City Court of Gloversville, August 24, 2018

Paul M. Callahan, Duanesburg, for defendant.

Chad W. Brown, District Attorney, Johnstown (Christopher Stanyon of counsel), for plaintiff.

Defendant moves for an order of this court suppressing all evidence obtained by police after the stop of defendant's motor vehicle, and the dismissal of the charges against him based upon a lack of probable cause.

After a Huntley/Mapp/Dunaway hearing held on July 25, 2018, this court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

On May 18, 2018, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Officer Melinda Palmer initiated a traffic stop of a motor vehicle operated by the defendant on South Kingboro Avenue, in the City of Gloversville. The traffic stop was based upon the Officer's belief that the condition of defendant's vehicle was in violation of the provisions of New York State's Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (2) (a) (3)—commonly cited as "insufficient taillight." Of the four taillights installed on the defendant's vehicle, a total of three were in proper working order.

After explaining to the defendant the reason for the stop, the Officer returned to her patrol vehicle to check the defendant's license and registration. After confirming that his license and registration were valid, the Officer reapproached Paniccia's vehicle, and while doing so, observed the defendant throw a broken crack pipe out of the window.

Reasonably suspicious that the defendant may be in possession of a controlled substance, the Officer radio called for additional officer assistance. Upon the arrival of a second officer, defendant was ordered to exit his vehicle and subjected to a pat search, and without his consent, Officer Palmer conducted a vigorous and extensive search of the vehicle.

While Officer Palmer conducted the search, the defendant remained under the detention and observation of another officer,{**61 Misc 3d at 399} who reported to Palmer that the defendant smelled of alcohol. When questioned, the defendant admitted to consuming two alcoholic beverages earlier that evening. The defendant thereafter submitted to a series of standardized field sobriety tests, all of which he failed, and after a portable breath test indicated the presence of alcohol in his breath, the defendant was arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated, and transported to the station. After being issued the standard DWI refusal and Miranda warnings, the defendant refused to submit to a chemical test.

The Legal Standard for a Motor Vehicle Stop

While it is well settled that a stop of an automobile for a routine traffic check constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment,^[FN1] the correct legal standard under which police may initiate a stop has been intolerably confusing.

In 1975, the New York State Court of Appeals held that a traffic stop could be based upon reasonable suspicion that a driver had committed a traffic offense (see People v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413 [1975]). This standard of evidentiary review governed New York State suppression courts until 2001, when the New York State Court of Appeals, adopting the United States Supreme Court decision in Whren v United States (517 US 806 [1996]), held that "pretext stops" were constitutional, if police possessed probable cause to believe that a driver had committed a traffic violation (see People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341 [2001]).

Since the holding in Robinson, there has been considerable debate whether the Ingle standard of reasonable suspicion has been abrogated in favor of probable cause.

In a more recent case, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department held that

"police stops of automobiles in this State are legal only pursuant to routine, nonpretextual traffic checks to enforce traffic regulations or when there exists at least a reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants of the vehicle have committed, are committing, or are about to commit crime . . . [,] {**61 Misc 3d at 400}or where the police have probable cause to believe that the driver . . . has committed a traffic violation" (see Matter of Deveines v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 136 AD3d 1383, 1384 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also People v Washburn, 309 AD2d 1270, 1271 [2003]; People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341 [2001]).

This court finds the holdings in both Robinson and Deveines to be binding on this court, and therefore applies a probable cause standard to traffic stops prompted by an alleged violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

Mistakes of Law

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (2) (a) (3) reads, in pertinent part:

"Every motor vehicle except a motorcycle, driven upon a public highway during the period from one-half hour after sunset to one-half hour before sunrise . . . , shall display:

"if manufactured on or after January first, nineteen hundred fifty-two, at least two lighted lamps on the rear, one on each side, which lamps shall display a red light visible from the rear for a distance of at least one thousand feet" (emphasis added).

In the case at bar, the defendant can not be prosecuted for a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (2) (a) (3), because the presence of one malfunctioning taillight does not constitute a violation, as long as the vehicle has at least one working taillight on each side. It is undisputed that at the time of the stop, the defendant's vehicle possessed two working taillights on the right-hand side, and one working taillight on the left.

The determinative question in this case, therefore, is whether the Officer's mistaken view of the law deprives police of probable cause for the stop.

In People v Guthrie (25 NY3d 130, 134 [2015]), the Court of Appeals held that the Fourth Amendment "tolerates objectively reasonable mistakes supporting . . . a . . . belief that a traffic violation ha[s] occurred" (see Heien v North Carolina, 574 US —, —, 135 S Ct 530, 534 [2014]). While this court finds Guthrie's holding extremely persuasive, it does not interpret its holding in the same light as the prosecution, nor does this court find that the holding suggests that all mistakes of law or fact are excusable. Contrary to the prosecution's argument, Guthrie does not hold that a "good faith" mistake of law will {**61 Misc 3d at 401}justify a traffic stop.^[FN2] The question of whether a traffic stop based upon a mistake of law is constitutional can only be answered after a determination of whether the Officer's mistaken belief was objectively reasonable.

In Guthrie, the Court reasoned that the officer's mistake of law was reasonable because police should not be chargeable with the knowledge of whether a particular stop sign has been properly registered under the municipal code. Similarly, in People v Estrella (10 NY3d 945 [2008]), the Court found that while police are required to know that New York State provides exemptions for out-of-state vehicles that comply with their state's tinting restrictions, police are not chargeable with the knowledge of another state's particular restrictions.

When determining what is considered "objectively reasonable" this court can not ignore the realities of honest human failures. Obvious from her testimony, and this court's review of the body camera footage, Officer Palmer is an intelligent, experienced police officer, who is clearly dedicated to law enforcement. If the "objectively reasonable" standard were to be measured against an average motorist's knowledge of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, this court would likely find that the Officer's mistaken belief was reasonable. But the analysis can not be measured in that way. The determination of what is reasonable must be examined in the context of what a reasonably trained police officer should know.

For this court, the most decisive and compelling portion of the Guthrie holding decidedly cautions against the interpretation that an officer's ignorance of the provisions of the Vehicle and Traffic Law would be reasonable.^[FN3]

Of the various equipment violations enumerated under the statute, only eight provisions describe offenses that involve vehicle lighting. Unlike the factual scenario described in Heien,{**61 Misc 3d at 402} the provisions of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (2) (a) (3) are straightforward and unambiguous, and are not susceptible of multiple interpretations. It stands to reason that all police officers, charged with the responsibility of enforcing New York State's traffic laws, should possess a strong command of one of the most commonly cited equipment violations under the statute.

Many vehicles manufactured today offer various stylistic or esthetic lighting options that have no relation to driver visibility or driver safety. The observation of at least one working taillight on each side of a vehicle is sufficient confirmation that a vehicle meets the minimum requirements under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (2) (a) (3). The fact that one or more nonessential lights are nonfunctioning does not serve as a basis for a valid traffic stop, and this is something that every police officer should know.

In the case at bar, the defendant's vehicle possessed twice the number of taillights required under the statute, and at least one on each side. There is no evidence that the defendant committed any other traffic offense. Even if the Officer's intention was to only issue a warning, or advise the defendant of a condition to which he was likely unaware, the testimony provided during the hearing illustrates that the Officer based the stop on her belief that the missing taillight constituted an equipment violation. These facts move the encounter squarely to the criminal arena, where the constitutional protections of the private citizen become paramount to any gratuitous intention behind a stop.

Based upon these conclusions, this court finds that the Officer's mistaken belief of the law was not objectively reasonable, and that police lacked probable cause for the stop. Any evidence obtained as a result must therefore be suppressed.

Defendant's motion for a dismissal of the charges against him based upon a lack of probable cause is therefore granted.

"[W]e are not saying that it would have been objectively reasonable for the arresting officer to have claimed ignorance of the requirement in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1100 (b) that a stop sign in a parking lot be registered to be valid. We are saying that the stop was nonetheless constitutionally justified because the officer was not chargeable with knowing each and every stop sign that was registered under the Newark Village Code" (see Guthrie at 136).