Appeal from five judgments of the District Court of Nassau County, Nassau County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency (Lawrence M. Schaffer, J.H.O.), rendered December 21, 2012. The judgments convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of disobeying a traffic control device, improper passing, unsafe lane change (two counts), and following too closely, respectively.

ORDERED that the judgments convicting defendant of improper passing, unsafe lane change (two counts) and following too closely are affirmed; and it is further,

ORDERED that the judgment convicting defendant of disobeying a traffic control device is reversed, on the law and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, and the simplified traffic information charging that offense is dismissed.

During the morning of June 4, 2012, on the eastbound Long Island Expressway in Nassau County, a police officer pulled over a vehicle driven by defendant and issued five summonses alleging that defendant had committed the traffic infractions of disobeying a traffic control device (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1110), improper passing (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1123), unsafe lane change (two counts) (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128 [a]), and following too closely (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129 [a]), respectively. At a nonjury trial, the officer testified, among other things, that defendant, who had less than two people in his vehicle, had improperly been in the high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lane "during the HOV time," which lane, at that time, was restricted to vehicles containing at least two occupants; that defendant had improperly swerved to the right from the HOV lane through an entrance to the HOV lane and into the left lane of the non-HOV lanes; that defendant had passed on the right a vehicle that was in the HOV lane; that he had swerved back into the HOV lane; and that he had traveled one car length behind another vehicle. Defendant was convicted of all of the charges.

Defendant's contention that the simplified traffic informations should be dismissed as defective because, among other things, the officer failed to provide him with a supporting deposition, is improperly raised for the first time on appeal. In any event, as defendant did not move to dismiss the simplified traffic informations, in writing and with notice to the People, on that ground before his trial commenced, he waived that alleged defect, and appellate review of this claim is foreclosed (see CPL 170.30 [1] [a]; 170.35 [1] [a]; 170.45; 210.45 [1]; People v Beattie, 80 NY2d 840, 842-843 [1992]; People v Key, 45 NY2d 111, 116 [1978]; People v Long, 44 Misc 3d 126[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50949[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2014]; People v Garrido-Sanchez, 39 Misc 3d 137[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 52468[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2012]; People v Turnbull, 2003 NY Slip Op 51183[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2003]; People v Fattizzi, 98 Misc 2d 288, 289-290 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 1978]).

Defendant failed to preserve for appeal any claim of legal insufficiency of the evidence, by not moving for dismissal in the District Court (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 [*2]NY3d 484, 491-492 [2008]; People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19-20 [1995]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to support the convictions of improper passing (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1123 [b]), unsafe lane change (two counts) (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128 [a]; People v Parris, 26 AD3d 393, 394 [2006]; People v Riggio, 202 AD2d 609, 610 [1994]; People v Marshall, 30 Misc 3d 145[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 52388[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2010]; People v Moran, 17 Misc 3d 1116[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52021[U], *2-3 [Suffolk Dist Ct 2007]), and following too closely (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129 [a]; cf. People v Twoguns, 108 AD3d 1091, 1093 [2013]), respectively. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdicts of guilt as to these four charges were not against the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]; People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 644 [2006]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).

However, the evidence with respect to the charge of disobeying a traffic control device was legally insufficient to establish defendant's guilt of that charge. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1110 (b) states that "[n]o provision of this title for which signs are required shall be enforced against an alleged violator if at the time and place of the alleged violation an official sign is not in proper position and sufficiently legible to be seen by an ordinarily observant person." Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1110 (c) and (d), respectively, provide for rebuttable presumptions that traffic-control devices were "placed by the official act or direction of lawful authority" and "comply with the requirements" of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Notwithstanding these presumptions, the prosecutor, in order to meet the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt a case involving a violation of a traffic control device (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 153), must show, among other things, that the device was in place at the time of the alleged violation, and provide a description of the sign and/or pavement markings. Here, the ticketing officer did not even establish

Defendant's remaining claims are either raised for the first time on appeal or

Accordingly, the judgments convicting defendant of improper passing, unsafe

Iannacci, J.P., Marano and Garguilo, JJ., concur.