Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Alexander Jeong, J.), rendered June 2, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is modified, on the law, by reducing defendant's conviction of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree to unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, and vacating the sentence imposed thereon; as so modified, the judgment of conviction is affirmed and the matter is remitted to the Criminal Court for resentencing on the conviction of unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle.

Insofar as is relevant to this appeal, the charges of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [1] [a]) and unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 509 [1]) were presented to the jury with respect to an incident involving defendant on September 5, 2009. Following deliberations, defendant was convicted of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree. On appeal, defendant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish her guilt of that charge, beyond a reasonable doubt, because the evidence did not show that she knew or had reason to know, on September 5, 2009, that her driver's license had been revoked.

To convict defendant of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 (1) (a), the People had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that, on September 5, 2009, defendant "operate[d] a motor vehicle upon a public highway while knowing or having reason to know that such person's license or privilege of operating such motor vehicle in this state or privilege of obtaining a license to operate such motor vehicle issued by the commissioner is suspended, revoked or otherwise withdrawn by the commissioner" (emphasis added). In order to establish that defendant knew, or had reason to know, that her license had been revoked, the People sought to prove that the revocation notice had been properly mailed to defendant so that they could then invoke the rebuttable presumption that this notice had been received by defendant (see e.g. Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 [2001]).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), it is uncontroverted that the notice of revocation which the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) allegedly mailed to defendant was dated November 18, 2009, which is more than two months after the September 5, 2009 incident. Moreover, the People failed to show that defendant had reason to know that her license had been revoked on September 5, 2009 due to her unrelated April 21, 2009 conviction. As a result, the People failed to establish that defendant knew, or had reason to know, that her license or privilege of operating a motor vehicle in New York had been "suspended, revoked or otherwise withdrawn by the commissioner."

In view of the foregoing, we reduce the judgment convicting defendant of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [1] [*2][a]) to the lesser included offense of unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 509 [1]), which offense lacks the element of knowledge that one's license to operate a motor vehicle had been suspended or revoked (see People v Pacer, 6 NY3d 504, 513 [2006]).

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is modified by reducing defendant's conviction of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree to unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle and vacating the sentence imposed thereon, and the matter is remitted to the Criminal Court for resentencing on the conviction of unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle.

Aliotta, J.P., Solomon and Elliot, JJ., concur.