Supreme Court, New York County, August 20, 2018

Edelstein & Grossman, New York City (Jonathan Edelstein of counsel), and Glass & Hogrogian LLP, New York City (Bryan D. Glass of counsel), for petitioner.

Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Kerri Devine and Amy Weinblatt of counsel), for respondents.

I. Background

This proceeding challenges two categories of notices of violations, referred to as summonses or tickets, for violations of parking laws adjudicated by respondents (see 19 RCNY 39-01). The first category sustains violations of 34 RCNY 4-08 (k) (7), which prohibits a commercial vehicle from parking with its lift gate lowered when the vehicle is unattended. The petition challenges only those summonses for these "lift gate violations" that are issued to tractors, which haul the trailers with the lift gates, rather than to the trailers, which bear separate license plates. The second category sustains the violations on summonses issued to tractors or trailers that describe the vehicle as other than a tractor or trailer, such as a truck or other delivery vehicle, referred to as "body type summonses." In an order dated September 20, 2017, the court denied the petition insofar as it challenged lift gate violations issued to tractors, but granted the petition insofar as it challenged summonses that misdescribed tractors and enjoined respondents from sustaining violations on these summonses. Therefore any procedural impediments petitioner claims in defending against lift gate violations issued to tractors are moot. Petitioner nevertheless claims two procedural impediments in defending against any summonses that continue to misdescribe tractors, because respondents' officers issuing the summonses or the hearing examiners hearing the contested summonses have failed to recognize the misdescription.

First, petitioner claims that, after it pleads not guilty and requests hearings on summonses, respondents schedule the hearings too quickly and in excessive volume to allow petitioner{**62 Misc 3d at 1000} to gather the evidence necessary to prove that commercial vehicles were making deliveries when issued summonses for parking violations. Petitioner has failed to show, however, that this evidence is necessary or relevant to prove that a vehicle is a tractor when the summons has misdescribed the vehicle as another body type. Second, petitioner claims that, when it requests that the hearing examiners issue subpoenas to the ticketing officers to appear at the hearings, so that petitioner may question them how they identified vehicles as body types other than tractor rather than tractors, the hearing examiners never grant the request and never issue subpoenas, to the officers or to any other witnesses.

II. Subpoenas

[1] Vehicle and Traffic Law § 240 (2) (d) provides that respondents' hearing examiners "shall at the request of the person charged on a showing of good cause and need therefor, or in his [or her] own discretion, issue a subpoena to compel the appearance at a hearing of the officer who served the notice of violation or of other persons to give testimony" (emphases added). Thus, hearing examiners' issuance of subpoenas not only is at their discretion, but also is mandatory whenever the person charged with a violation requests a subpoena and shows good cause and need for the subpoena.

Respondents' regulations governing the issuance of subpoenas contravene this mandate by providing only that hearing examiners "may . . . issue a subpoena," even when it is not simply in their discretion, but also when it is "on a showing of good cause and need" (19 RCNY 39-08 [h] [emphasis added]). Under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 240 (2) (d), when the person charged with a violation shows good cause and need for a requested subpoena, it is not simply permitted; it is mandatory.

The evidentiary hearing on petitioner's motion revealed that subpoenas are considered entirely discretionary in all circumstances and, under that standard, not even permitted. Each witness from respondent New York City Department of Finance Commercial Adjudications Unit (CAU), from hearing examiners to the Deputy Chief and Chief Administrative Law Judges, maintained that hearing examiners' issuance of subpoenas was entirely in their discretion. No witness considered the issuance of a subpoena mandatory in any circumstances. These CAU{**62 Misc 3d at 1001} witnesses evinced no awareness that the Vehicle and Traffic Law governed the issuance of subpoenas. In fact, none of these witnesses ever had issued a subpoena or was aware of another hearing examiner issuing one during their service as a hearing examiner, except once many years ago, when the person charged did not request a subpoena, but the hearing examiner believed the ticketing officer was issuing vindictive summonses to a person dating the officer's former girlfriend.

[2] As set forth above, the purpose for which petitioner's motion claims petitioner seeks ticketing officers' appearance at hearings is to question the officers how they identified vehicles as body types other than tractor rather than tractors. Petitioner's representatives challenge the body type described on a summons by comparing it to the body type described on the vehicle's registration and on other summonses issued to the same vehicle that comport with the registration. It well might be expected that this documentary evidence, the registration filed with the vehicle's home state and other summonses issued by respondents' own officers, would be more compelling evidence that the summons in question was inaccurate than the ticketing officer's explanation for identifying the vehicle differently. Nevertheless, the testimony consistently revealed that the hearing examiners accepted the summonses issued by ticketing officers and recorded in respondents' computer system as the immutable truth. Only if that recorded summons on its face lacks, due to an omission or illegibility, any of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 238 (2)'s prescribed identification elements, which include a vehicle's body type, will a hearing examiner sustain a challenge to a summons (see Matter of Wheels, Inc. v Parking Violations Bur. of Dept. of Transp. of City of N.Y., 80 NY2d 1014, 1016 [1992]; Matter of Ryder Truck Rental v Parking Violations Bur. of Transp. Admin. of City of N.Y., 62 NY2d 667, 669-670 [1984]; Matter of Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc. v City of New York, 121 AD3d 124, 129 [1st Dept 2014]).

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 238 (2-a) (b), however, provides that "[i]f any information which is required to be inserted on a notice of violation is omitted from the notice of violation, misdescribed, or illegible, the violation shall be dismissed upon application of the person charged with the violation" (emphasis added). Hearing examiners' rote acceptance of the accuracy of summonses issued by ticketing officers and recorded in respondents' computer system effectively prevents petitioner from showing that summonses in fact misdescribe a vehicle's body{**62 Misc 3d at 1002} type, requiring the summonses' dismissal under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 238 (2-a) (b).

Petitioner also seeks to question the ticketing officers how they identified vehicles as body types other than tractor rather than tractors, because hearing examiners interpret the above authority, in particular Matter of Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc. v City of New York (121 AD3d 124 [2014]), to require only a reasonable body type description, rather than an accurate one. Thus, the misdescription must be unreasonable, rather than simply inaccurate, for the hearing examiners to dismiss the charge. To convince hearing examiners that a misdescription is unreasonable, petitioner seeks to question the officers how they arrived at the description given and to demonstrate that the accurate body type was in fact easily ascertainable.

Matter of Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc. v City of New York (121 AD3d 124 [2014]) allows no such interpretation. The Court found that respondents' inaccurate description, not their unreasonable description, of vehicles' "plate type," another of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 238 (2)'s prescribed identification elements, mandated dismissal of the charges (Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc. v City of New York, 121 AD3d at 129). The Court emphasized in no uncertain terms that any "misdescription of any of the five mandatory identification elements" mandates dismissal (id.). The "legislature intended strict compliance" with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 238 (2), not just reasonable compliance (Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc. v City of New York, 121 AD3d at 129 [emphasis added]).

Against this backdrop, petitioner claims it needs subpoenas in several instances. One instance is when a summons is issued more than eight hours, the length of a ticketing officer's shift, after the summons alleges that the charged violation was observed. Such a gap in time raises a question whether the officer writing the summons actually observed the charged vehicle or, if the same officer did observe the charged vehicle and then write the summons, whether that officer accurately recalled the vehicle's description after eight hours observing subsequent violations, in turn raising issues regarding the credibility of the summons. When the credibility of this sole evidence on which hearing examiners rely is undermined, the fundamental requirement of 19 RCNY 39-08 (e), that a charge may be established only "upon proof by substantial credible evidence," {**62 Misc 3d at 1003}is unsatisfied (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 240 [2] [b]).

A second instance in which petitioner claims it needs subpoenas is when the information in a summons contradicts information in other summonses issued to the same vehicle or issued at the same location on the same day during the ticketing officer's shift. A contradiction in the body type information between the summons in question and other summonses to the same vehicle, however, is the only discrepancy that would be relevant to this proceeding and the purpose for which petitioner's motion claims the need for ticketing officers' appearance at hearings. Petitioner seeks to question the officers regarding their identification of a vehicle as a body type other than tractor rather than tractor. Petitioner does not explain, and the court is at a loss to ascertain, how contradictions in other information or contradictions between the summons in question and other summonses issued at the same location on the same day would be relevant to this inquiry.

A third instance in which petitioner claims it needs subpoenas is when the version of a summons recorded in respondents' computer system differs from the version of the summons served personally on a vehicle's operator or by affixation to the vehicle (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 238 [2]). There may be many instances in which petitioner claims that the summons served omits required information that nonetheless inexplicably appears in the electronic version of the summons. A discrepancy in the description of the body type, however, is the only one that would be relevant to this proceeding and to an inquiry regarding summonses delivered to vehicle operators or affixed to vehicles identifying vehicles as body types other than tractor rather than tractors.

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 238 (1) provides that the original summons "or a facsimile thereof" is the one entered in respondents' computer system, and a duplicate "shall be served" by delivery to the operator of the vehicle or affixation on the vehicle charged with the violation. Once the ticketing officer delivers or affixes that duplicate, it is no longer subject to alteration by the officer. It is subject to alteration only by the operator or other persons with access to the duplicate via the operator or the vehicle, which explains why the operator may be necessary to attest to the duplicate's unaltered form after service when there is a discrepancy between the duplicate and the original summons or its facsimile entered in respondents' computer{**62 Misc 3d at 1004} system. While this electronic version may not be subject to alteration by anyone outside the department, no evidence disclosed that, after the duplicate has been served, the electronic version is free from alteration, inadvertent or otherwise, by the ticketing officer when entering the information or afterward. Nor did any evidence disclose that the version served is free from alteration before service, so that that version is not in fact the "duplicate" that "shall be served," thus violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 238 (1). The potential for alteration of either the original summons, its facsimile, or the duplicate in either of these instances explains why the ticketing officer may be necessary to attest to that version's unaltered form.

In the exceptional circumstances where there is a discrepancy between the two versions, it may not be reconciled by hearing examiners' rote acceptance of the summons recorded in respondents' computer system. This shortcut forecloses authentication of that original or facsimile summons as unaltered, when petitioner has challenged that version's very authenticity, and ignores 19 RCNY 39-08 (f) (4). This regulation first provides that "[a] reproduction of the summons or the original thereof filed with the Bureau may be used at the hearing in lieu of the copy from which it was made." Depending whether the phrase "filed with the Bureau" modifies a "reproduction of the summons" as well as that phrase's immediately preceding noun, the "original thereof," or only the latter, "reproduction" refers to either the facsimile filed or recorded with respondent Department's Parking Violations Bureau, instead of the original summons, or the duplicate served. In either event, this provision suggests that the original summons entered in respondents' computer system actually is made from another copy. The only other copy is the summons served on the vehicle operator or the vehicle. Although the regulation's terminology is confusing, whatever is the correct interpretation of its references to "reproduction," "original," and "copy," and even if the summons served is not in fact the first version generated, the regulation is clear that all copies, reproductions, or versions of the summons are to be recognized and considered. No single version, such as the electronic version, is to be recognized and considered to the exclusion of all other copies, each of which is subject to authentication when there is a discrepancy between versions.

The final two instances in which petitioner claims it needs subpoenas are when it disputes a summons alleging that its{**62 Misc 3d at 1005} vehicle was unattended or disputes that its vehicle was parked near the time a summons alleges a parking violation. Again, petitioner does not explain, and the court is at a loss to ascertain, how either of these instances would be relevant to identification of a vehicle as a body type other than tractor rather than tractor.

III. Scheduling Hearings

[3] Although petitioner's motion does not claim that respondents schedule too many hearings too quickly to allow petitioner to gather the evidence necessary to prove that a vehicle is a tractor when the summons has misdescribed the vehicle as another body type, insofar as petitioner showed such constraints, respondents showed that they have accommodated petitioner. Petitioner asks that respondents (1) schedule hearings on summonses at least 30 days after it files a plea of not guilty to the violation charged, unless it requests a shorter time, and (2) grant an adjournment of at least 30 days after that initial 30 days whenever it still is awaiting documents necessary to its defense.

The only documents that petitioner showed to be necessary to defending against a summons misdescribing a body type were the registration; other summonses to the same vehicle; the duplicate delivered to the operator or affixed to the vehicle, authenticated by the operator's affidavit; and photographs of the vehicle, authenticated by the operator or another employee of petitioner. Although witnesses testified about the need to gather a map, photographs, or signage covering the location of the violation charged, documents demonstrating that the vehicle charged was performing an expeditious delivery or service at that location, rather than double parking, or parking meter receipts, this evidence is irrelevant to the misdescription of a body type.

No witness testified that extra time was needed to gather other summonses to the same vehicle. The only relevant evidence necessitating extra time might be the registration and an affidavit authenticating the duplicate summons or photographs of the vehicle.

The testimony suggested that petitioner itself is unaware of all the summonses issued to its vehicles and that it has retained a broker with staff to track all these summonses, to plead guilty or not guilty on its behalf as warranted, and to{**62 Misc 3d at 1006} represent it at hearings and administrative appeals. Therefore, even though the evidence showed that the representative uses the registration of the vehicle to which a summons was issued in support of petitioner's defense at every hearing, the representative still needs to contact petitioner to obtain the registration for the particular vehicle. Nevertheless, given the regularity with which the representative requests registrations from petitioner to defend against summonses, it is incumbent on petitioner, a large enterprise that owns and operates a fleet of vehicles, to be capable of readily retrieving its vehicles' registrations and quite inconceivable that it would not maintain that capability for various purposes. The only exceptional circumstance would be if a new registration is issued during the short period between the summons and the hearing, so that the old registration must be retrieved. The representative's prompt notification to petitioner regarding each summons, however, further reduces the frequency of this circumstance.

Similarly, even when the summons does not identify the vehicle operator, the summons still identifies the vehicle and the location and time of the alleged violation, which undoubtedly enables petitioner from its records of its operators' assignments to identify the operator when needed to authenticate a duplicate summons. The only exceptional circumstance necessitating extra time might be if the operator were temporarily unavailable, due to illness, vacation, or night shifts for example, to authenticate a duplicate summons when needed for the defense.

Petitioner is enrolled in respondents' Fleet Program. In that program, if petitioner seeks to contest a summons at a hearing, petitioner must plead not guilty and request a hearing within 60 days after respondent Department enters the summons in the department computer system (19 RCNY 39-03 [f]). By requesting a hearing, petitioner signifies that it is prepared to appear at the hearing (id.). Respondents then may set the date of the hearing (19 RCNY 39-04 [d] [3]).

Hearings are scheduled between three days and one month after a plea of not guilty. Petitioner need not wait until the hearing date to request an adjournment, but may request it before the hearing, so petitioner will know before the hearing date whether petitioner must be prepared to proceed as scheduled, or extra time to gather evidence is permitted (19 RCNY 39-08 [j]).{**62 Misc 3d at 1007}

The Fleet Program contemplates adjournments of hearings when requested, because the program regulations provide that, when a hearing adjournment is granted, it may be "marked 'final,' " in which event "no further adjournments will be granted except for extraordinary circumstances" (19 RCNY 39-03 [g]). "Continual and excessive adjournment requests," however, may not be permitted (id.).

At minimum, adjournments "will be granted . . . for extraordinary circumstances" (id.). This provision, however, is after an adjournment already has been granted as the "final" adjournment (id.). Therefore, absent a previous, final adjournment, circumstances short of extraordinary will warrant an adjournment. The exceptional circumstances identified by the evidence here meet that standard of less than "extraordinary circumstances." These circumstances are, in sum, when petitioner must retrieve (1) a registration that is no longer current or (2) an affidavit by a vehicle operator temporarily unavailable to authenticate a duplicate summons delivered to the operator or affixed to the vehicle.

19 RCNY 39-08 (f) (3) further provides that petitioner "shall have the right to present witnesses . . . and to introduce documentary evidence." Therefore, if the denial of an adjournment will deny this right to present evidence, then the adjournment must be granted. Although the granting or denial of an adjournment is within hearing examiners' discretion, a denial is an abuse of discretion when this denial in turn denies the right to gather material evidence and prepare for a hearing (see Matter of Weinstock, 283 AD2d 511, 512 [2d Dept 2001]), as long as petitioner's failure to exercise due diligence has not caused the need for the adjournment (see Azapinto v Jamaica Hosp., 297 AD2d 301, 301 [2d Dept 2002]; Matter of Crimi v Droskoski, 217 AD2d 698, 699 [2d Dept 1995]; Matter of Insurance Co. of N. Am. v St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. Co., 215 AD2d 386, 387 [2d Dept 1995]).

The principle embodied in 19 RCNY 39-08 (f) thus does not pertain if petitioner needs an adjournment because petitioner's internal procedures prevent petitioner from promptly retrieving documents regularly used or taking and authenticating photographs of its vehicles to defend against summonses. Nor does the principle pertain if petitioner's broker is defending too many summonses with too few staff to notify petitioner promptly of the need for documents or witnesses or to prepare for hearings in 60 days. In these instances, petitioner or its{**62 Misc 3d at 1008} broker is denying petitioner its right to present evidence (see Matter of Padilla v Martinez, 300 AD2d 96, 102 [1st Dept 2002]). If petitioner's broker has undertaken to represent more clients with more summonses than the broker's staff are capable of handling, the broker needs to represent fewer clients or hire more staff, or petitioner needs to retain a more capable broker.

Exhibit 2 (Apr. 26, 2018), respondents' manual that respondents train hearing examiners to follow along with the Vehicle and Traffic Law and the governing regulations and that hearing examiners also regard as requirements governing the conduct of hearings, recognizes this principle. Section 4.3.1 (iv) and (v) of the manual instructs hearing examiners to ask petitioner at hearings if it has all the documents it seeks to be considered in defense of the contested summons and, if it does not, to adjourn 30 days for those documents, without exception (exhibit 2, Apr. 26, 2018, § 4.3.1 [iv], [v]). Petitioner seeks nothing more. Yet respondents' Chief Administrative Law Judge could not indicate any factor that hearing examiners are instructed to use in determining whether to grant an adjournment, nor whether they were provided any continuing training to remind them of the manual's provisions if they were ignoring their initial training. The Deputy Chief testified that the Vehicle and Traffic Law, which is silent regarding adjournments, nonetheless governed them, rather than 19 RCNY 39-03 (g), 19 RCNY 39-08 (f) or the manual, and that adjournments might be granted when hearing examiners, not petitioner, determine that they, not petitioner, do not have all the documents that they, not petitioner, need to consider. The only other guidance to hearing examiners from superiors discouraged adjournments and instructed "to try to avoid them" (tr of proceedings, Apr. 26, 2018, at 90). It is no wonder that the consistent testimony of the hearing examiners and the Deputy Chief and Chief Administrative Law Judges revealed that the hearing examiners occasionally may grant adjournments, but not according to the manual's prescriptions.

Once respondents have adopted regulations or even unpublished internal policies, procedures, or guidelines, such as respondents' manual for their hearing examiners, respondents must comply with them to ensure all persons charged with violations are treated equally, uniformly, and fairly according to the adopted policies, procedures, or guidelines (Padilla v Martinez, 300 AD2d at 97; Matter of Hakim v Division of Hous. {**62 Misc 3d at 1009}& Community Renewal, 273 AD2d 3, 4 [1st Dept 2000]). When respondents fail to adhere to their own internal procedures or guidelines in determining to sustain violations charged, respondents violate lawful procedure, requiring annulment of their determination (CPLR 7803 [3]; Padilla v Martinez, 300 AD2d at 97; Hakim v Division of Hous. & Community Renewal, 273 AD2d at 4; Matter of Blaize v Klein, 68 AD3d 759, 761 [2d Dept 2009]). "Simply because a challenged act is discretionary does not mean it is unreviewable under CPLR 7803 (3)" (Matter of Anonymous v Commissioner of Health, 21 AD3d 841, 843 [1st Dept 2005]).

Respondents maintain a legitimate interest in preventing backlogs of unheard contested summonses from accruing, especially given that the parking violations charged do not implicate a fundamental right (Matter of Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 2562, IAFF, AFL-CIO v City of Cohoes, 94 NY2d 686, 693 [2000]; Curiale v Ardra Ins. Co., 88 NY2d 268, 277-278 [1996]; see Matter of K.L., 1 NY3d 362, 373 [2004]; People v Spears, 64 NY2d 698, 700 [1984]). Respondents surely need not accommodate petitioner's unresponsive or inefficient internal procedures or its broker's representation of too many clients with too many parking violations for its staff to defend according to the governing regulations. Nevertheless, respondents failed to show that granting adjournments in the two exceptional circumstances identified by the evidence or even in the circumstances instructed by respondents' manual, for 30 days whenever petitioner lacks all the documents it seeks to be considered in its defense, will cause a backlog or otherwise prejudice respondents (see Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 2562, IAFF, AFL-CIO v City of Cohoes, 94 NY2d at 692; Curiale v Ardra Ins. Co., 88 NY2d at 274). Again, while the granting or denial of adjournments is discretionary, the denials are an abuse of discretion when the reason for them is unexplained (Matter of Koch v Sheehan, 21 NY3d 697, 703 [2013]; Anonymous v Commissioner of Health, 21 AD3d at 843).

Finally, respondents also retain the discretion to amend their internal procedures or guidelines and their regulations, through the governing rulemaking procedures (NY City Charter § 1043), but may not subject adjournments to unfettered, unreviewable discretion, without adequate objective standards to safeguard against the exercise of that discretion vindictively, arbitrarily, or unfairly (Matter of Big Apple Food Vendors' Assn. v Street Vendor Review Panel, 90 NY2d 402, 408{**62 Misc 3d at 1010} [1997]; Matter of Warder v Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 53 NY2d 186, 198 [1981]; Matter of Nicholas v Kahn, 47 NY2d 24, 28-29, 33-34 [1979]; Anonymous v Commissioner of Health, 21 AD3d at 843). Currently 19 RCNY 39-03 (g), 19 RCNY 39-08 (f) and the Administrative Law Judge Manual § 4.3.1 (iv) and (v) set the necessary standards to guide the exercise of discretion in granting or denying adjournments and against which to measure the rationality of a denial (exhibit 5, Apr. 26, 2018; Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc. v City of New York, 121 AD3d at 126).

IV. Conclusions

Based on the evidence, including the availability of the Fleet Program and petitioner's enrollment in it, respondents do not schedule hearings too quickly or in excessive volume to allow petitioner to gather the evidence necessary to prove that a vehicle is a tractor when the summons has misdescribed the vehicle as another body type. The Fleet Program provides petitioner at least 60 days to prepare for a hearing and then the additional days that elapse, from 3 to 30 days, between petitioner's hearing request and the scheduled hearing date. Therefore the court vacates its interim injunction dated November 13, 2015, requiring respondents to permit at least 60 days between when petitioner pleads not guilty to a violation charged on a summons and the first date for which respondents schedule a hearing on the summons. The court also denies petitioner's motion insofar as it seeks an injunction requiring respondents to schedule hearings on summonses at least 30 days after petitioner pleads not guilty to the violation charged.

Nevertheless, based on the evidence adduced, the court grants petitioner's motion insofar as it seeks an injunction requiring respondents to grant adjournments as follows. The court enjoins respondents to ensure that their hearing examiners grant adjournments of hearings consistent with 19 RCNY 39-03 (g), 19 RCNY 39-08 (f) and respondents' Administrative Law Judge Manual § 4.3.1 (iv) and (v). When petitioner claims that a summons issued to petitioner's tractor misdescribes the vehicle's body type, adjournments are to be granted for 30 days whenever petitioner lacks all the documents it seeks to be considered in its defense. These circumstances include, but are not limited to when petitioner must retrieve (1) a registration that is no longer current or (2) an affidavit by a vehicle operator temporarily unavailable to authenticate a duplicate summons delivered to the operator or affixed to the vehicle.{**62 Misc 3d at 1011}

The court also grants petitioner's motion insofar as it seeks an injunction requiring respondents to issue subpoenas as follows. The court enjoins respondents to comply with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 240 (2) (d), by amending 19 RCNY 39-08 (h) to provide that hearing examiners' issuance of subpoenas is mandatory when the person charged with a violation shows good cause and need for a requested subpoena. When petitioner claims that a summons issued to petitioner's tractor misdescribes the vehicle's body type, good cause and need include, but are not limited to the following circumstances: (1) the summons was issued more than eight hours after the summons alleges that the charged vehicle was observed, raising a question whether the officer writing the summons actually observed the charged vehicle or accurately recalled the vehicle's description; (2) the body type information in a summons contradicts the body type information in other summonses issued to the same vehicle; or (3) the description of the body type in the version of the summons recorded in respondents' computer system differs from the description in the version of the summons served personally on a vehicle's operator or by affixation to the vehicle.

The court otherwise denies petitioner's motion.