| 322 W. 47th St. HDFC v Loo |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 50227(U) [50 Misc 3d 143(A)] |
| Decided on February 25, 2016 |
| Appellate Term, First Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Tenant appeals from (1) an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (Arlene H. Hahn, J.), dated January 16, 2015, which, after a hearing, overruled the traverse, and (2) a final judgment (same court and Judge), entered July 30, 2015, after a nonjury trial, which awarded possession to landlord in a holdover summary proceeding.
Per Curiam.
Final judgment (Arlene H. Hahn, J.), entered July 30, 2015, affirmed, with $25 costs, for the reasons stated by Arlene H. Hahn, J. at Civil Court. Appeal from order (Arlene H. Hahn, J.), dated January 16, 2015, dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeal from the final judgment.
Landlord, a housing development fund corporation (HDFC), seeks to recover possession of the subject apartment on the basis that tenant, after the building was converted to cooperative ownership, failed to purchase her unit. Inasmuch as landlord alleged and proved a cause for eviction other than the mere expiration of tenant's lease (see 512 E. 11th St. HDFC v Grimmet, 181 AD2d 488 [1992], appeal dismissed 80 NY2d 892 [1992]; 80 St. Nicholas Ave. HDFC v Lewis, 24 Misc 3d 134[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51473[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2009]), the requisite good cause for terminating tenant's month-to-month tenancy was established. Nor was landlord's delay in commencing the within holdover proceeding fatal to its possessory claim (see Schorr v New York City Dept. Of Hous. Preserv. & Dev., 10 NY3d 776 [2008]; see also 546 W. 156 St. HDFC v Smalls, 43 AD3d 7, 14 [2007]).
We also find no basis to disturb the traverse court's findings of fact, which in large part turned on witness credibility (see Holtzer v Stepper, 268 AD2d 372 [2000]), and agree that service of the underlying notice of termination was properly effectuated upon tenant in compliance with RPAPL § 735(1). In the particular circumstances at issue, the outer bounds of [*2]tenant's actual dwelling place must be deemed to extend to the exterior door of the building at which the process server's progress was arrested (see generally F.I. duPont, Glore Forgan & Co., 41 NY2d 794, 797 [1977]). We have considered and rejected tenant's remaining arguments.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.