People v Maldonado |
2018 NY Slip Op 07198 [165 AD3d 1486] |
October 25, 2018 |
Appellate Division, Third Department |
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
The People of the State of New York,
Respondent, v Frank Maldonado, Appellant. |
Carolyn B. George, Albany, for appellant.
P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Michael C. Wetmore of counsel), for respondent.
Rumsey, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Breslin, J.), rendered April 4, 2014 in Albany County, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.
In December 2012, defendant was driving a vehicle that was stopped by State Troopers
Jeffrey Devine and James Redden after they observed the vehicle change lanes without signaling.
Upon searching the vehicle, Devine found a potato chip bag that held a clear plastic bag
containing cocaine. Defendant and David Colon, a passenger, were thereafter charged with
criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree and criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the third degree. Supreme Court denied defendant's motion to suppress
the cocaine seized during the traffic stop and, following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as
charged and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 8
Defendant first contends that Supreme Court erred by denying his motion to suppress. His argument that changing lanes without signaling does not constitute a traffic violation providing probable cause for a traffic stop is unavailing. It is well settled that probable cause exists for a traffic stop if an officer observes a person committing a traffic violation, and changing lanes without signaling is a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (see People v Wynn, 149 AD3d 1252, 1253-1254 [2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1136 [2017]; People v Rasul, 121 AD3d 1413, 1415 [2014]; People v Horge, 80 AD3d 1074, 1074 [2011]).
Defendant's argument that the verdict was not supported by legally sufficient evidence because he overcame the presumption created by Penal Law § 220.25 (1)—that he knowingly possessed a controlled substance because he was an occupant of the vehicle when it was discovered—was not preserved by the general motions to dismiss that were made upon the close [*2]of the People's proof and again at the conclusion of all proof (see People v Carter, 40 AD3d 1310, 1311 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 873 [2007]; People v Parker, 29 AD3d 1161, 1162 n 1 [2006], affd 7 NY3d 907 [2006]). Finally, defendant's argument challenging the instruction given to the jury regarding the automobile presumption was not preserved for our review because he made no objection to this instruction at trial (see People v Williams, 301 AD2d 794, 796 [2003]).[FN*]
Garry, P.J., Clark, Mulvey and Pritzker, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.