Paul Skip Laisure, New York, NY (Sean Nuttall of counsel), for appellant.

Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove and Victor Barall of counsel; Robert Ho on the brief), for respondent.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Cassandra Mullen, J.), rendered June 29, 2017, convicting him of attempted robbery in the second degree and petit larceny, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, the convictions are deemed vacated and replaced with a finding that the defendant is a youthful offender (see CPL 720.20 [3]), the sentence is vacated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for the imposition of sentence pursuant to Penal Law § 60.02 and for further proceedings in accordance with CPL 720.35.

Contrary to the People's contention, under the particular circumstances of this case, the defendant's purported waiver of his right to appeal was invalid. A waiver "is effective only so long as the record demonstrates that it was made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily" (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; see People v Bradshaw, 18 NY3d 257, 264 [2011]; People v Brown, 122 AD3d 133, 136 [2014]). "An appellate waiver meets this standard when a defendant has a full appreciation of the consequences of such waiver" (People v Bradshaw, 18 NY3d at 264 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Sanders, 25 NY3d 337 [2015]; People v Brown, 122 AD3d at 136). "[F]actors individual to each defendant, such as the defendant's 'age, experience and background,' may be relevant in assessing the validity of a particular appeal waiver" (People v Brown, 122 AD3d at 138, quoting People v Bradshaw, 18 NY3d at 264; see People v Sanders, 25 NY3d 337 [2015]).

Here, the defendant's age and lack of experience with the criminal justice system "warranted a more thorough explanation, as the [conviction of attempted robbery in the second degree] was the first felony conviction for the defendant," whose education was limited to some high school (People v Brown, 122 AD3d at 146). We find that the colloquy in which the Supreme Court engaged with the defendant was insufficient to produce a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver (see People v Bradshaw, 18 NY3d at 265-266; People v DeMicheli, 129 AD3d 743 [2015]; People v Brown, 122 AD3d at 145). Moreover, although the record contains a written waiver, there is no indication from the defendant on the record that he actually read the waiver, and that he understood and was aware of its contents (see People v Conley, 150 AD3d 1023, 1024 [2017]). Accordingly, the defendant is entitled to review of his contention that he should have been afforded youthful offender treatment (see People v Sheldon O., 169 AD3d 1062, 1063 [2019]).

A finding of youthful offender status is permissible when "the interest of justice would be served by relieving the eligible youth from the onus of a criminal record and by not imposing an indeterminate term of imprisonment of more than four years" (CPL 720.20 [1] [a]). " 'The determination of whether to grant or deny youthful offender status rests within the sound discretion of the court and depends upon all the attending facts and circumstances of the case' " (People v McEachern, 163 AD3d 850, 851 [2018], quoting People v Hesterbey, 121 AD3d 1127, 1128 [2014]). In making such a determination, factors to be considered by the court include "the gravity of the crime and manner in which it was committed, mitigating circumstances, defendant's prior criminal record, prior acts of violence, recommendations in the presentence reports, defendant's reputation, the level of cooperation with authorities, defendant's attitude toward society and respect for the law, and the prospects for rehabilitation and hope for a future constructive life" (People v Cruickshank, 105 AD2d 325, 334 [1985], affd sub nom. People v Dawn Maria C., 67 NY2d 625 [1986]).

Here, the Supreme Court's determination to deny the defendant youthful offender status was an improvident exercise of discretion (see People v Darius B., 145 AD3d 793 [2016]; People v Cruickshank, 105 AD2d 325 [1985]). The defendant, who was 17 years old at the time of the offenses, admitted his guilt and took responsibility for his actions. The record demonstrates that after pleading guilty, the defendant, as part of his plea conditions, entered and successfully completed one program, passing every drug test he was administered, and received positive reports from a second program. Furthermore, in the presentence investigation report, the Department of Probation recommended that the defendant be granted youthful offender status. Although the defendant did not fully comply with all of his plea conditions, in view of his tender years, background, and other mitigating factors appearing in the record, the interest of justice would be served by relieving the defendant from the onus of a criminal record (see CPL 720.20 [1] [a]; People v Darius B., 145 AD3d at 793; People v Charles S., 102 AD3d 896 [2013]; People v David S., 78 AD3d 1205, 1206 [2010]). Leventhal, J.P., LaSalle, Barros and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.