City Court of Poughkeepsie, August 22, 2018

William V. Grady, District Attorney, Poughkeepsie (Melissa A. Pasquale of counsel), for plaintiff.

Patrick F. Moore, Poughkeepsie, for defendant.

On June 11, 2018, a pretrial probable cause hearing was scheduled to be held before this court to determine the legality of a vehicle traffic stop by the police and whether evidence recovered by the police from the defendant was in violation of his Fourth Amendment constitutional rights. The People were represented by Senior Assistant District Attorney Melissa A. Pasquale, Esq., and the defendant was represented by Patrick F. Moore, Esq. The parties waived the hearing, stipulated to the facts, and conceded that the only issue for this court to decide is whether the New York State Trooper had probable cause to stop defendant's vehicle on the basis that defendant failed to properly signal his intention to turn thereby violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (b). The defendant is charged with driving while intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2) and (3), and insufficient turn signal in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (b). Having duly deliberated on the issue, the court makes the following findings and conclusions of law:

On October 31, 2017, at 4:21 a.m., the defendant was operating a grey 2017 Honda bearing New York State license plate No. HRW 6136 heading in an easterly direction on Verazzano Boulevard in the City of Poughkeepsie. Defendant's vehicle came to a complete stop at a red light at the intersection of Verazzano Boulevard and Mount Carmel Square, in the City of Poughkeepsie, Dutchess County, New York. At no point in time prior to stopping at the light did defendant activate his signal lamps to turn. However, defendant did activate his right-hand turn blinker while his vehicle was stationary at the red light, signaling his intent to turn right. Upon the defendant's completion of his signaled right-hand turn, New York State Trooper{**60 Misc 3d at 958} Daniel Dworkin pulled the defendant over for failing to signal 100 feet prior to the [*2]intersection in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (b).

The defendant raises an issue concerning the validity of the initial stop for failing to begin signaling an intention to turn "during not less than the last [100] feet traveled by the vehicle before turning" (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 [b]). Defendant argues that the stop of his motor vehicle by the police had no legal basis and was pre-textual, and any evidence obtained as a result of this pre-textual stop must be suppressed. Specifically, defendant contends that he was well within his right to pull up to a red light, stop, and while stationary, and in the proper lane, signal his intent to turn, followed by a lawful right-hand turn, without being in violation of the law. He was not required to signal 100 feet prior to effectuating the turn because his vehicle had come to a complete stop at a stop light. Defendant was stopped for violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (b), which he argues only applies to a moving vehicle that must signal a turn 100 feet prior to turning. Where the defendant's vehicle was stationary at a red light and he signaled his intention to turn while stopped, the 100 feet does not apply.

In opposition, the People argue that there is no exception for the requirement that the operator of a vehicle signal his intention no less than the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. The People cite People v Tamburrino (26 Misc 3d 930 [Saratoga Springs City Ct 2009]) in support of the proposition that a stop of a vehicle that signaled while stopped at a red light, just prior to turning, was a valid stop. The People further argue that regardless of the Trooper's subjective motives the stop was still valid, citing People v Robinson (97 NY2d 341 [2001]).

The People have the initial burden to come forward with evidence to show the legality of the police conduct. (See People v Di Stefano, 38 NY2d 640 [1976]; People v Pettinato, 69 NY2d 653 [1986].) This burden cannot be satisfied with conclusory statements or assurances that the police conduct was proper, without an adequate demonstration of the facts. (See People v Dodt, 61 NY2d 408 [1984]; People v Bouton, 50 NY2d 130 [1980].) Here the facts are conceded. In turn, the defendant bears the ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of the{**60 Misc 3d at 959} evidence that the evidence seized was illegally obtained and should not be used against him. (See People v Hetrick, 80 NY2d 344 [1992].) In the absence of credible evidence establishing a legal basis for the initial traffic stop of defendant's vehicle, the statements and other evidence seized subsequent to his arrest must be suppressed, as having been obtained in violation of defendant's constitutional rights.

Here, since the parties stipulated to the facts, the only issue before this court is whether the Trooper had probable cause to stop the vehicle based upon his observations that he saw defendant not signal 100 feet prior to turning at a red light in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (b). The court finds that the initial stop was not valid.

Section 1163 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law is entitled, "Turning movements and required signals" (hereinafter, The Turning Statute). Highlighting how The Turning Statute begins is necessary to provide a complete and thorough analysis of this issue. Specifically, and in relevant part, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (a) provides as follows,

"No person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection unless the vehicle is in proper position upon the roadway as required in section eleven hundred sixty, or turn a vehicle to enter a private road or driveway, or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direction course or move [*3]right or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety. No person shall so turn any vehicle without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided" (emphasis added).

The Turning Statute then sets forth four different scenarios setting the manners "hereinafter provided" of what a vehicle must do to provide the appropriate signal to others of one's intention to turn in order to comply with the law—only two of which bear any meaningful discussion.

First, there is Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (b), which is what the State Trooper accused defendant of violating and provides the basis for the stop. This subdivision of the statute provides, "A signal of intention to turn right or left when required shall be given continuously during not less than the last one hundred feet traveled by the vehicle before turning."

However, this court finds that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (b) does not apply to the facts here, and finds instead that it applies to motor vehicles continuously traveling just prior to{**60 Misc 3d at 960} effectuating a turn. Likewise, this court rejects the holding of People v Tamburrino (26 Misc 3d 930 [Saratoga Springs City Ct 2009]) as unpersuasive, and inapposite. Preliminarily, the Tamburrino court noted that while the defendant signaled her intention to turn at the traffic light (like the facts here), she had failed to signal the change of lanes—which is a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (d)—and whether charged or not, it gave the officer a basis to stop the vehicle. Moreover, unlike here, the Tamburrino case hinged upon the duty to signal a lane change under all circumstances (citing People v Rice, 44 AD3d 247 [1st Dept 2007]). Yet, here, it is undisputed that the defendant did signal, whereas the defendant in Tamburrino signaled at the light, but failed to signal the lane change before reaching the traffic light.

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (d) bears significant relevance to the facts herein, because it addresses the opposite scenario of section 1163 (b) and when a motorist must signal his/her intention to turn. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (d) applies to a motor vehicle starting from a stopped or stationary position.^[FN1] Specifically, it provides,

"The signals provided for in section eleven hundred sixty-four^[FN2] shall be used to indicate an intention to turn, change lanes, or start from a parked position and not be flashed on one side only on a parked or disabled vehicle, or flashed as a courtesy or 'do pass' signal to operators of other vehicles approaching from the rear." (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 [d] [emphasis added].)

The parties stipulated that the defendant was stationary. The vehicle was stopped at a red light at the intersection of Verazzano Boulevard and Mount Carmel Square. The parties further stipulated that defendant activated his right-hand turn signal while in a stationary position signaling his intention to turn. It is undisputed that defendant's vehicle was at an intersection and [*4]in a "proper position upon the roadway" in compliance with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (a). Therefore, at that intersection defendant was required at that time to give "an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided"{**60 Misc 3d at 961} (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 [a] [emphasis added]). The facts of this case dictate that the "manner hereinafter provided" falls within the strictures of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (d)—a stopped motor vehicle that must signal its intention to turn from a stationary position, not Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (b)—which requires signaling an intention to turn not less than the last 100 feet traveled. The applicability of this statute (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 [d]) is evident because while Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (b) provides similar language to subdivision (d), it is distinguishable.

And this court is bound by the principles of statutory construction which provide that "the purpose of the statute and the objectives sought to be accomplished by the Legislature must be borne in mind" (Abood v Hospital Ambulance Serv., 30 NY2d 295, 298 [1972]; see also People v Litto, 33 AD3d 625 [2d Dept 2006]), and where "statutory language is unambiguous, a court will ordinarily give effect to the plain meaning of the words and apply the statute according to its express terms." (Matter of Tucker v Board of Educ., Community School Dist. No. 10, 82 NY2d 274, 278 [1993] [citations omitted]; see also Carey v Cuomo, 209 AD2d 570 [2d Dept 1994].) Bearing this in mind, and reading the statutes as consistent with one another, which can be done so here, this court finds that while both subdivisions require a signal of the motorist's intention to turn, subdivision (b) applies to motor vehicles continuously traveling before turning and requires a signal of an intention to turn "during not less than the last [100] feet traveled," whereas subdivision (d) applies to those vehicles (not continuously traveling) that must also signal their intention to turn—but does not require a signal during the last 100 feet previously traveled.

In other words, had the defendant in this case not signaled at all at the stop light, and turned right, the Trooper could have conducted a valid motor vehicle traffic stop for violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (d)—failure to signal an intention to turn. But again, here the parties concede that the defendant did in fact signal. Therefore, the defendant complied with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (d) when he signaled his intention to turn while stopped at a traffic light. Defendant did not violate either Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (b) or (d), and there is no controlling case law that supports a finding otherwise.

Therefore, this court finds that the People have failed to meet their burden in coming forth with evidence to show the{**60 Misc 3d at 962} legality of the police conduct. (See People v Di Stefano, 38 NY2d 640 [1976]; People v Pettinato, 69 NY2d 653 [1986].) The general rule of law is that where a police officer has "reasonable suspicion" to believe that a violation or crime is being committed or is afoot, the officer may effectuate a vehicle traffic stop. (People v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413 [1975]; People v Chilton, 69 NY2d 928 [1987]; Matter of Muhammad F., 94 NY2d 136 [1999]; see also People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341 [2001] [probable cause standard applied].) Where the conduct observed provides a rational "articulable" reason to pull a car over, the officer may effectuate a vehicle traffic stop. (People v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413 [1975]; Delaware v Prouse, 440 US 648 [1979].) Here, the defendant did not violate any traffic laws, and Trooper Dworkin did not have the requisite "reasonable suspicion" to effectuate a lawful vehicle traffic stop of the defendant's vehicle. (People v Troche, 162 AD2d 483 [2d Dept 1990]; People v Blajeski, 125 AD2d 582 [2d Dept 1986].)

Therefore, based upon the foregoing, this court finds that there was no probable cause for the vehicle traffic stop, and the evidence seized subsequent to the arrest must be [*5]suppressed.