Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, First District (Toni A. Bean, J.), rendered April 4, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminal contempt in the second degree.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Defendant's conviction, following a jury trial, of criminal contempt in the second degree (Penal Law § 215.30 [3]) stems from his violation of an order of protection in favor of his wife and against him, issued on or about November 13, 2011, by the District Court of Suffolk County (Glenn A. Murphy, J.).

The factual part of the accusatory instrument alleged that at approximately 2:34 a.m. on December 23, 2011, defendant engaged in intentional disobedience or resistance to the lawful process or other mandate of a court, by calling his wife and leaving three voice messages. It specified the docket number and the date of the order of protection, and that it was issued by Judge Glenn Murphy. The factual part of the accusatory instrument further alleged that defendant was aware of the order, as he had been advised of its issuance and contents in court. The order, among other things, directed him to "[r]efrain from communication or any contact by mail, telephone, e-mail, voicemail or other electronic or any means with" his wife. In addition, a supporting deposition was filed consisting of a detailed statement by defendant's wife, which set forth the docket number and date of issue of the order of protection, specified defendant's cell phone number and the exact times of the three calls, and quoted the three voice messages verbatim.

The factual allegations of the accusatory instrument, together with the supporting deposition, are facially sufficient, as they establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and defendant's commission thereof, thereby satisfying the "prima facie case requirement" applicable to informations (People v Dumay, 23 NY3d 518, 522 [2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPL 100.15 [3]; 100.40 [1] [b], [c]; People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 228-229 [2009]).

Penal Law § 215.50 (3) provides that a person is guilty of criminal contempt in the second degree when he or she "engages in any of the following conduct . . . [i]ntentional disobedience or resistance to the lawful process or other mandate of a court except in cases involving or growing out of labor disputes." This court has determined that "[t]he essential elements of criminal contempt in the second degree are that a lawful order of the court was in effect and was clearly expressed, that the defendant had knowledge of its provisions . . . and that the defendant intentionally disobeyed it" (People v Labagh, 40 Misc 3d 54, 56-57 [App Term, 9th [*2]& 10th Jud Dists 2013]; see Matter of McCormick v Axelrod, 59 NY2d 574, 583 [1983]). Here, the factual allegations of the accusatory instrument, together with the supporting deposition, established the essential elements of criminal contempt in the second degree (Penal Law § 215.50 [3]; see People v Santana, 7 NY3d 234, 236-237 [2006]; People v Labagh, 40 Misc 3d at 56-57).

Evidence was adduced at the trial that, on December 23, 2011, between 2:30 a.m. and 3:00 a.m., defendant made three successive telephone calls to his wife, and left three voice messages on her answering machine. Defendant admitted that he made the calls and left the messages. He claimed, in effect, that he made the calls because his son and his son's girlfriend were allegedly selling drugs from defendant's wife's house, and were using drugs. He asserted that his children were in grave danger because of their exposure to drugs. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to support defendant's conviction of criminal contempt in the second degree (see People v Jenkins, 21 Misc 3d 134[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52196[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2008]).

In exercising our factual review power (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]), we accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear their testimony, observe their demeanor, and assess their credibility (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). We must weigh "the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony" (People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), and determine whether an acquittal would not have been unreasonable based upon the evidence, and whether the jury failed to accord the evidence the weight it should have been accorded (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d at 348; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495). Based on the evidence, an acquittal in this case would have been unreasonable. Thus, the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence.

Defendant testified at the trial in his own behalf. He asserted, among other things, that he did not use drugs. He stated that drug use affected the community, and destroyed families. He was "against it," as it devalued a neighborhood. Based on that testimony, the District Court granted the prosecutor's request to call a rebuttal witness to establish that defendant did use drugs. The rebuttal witness testified, among other things, that he smoked marijuana with defendant in 2007, and that, after they did so, defendant permitted his son and the rebuttal witness to drive defendant's Porsche.

The District Court correctly permitted the prosecutor to call the rebuttal witness, as defendant's testimony constituted a "global denial" of his use of drugs (People v Dunkley, 61 AD3d 428, 429 [2009]; see People v Alvino, 71 NY2d 233, 245 [1987]; People v Wilson, 77 AD3d 858, 859 [2010]; People v Bailey, 159 AD2d 862 [1990]). To the extent the District Court erred in permitting the rebuttal witness to testify that after they smoked marijuana, defendant allegedly permitted his son and the rebuttal witness to drive defendant's Porsche, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming, and there is no significant probability that defendant would have been acquitted but for this error (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]; People v Wilson, 93 AD3d 483, 484 [2012]; People v Davis, 67 AD3d 1397 [2009]).

The People concede that the District Court overstepped its bounds by directing defendant to turn over documents prepared or obtained by defendant himself, which related to his own testimony, rather than to that of defendant's witnesses. Disclosure of such documents is not authorized by CPL 240.45 (2) (a). However, the People correctly argue that, based on the overwhelming proof of defendant's guilt, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to defendant's conviction (see People v Calero, 105 AD3d 864, 865 [2013]).

Defendant's claim that the trial court should have provided the jury with a justification charge under the emergency doctrine (Penal Law § 35.05 [2]) is unpreserved for appellate review, as defendant did not request such an instruction (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Farrell, 28 AD3d 244, 244-245 [2006]). In any event, his contention is without merit, as, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant, we find that his placing of three calls to his wife in the middle of the night, in violation of an order of protection, was not "necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury which is about to occur by reason of a situation occasioned or developed through no fault of the actor" (Penal Law § 35.05 [2]). The justification charge under the emergency doctrine involves a choice of evils. The "statutory standard, by its terms, [is] objective," not subjective (People v Craig, 78 NY2d 616, 622 [1991]; see People v Rodriguez, 16 NY3d 341, 343 [2011]; People v Lemmo, 85 AD3d 1204 [2011]; People v Santana, 16 AD3d 346, 346-347 [2005]). Thus, Penal Law § 35.05 (2) was not applicable to this case.

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Tolbert, J.P., Marano and Garguilo, JJ., concur.