spathis v Spathis, 174 AD3d 407, 408 [1st Dept. 2019]). Although the Court agrees with the plaintiff that it was the Court's intent to exclude advance equitable distribution payments in calculating the plaintiff's receipt of $5 million in hand in non-retirement assets, the Court also finds that the language in the third decision fell short of constituting a clear and unequivocal mandate since it was susceptible to differing interpretations.

Thus, the Court denies the second branch of the plaintiff's motion to the extent that it seeks to hold the defendant in contempt for violating the provisions in the June 2011 stipulation and the third decision regarding interim maintenance payments.

The Court declines to "so order" the subpoenas duces tecum annexed to the plaintiff's moving papers. With respect to the bank accounts, brokerage/investment accounts and mutual funds ^[FN4] , the Court finds that the subpoenas duces tecum served by the plaintiff should be limited to a request for "all annual (and quarterly if prepared) statements," which would sufficiently reflect all transactions related to the liquid assets held in those accounts and the "proper value and growth of [those] assets" (NYSCEF Doc. # 7, ¶ 43). This Court agrees with the plaintiff that such information is relevant given that the 2020 Appellate Division Order vacated the award of [*7]prejudgment interest at the rate of 6% per annum, finding that "[w]hile we agree that the plaintiff is entitled to the income generated by her percentage share of these assets up to the time of distribution, we do not agree that the appropriate means for doing so is to utilize an arbitrary 5% or 6% rate when it would seem that the amount of income generated by these assets is readily determinable." (Kaufman v Kaufman, 189 AD3d at 67). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the 2020 Appellate Division Order contemplated that such discovery was necessary, emphasizing that "[t]here is no indication in the record that the parties were afforded the opportunity to offer evidence as to whether the income generated by the parties' liquid assets post-commencement [is] reasonably calculable, on the court's use of prejudgment interest as a means of recognizing the plaintiff's claim to compensation for the post-valuation date used by the defendant of her share of marital funds, on the interest rate to be applied, or on whether, and if so, to what extent, the defendant's pendente lite payments and agreed-upon advance equitable distribution payments to the plaintiff compensated her for the pendente lite deprivation to the plaintiff of the use of her share of the funds in question" (id. at 68).

With respect to the illiquid assets, such as the hedge funds, equity funds, and private company investments ^[FN5] , the Court finds that the proposed subpoenas duces tecum annexed as Exhibit 18 to the defendant's moving papers are more narrowly tailored (as compared to the proposed subpoenas annexed to the plaintiff's moving papers), and are sufficient to provide the information sought by the plaintiff concerning whether those assets have generated any income to the defendant.

In addition, the Court finds that it is appropriate under the circumstances of this case to appoint Klein Leibman & Gresen, LLC (hereinafter KLG), which was the prior neutral forensic accountant involved in this case, with respect to the issues remitted to this Court regarding the tax impact of the distribution of marital assets, the amount of tax attributable to income received by the parties from January 1, 2010, to October 31, 2010, whether the amount of income generated by the parties' liquid assets post-commencement is reasonably calculable, and the amount of income, if any, paid to the defendant from the illiquid assets being held by him pending distribution (see Kaufman v Kaufman, 189 AD3d at 65-68). Although the defendant points out that the Court, in the third decision, declined to consider the valuation reports prepared by KLG in favor of an "as, if and when basis," this Court disagrees with the defendant that "there is no reason to appoint KLG," which is already familiar with the complex marital assets at issue. The defendant is directed to pay 100% of the cost of KLG, subject to reallocation.

Furthermore, notwithstanding the acrimony and litigiousness of the parties, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a need, at this juncture, for the appointment of a special master to oversee and supervise discovery (see Di Giovanni v Pepsico, Inc., 120 AD2d 413, 414 ["(t)he supervisory power conferred by CPLR 3104 should be exercised sparingly and its exercise is not warranted in the absence of special circumstances"]). Accordingly, the ninth and tenth branches [*8]of the plaintiff's motion are denied.

The second branch of the defendant's cross motion which is for leave to conduct disclosure regarding the plaintiff's finances for purposes of resolving the issues of child support and the final counsel fee award is granted.^[FN6] The Court also grants the third branch of the defendant's motion which is for an order directing that all disclosed information that is designated confidential or highly confidential shall be subject to the parties' 2012 Confidentiality Agreement.

The plaintiff requests an interim award of counsel fees in the sum of not less than $500,000, asserting that she has "insignificant assets," "no access to the massive amount of marital assets still to be equitably distributed to [her]," and is "at a serious disadvantage." She submitted certain billing records from Kramer Kozek LLP and Rottenberg Lipman Rich, P.C., the two law firms retained to represent her in this case. In separate affirmations, the plaintiff's attorneys emphasize that a substantial amount of work remains to be done in this case, and that the plaintiff "was compelled to use the bulk of her partial advance on equitable distribution to pay attorneys and accountants," while the defendant "has used virtually the entirety of the marital estate as he has seen fit, spending and investing same, without oversight of the Court and without notice to Plaintiff" (NYSCEF Doc # 17, ¶¶ 12-13).

In opposition, the defendant asserts that he has already advanced $1,135,000 toward the plaintiff's interim counsel fees and that an additional award is not warranted. According to the defendant, the plaintiff has sufficient resources, including "over $5 million in non-liquid advances of equitable distribution as well as the tremendous amount in support payments," to litigate this matter through the final counsel fee hearing. In an affirmation, the defendant's attorney contends that "the large majority of the work to be performed upon . . . remittal involves basic accounting work," and that the plaintiff has not demonstrated any financial need for yet another interim counsel fee award prior to the conclusion of this case.

"The purpose of an award of interim counsel fees is to ensure that the less monied spouse will be able to litigate the action on equal footing with the monied spouse" (Duval v Duval, 144 AD3d 739, 742-743; see Sokos v Sokos, 168 AD3d 782, 783). "There is a rebuttable presumption that interim counsel fees shall be awarded to the less monied spouse, and courts should normally exercise their discretion to grant such a request made by the nonmonied spouse, in the absence of good cause to deny the request" (Pezzollo v Pezzollo, 173 AD3d 918, 919 [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]). "Unlike a final award of counsel fees, a detailed inquiry or evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the award of interim counsel fees" (Gaffney-Romanello v Romanello, 82 AD3d 930).

Notably, the plaintiff's request is made less than three months after the issuance of the 2020 Appellate Division Order, which held that the Court had "erred in awarding the plaintiff $1.5 million in counsel fees without holding a hearing, as such award was in the nature of a final award of counsel fees" and remitted the matter "for a hearing and a determination by the court of the total amount of counsel fees expended in this action and an apportionment of such fees between the parties, taking into account the financial circumstances of the parties, the conduct of the parties throughout the litigation, and any interim payments previously made" (id. at 76). The 2020 Appellate Division Order further held that, "[t]aking into account all of the relevant circumstances, including the extensive work done on these appeals and cross appeals, the Supreme Court should have awarded the plaintiff $500,000 in additional counsel fees, rather than the $750,000 awarded and then replaced with the $1.5 million award," (id. at 77 [emphasis added]).

This Court finds that in light of all the relevant facts and circumstances, including the procedural posture of this case, an additional interim counsel fee award of $75,000 is appropriate to enable the plaintiff to litigate the narrow scope of issues that were remitted to this Court pursuant to the 2020 Appellate Division Order (see DRL § 237[a]; Yakobowicz v Yakobowicz, 171 AD3d 993, 993 [2d Dept. 2019]). This award is to be paid directly to the plaintiff's counsel within 30 days of the date of this decision and order, and is subject to reallocation following a hearing on a final award of counsel fees.

"The court, in its discretion, may award to any party or attorney in any civil action or proceeding before the court, except where prohibited by law, costs in the form of reimbursement for actual expenses reasonably incurred and reasonable attorney's fees resulting from frivolous conduct" (22 NYCRR 130-1.1[a]). Conduct is frivolous under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 if it is "completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law" or it is "undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another" (22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c][1], [2]). Based on the determinations of this Court, as indicated supra, the defendant failed to prove that the plaintiff's motion is completely without merit (see Brin v Shady, 179 AD3d 760 ,763 [2d Dept. 2020]; Rhodes v Rhodes, 169 AD3d 841, 844-845 [2d Dept. 2019]; Perlman v Perlman, 163 AD3d 730, 732 [2d Dept. 2018]).

The Court denies the fifth and sixth branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for an order directing the defendant to transfer to the plaintiff the amount of $2,347,065.25, which represents 25% of the Fidelity brokerage accounts, within 30 days of the date of this decision and order, and compelling the defendant to post $5,000,000 in escrow as partial security for the equitable distribution still owed to the plaintiff in accordance with the 2020 Appellate Division Order.

Although it was determined in the 2020 Appellate Division Order that the plaintiff was [*9]entitled to a 25% share of the parties' brokerage accounts, the matter was remitted to this Court to determine, among other things, what the capital gains taxes would be upon liquidation of those accounts, "ascertained as if the defendant had liquidated them on October 30, 2010, and reported the gains on his 2010 tax return" (Kaufman v Kaufman, 189 AD3d at 59, 67). Thus, this Court declines to direct the defendant to pay to the plaintiff her share of the brokerage accounts prior to any such determination.

Furthermore, there is no language in the 2020 Appellate Division Order stating that, upon remittal, the defendant should be directed to post $5,000,000 in escrow as partial security for the equitable distribution still owed to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff otherwise fails to set forth any basis for doing so.

Accordingly, it is hereby,

ORDERED that the first branch of the plaintiff's motion is denied to the extent that it seeks leave to enter a money judgment against the defendant for all sums due and owing to her for interim child support; and it is further,

ORDERED that the first branch of the plaintiff's motion is granted to the extent that it seeks leave to enter a money judgment against the defendant for all sums due and owing to her for interim maintenance, and granting the plaintiff execution therefor; and it is further,

ORDERED that the second branch of the plaintiff's motion which is pursuant to DRL § 245 and Judiciary Law § 753, adjudging the defendant in contempt for his willful, deliberate and ongoing violations of his court-ordered obligations to pay interim maintenance and child support pursuant to the so-ordered stipulation and the third decision, and, thereupon, granting and issuing a final order of commitment with leave to purge is denied; and it is further,

ORDERED that the third branch of the plaintiff's motion pursuant to DRL § 244-a is granted to the extent that it seeks continued, accumulated maintenance arrears, plus interest, from the date of the filing of the motion up to and including the date of this decision and order; and it is further,

ORDERED that the fourth branch of the plaintiff's motion which is for an order sanctioning the defendant pursuant to DRL §§ 244-b and 244-c is denied; and it is further,

ORDERED that the fifth branch of the plaintiff's motion which is for an order directing the defendant to transfer to the plaintiff the amount of $2,347,065.25, within 30 days of a decision on this motion is denied; and it is further,

ORDERED that the sixth branch of the plaintiff's motion which is for an order compelling the defendant to post $5,000,000 in escrow as partial security for the equitable distribution still owed to the plaintiff in accordance with the 2020 Appellate Division Order within 30 days of a decision on this motion is denied; and it is further,

ORDERED that the seventh branch of the plaintiff's motion is granted to the extent that it [*10]seeks an order appointing Klein Leibman & Gresen, LLC as the neutral forensic accountant; and it is further,

ORDERED that the eighth branch of the plaintiff's motion is granted to the extent of directing the defendant to pay 100% of the costs of Klein Leibman & Gresen, LLC, subject to reallocation; and it is further,

ORDERED that the ninth and tenth branches of the plaintiff's motion which are for an order appointing a special master to oversee and supervise discovery, and directing the defendant to pay the cost associated therewith, subject to reallocation, are denied; and it is further,

ORDERED that the eleventh branch of the plaintiff's motion which is for an order granting the plaintiff's request to so-order the subpoenas attached as Exhibit A is denied; and it is further,

ORDERED that the plaintiff is directed to provide to this Court revised subpoenas duces tecum in accordance herewith within 14 days of the date of this decision and order; and it is further,

ORDERED that the twelfth branch of the plaintiff's motion is granted to the extent that the defendant is directed to pay to Kramer Kozek LLP, the plaintiff's counsel, the amount of $75,000 in interim counsel fees within 30 days of the date of this decision and order; and it is further,

ORDERED that the first branch of the defendant's cross motion which is for an order appointing Gerald A. Defeo, CPA as the neutral certified public accountant is denied; and it is further,

ORDERED that the second branch of the defendant's cross motion which is for leave to conduct disclosure, including but not necessarily limited to serving discovery demands upon the plaintiff, as well as any relevant subpoena duces tecum and depositions with respect to the plaintiff's finances is granted; and it is further,

ORDERED that the third branch of the defendant's cross motion which is for an order reinforcing and directing that all disclosed information upon remittitur designated confidential or highly confidential shall be subject to the parties' March 2012 Confidentiality Agreement is granted; and it is further,

ORDERED that the fourth and fifth branches of the defendant's cross motion which are pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(a) for an award of costs and attorney's fees, and granting the defendant leave to submit an additional affirmation of counsel, are denied; and it is further,

ORDERED that all other relief requested and not decided herein is denied.