Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Hannah Cohen, J.), entered January 23, 2013. The order granted a motion by tenant David Temammee to vacate a default final judgment and to dismiss the petition in a nonpayment summary proceeding. ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that the branch of the motion by tenant David Temammee seeking to vacate the default final judgment and dismiss the petition based on a lack of personal jurisdiction is granted to the extent of setting the matter down for a traverse hearing to determine whether tenant David Temammee was properly served with the notice of petition and petition, and the motion is otherwise denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

After tenants failed to appear or submit an answer in this nonpayment summary proceeding seeking to recover unpaid rent for September and October 2012, a default final judgment was entered against them in November 2012. Thereafter, David Temammee (tenant) moved to vacate the default final judgment and to dismiss the petition, asserting that the Civil Court lacked personal jurisdiction over him and that he had an excuse for the default and a meritorious defense. In support of the motion, tenant specifically denied the statement in the affidavit of the process server that tenant had been personally served with the notice of petition and petition. Moreover, tenant stated that he had not received from landlord a written rent demand, which, contrary to landlord's assertion, had not been sent to him by certified mail, and that he had a meritorious defense because landlord had failed to make repairs to the apartment. By order dated January 23, 2013, the Civil Court granted tenant's motion and dismissed the petition without prejudice, finding that the "petition is jurisdictionally defective" because "petitioner does not have proof that the rent demand was served by certified mail."

The Civil Court erred in dismissing the petition as "jurisdictionally defective" based on a defect in the service of the written rent notice. A failure to comply with the statutory requirements for service of a rent notice does not affect a court's subject matter jurisdiction, which is conferred by statute (CCA 204; see 170 W. 85th St. Tenants Assn. v Cruz, 173 AD2d 338, 339 [1991]; 716 Realty, LLC v Zadik, 38 Misc 3d 139[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50194[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud DIsts 2013]). In any event, while a statutory rent notice (RPAPL 711 [2]) is one of "the facts upon which the special proceeding is based" (RPAPL 741 [4]; see Martine Assoc. LLC v Minck, 5 Misc 3d 61 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2004]; Kentpark Realty Corp. v Lasertone Corp., 3 Misc 3d 28 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]), and a landlord must establish either that a personal demand for rent was made or that a three-day notice was served in the manner prescribed in RPAPL 735 (RPAPL 711 [2]; see Community Hous. Innovations, Inc. v Franklin, 14 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50050[U] [*2][App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007]), here tenant failed to address landlord's assertion in the verified petition that a demand for rent had also been personally made. In view of the foregoing, there was no basis to dismiss the petition as "jurisdictionally defective."

However, tenant further alleged that he had never been personally served with the notice of petition and petition. If the Civil Court, in fact, lacked personal jurisdiction over tenant, it is irrelevant whether tenant had a reasonable excuse for his default and a meritorious defense to the proceeding, inasmuch as the judgment must be vacated and the proceeding dismissed (see McMullen v Arnone, 79 AD2d 496 [1981]; see also CPLR 5015 [a] [4]).

It is well settled that a process server's affidavit of service constitutes prima facie evidence of proper service (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Quinones, 114 AD3d 719 [2014]; Rox Riv. 83 Partners v Ettinger, 276 AD2d 782 [2000]). In order to rebut this showing and raise an issue of fact necessitating a traverse hearing, tenant was required to submit a sworn, nonconclusory denial of service (see NYCTL 1998-1 Trust v Rabinowitz, 7 AD3d 459 [2004]; see also 25 E. 26th St. Owners Corp. v Beaton, 50 AD3d 845 [2008]; Sando Realty Corp. v Aris, 209 AD2d 682 [1991]). We find that the nonconclusory allegations contained in tenant's affidavit were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to the propriety of the service of process. Consequently, a traverse hearing is required to determine whether tenant had, in fact, been personally served with the notice of petition and petition.

We note that if, following the hearing, it is determined that the Civil Court had obtained personal jurisdiction over tenant, tenant would not be entitled to vacatur of the default final judgment based on excusable default (see CPLR 5015 [a]), as his conclusory statement that landlord failed to make certain unspecified repairs to the apartment is insufficient to establish the existence of a potentially meritorious defense (see Good Realty, LLC v Weingarten, 32 Misc 3d 137[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51538[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that tenant's motion to vacate the default final judgment and dismiss the petition is granted only to the extent of setting the motion down for a traverse hearing to determine whether tenant was personally served with the notice of petition and petition.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.