Matter of Cohen |
2018 NY Slip Op 01174 [159 AD3d 113] |
February 20, 2018 |
Per Curiam |
Appellate Division, First Department |
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
As corrected through Wednesday, April 18, 2018 |
In the Matter of Stanley L. Cohen (Admitted as Stanley Lewis Cohen), a Suspended Attorney, Respondent. Attorney Grievance Committee for the First Judicial Department, Petitioner. |
First Department, February 20, 2018
Jorge Dopico, Chief Attorney, Attorney Grievance Committee, New York City (Raymond Vallejo of counsel), for petitioner.
Sarah Diane McShea for respondent.
Respondent Stanley L. Cohen was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the Second Judicial Department on July 11, 1984, under the name Stanley Lewis Cohen. At all times relevant to this proceeding, he maintained an office for the practice of law within the First Judicial Department.
By joint notice of motion dated November 16, 2017, the Attorney Grievance Committee and respondent ask this Court, pursuant to Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters (22 NYCRR) § 1240.8 (a) (5), to suspend him from the practice of law for a period of 2
On April 14, 2014, respondent was convicted, upon his plea of guilty, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York of obstructing and impeding the Internal Revenue Service, in violation of 26 USC § 7212 (a), a felony.
On May 1, 2014, respondent was convicted, upon his plea of guilty, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York of two counts of failure to file individual income tax returns for the years 2006 and 2007, in violation of 26 USC § 7203, a misdemeanor.
Respondent was sentenced, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, to concurrent{**159 AD3d at 115} terms of 18 months in prison on the Northern District matter and 12 months each on the two counts in the Southern District matter, to be followed by one year of supervised release. Defendant was also ordered to pay all taxes, penalties and interest due the IRS and the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, as well as pay a special assessment. On January 5, 2015, respondent began his prison sentence and ceased the practice of law.[FN1]
By order entered April 14, 2015, this Court found respondent's offenses constituted "serious crimes" and granted the Committee's motion immediately suspending him from the practice of law, and remanding the matter for a sanction hearing to be held within 90 days of his release from prison.
On December 15, 2015, respondent was released after serving 11 months in prison and, thereafter, completed his supervised release. Respondent also paid the assessment and, thereafter, filed his federal and state tax returns for the period 2005 through 2009, the tax years underlying the criminal matters. Respondent paid $118,000 in estimated taxes towards his tax liability.
Both the IRS and New York State are claiming significant taxes are still owed. Negotiations for a settlement and payment plan between the IRS and respondent and New York State and respondent remain ongoing.
On October 26, 2016, counsel for respondent filed an affidavit of compliance with this Court's April 14, 2015 interim suspension order.
Respondent admits that he was convicted of offenses which are defined as "serious crimes" under New York law and that his conduct violated rule 8.4 (b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0), which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in illegal conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer.
The parties agree that, in accordance with the case law and taking into account the factors in mitigation, a suspension of 2
This Court has previously imposed a range of sanctions on lawyers convicted of similar offenses (see Matter of Schnall, 146 AD3d 81 [1st Dept 2016]; Matter of Racht, 120 AD3d 156 [1st Dept 2014]; Matter of Roisman, 89 AD3d 164 [1st Dept 2011]). Longer suspensions have been imposed where the tax offenses were combined with willful or obstructive conduct, which is the case at bar (Matter of O'Brien, 136 AD3d 95 [1st Dept 2015]; Matter of Eagan, 142 AD3d 182 [2d Dept 2016]; Matter of Gamliel, 122 AD3d 125, 127 [2d Dept 2014]; Matter of Colbert, 121 AD3d 323 [2d Dept 2014]; compare Matter of Kelly, 250 AD2d 291 [1st Dept 1998]).
The parties have agreed further, subject to this Court's consent, that in light of his age, the absence of any new allegations, and respondent's desire to return to "productive activity so that he may repay his back tax liability and teach abroad, as he plans to do," he should be allowed to apply for reinstatement immediately.
In light of the foregoing, we find that the proposed discipline of a 2
As the period of suspension has already run, respondent may apply for reinstatement (22 NYCRR 1240.16 [c] [2]). Therefore, it is unnecessary for this Court to give respondent "permission to apply for reinstatement immediately," as the parties request.
Acosta, P.J., Friedman, Sweeny, Gische and Tom, JJ., concur.
Joint motion is granted to the extent of suspending respondent from the practice of law in the State of New York for a period of 2