Andrew Park, PC, New York, NY (Jusun Yook of counsel), for appellant.

Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, New York, NY (Judy C. Selmeci of counsel), for respondents.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Chereé A. Buggs, J.), dated October 1, 2018. The order granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident is denied.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that he allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident on October 9, 2013. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident. The Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion, and the plaintiff appeals.

The defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The papers submitted by the defendants failed to eliminate triable issues of fact regarding the plaintiff's claim, set forth in the bill of particulars, that he sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d 969 [2011]; Rouach v Betts, 71 AD3d 977 [2010]; cf. Calucci v Baker, 299 AD2d 897 [2002]). While the defendants relied upon the transcript of the plaintiff's deposition testimony to establish, prima facie, their entitlement to summary judgment under the 90/180-day category, this evidence failed to identify the plaintiff's usual and customary activities during the specific relevant time frame, and did not compare the plaintiff's pre-accident and post-accident activities during that relevant time frame. Since the defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to determine whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Mobley v J. Foster Phillips Funeral Home, Inc., 178 AD3d 916, 917 [2019]; Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d at 969).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident. Dillon, J.P., Miller, Barros and Connolly, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 2018 NY Slip Op 33090(U).]