Appeal from a judgment of the City Court of White Plains, Westchester County (JoAnn Friia, J.), rendered January 2, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of harassment in the second degree.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Defendant was charged in a superseding information with harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]). At a nonjury trial, the testimony revealed that defendant and the complainant had lived together at a YWCA and, on February 12, 2012, there had been a physical altercation between them which involved a radio that defendant thought was being played too loudly by the complainant. Following the trial, the City Court found defendant guilty as charged.

The crux of Penal Law § 240.26 (1) is the element of physical contact: actual, attempted, or threatened (see People v Bartkow, 96 NY2d 770 [2001]). Although not rising to the level of an assault causing physical injury (Penal Law § 10.00 [9]), petty forms of offensive touching, such as striking, shoving and kicking, are prohibited when committed with the intent to harass, annoy or alarm the victim. Furthermore, as there is "[o]ften . . . no direct evidence of a defendant's mental state" (People v Smith, 79 NY2d 309, 315 [1992]), the element of intent may "be inferred from the act itself" or from the defendant's "conduct and the surrounding circumstances" (People v Bracey, 41 NY2d 296, 301 [1977]; see also People v Griffin, 31 Misc 3d 130[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 50574[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2011]; People v Strong, 179 Misc 2d 809 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 1999]).

Contrary to defendant's contention, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish each element of harassment in the second degree, in violation of Penal Law § 240.26 (1). Here, the testimony reveals, and defendant now concedes, that she struck, punched, and kicked the complainant thereby subjecting her to physical contact. Thus, the only remaining issue is whether defendant's intent to harass, annoy or alarm the complainant was proven at trial. Defendant testified that when she came out of her room and walked toward the radio it was her intention to "pull out the radio." Defendant admitted that she had the ability to use her cell phone and dial the front desk to complain about the loud music, but, instead, since the complainant refused to turn down the volume of the radio, she decided to take matters into her own hands. She further admitted that while she was struggling with the complainant, the cord had become unplugged and the music was not playing. Yet, the testimony demonstrates that defendant continued to punch and kick the complainant even after the complainant had fallen to the floor while holding the radio in her hands. Thus, whereas defendant's stated purpose was to pull out the radio plug from the socket, her intent in achieving this goal was to do so through physical intimidation by beating the complainant and harassing her until the complainant handed over the radio. As a result, defendant's intent to harass, annoy or alarm the complainant can be inferred [*2]from the physical confrontation itself and from defendant's conduct and the surrounding circumstances (see Bracey, 41 NY2d at 301). In fact, defendant admitted at trial that the whole incident could have been resolved had she just called the front desk instead of confronting the complainant.

In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear their testimony and observe their demeanor (see People v Lane, 7 NY3d 888, 890 [2006]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon a review of the record, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Marano, P.J., Iannacci and Garguilo, JJ., concur.