[*1]
People v Pomerantz (Michael)
2018 NY Slip Op 50482(U) [59 Misc 3d 133(A)]
Decided on April 5, 2018
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on April 5, 2018
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT: : JERRY GARGUILO, J.P., ANTHONY MARANO, TERRY JANE RUDERMAN, JJ
2016-2737 S CR

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Michael J. Pomerantz, Appellant.


Michael J. Pomerantz, appellant pro se. Suffolk County Traffic Prosecutor's Office (Justin W. Smiloff of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, Suffolk County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency (Paul H. Senzer, J.H.O.), rendered September 26, 2016. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, convicted defendant of speeding.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

At a nonjury trial, a police officer, who had been qualified to estimate the rate of vehicular speed within five miles per hour of the actual speed, testified, among other things, that defendant had been traveling 65 miles per hour in a 45 miles per hour zone. Following the trial, the District Court convicted defendant of speeding (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 [d]). Defendant filed an affidavit of errors alleging that the testimony of the police officer was inconsistent and contradictory and that the People had failed to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, he alleged that he had been deprived of a fair trial due to the District Court's display of bias against him.

To the extent that defendant's argument on appeal can be viewed as contesting whether [*2]his conviction was supported by legally sufficient evidence, we find, upon viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), that it was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon an independent review of the record, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]; People v Olsen, 124 AD3d 1084 [2015]).

While defendant asserted, in his affidavit of errors, that the officer's testimony was contradictory and inconsistent, he failed to set forth a factual foundation for this claim. Consequently, the issue defendant seeks to raise on appeal regarding an inconsistency as to the time at which the simplified information had been issued is not preserved for appellate review (see People v Angel, 39 Misc 3d 149[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50946[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th and 10th Jud Dists 2013]), and we decline to review this issue in the interest of justice.

In the affidavit of errors, defendant alleged that the court had prejudged his guilt and, thus, was biased against him. We find that the minutes of the trial demonstrate that there was no such judicial impropriety. The actions of the trial court were, in the main, directed towards focusing the proceedings on the relevant issues and clarifying facts material to the case in order to expedite the trial (see People v Kikkenborg, 27 Misc 3d 133[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50710[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2010]). Nor can we conclude that the court displayed bias towards defendant by unduly or improperly interjecting itself into the proceedings, as the court acted properly to clarify testimony (see People v Bellamy, 5 Misc 3d 131[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 51347[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th and 10th Jud Dists 2004]). We note that defendant was permitted to fully cross-examine the police officer and to testify on his own behalf. The record fails to establish that defendant was precluded from introducing relevant demonstrative evidence or that the court, as claimed by defendant, bullied and intimidated him at any point during the trial.

Accordingly, the judgment convicting defendant of speeding is affirmed.

GARGUILO, J.P., MARANO and RUDERMAN, JJ., concur.


ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: April 05, 2018