Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Carolyn E. Wade, J.), entered on July 2, 2012. The order denied defendant's motion to vacate a default judgment.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.

In December 2006, plaintiff commenced this consumer credit transaction to recover unpaid credit card charges. The affidavit of service of process indicates that the summons and complaint were delivered to a person of suitable age and discretion at a Brooklyn address and that copies thereof were subsequently mailed to the same address (see CPLR 308 [2]). Defendant failed to appear or answer and, on March 8, 2007, a default judgment was entered against defendant in the sum of $3,644.98.

In April 2012, defendant moved to vacate the default judgment. In an affidavit in support of the motion, defendant argued that he had a reasonable excuse for his default in that he "was never informed of the within action," and he "never received any court papers or Plaintiff papers"; that the statute of limitations had expired; that the court lacked personal jurisdiction because the summons and complaint were not properly served; that he did not owe the money; and that plaintiff lacked standing. Defendant further stated that he had "denied" the entire debt in 2001, and that he had never received any billing statements or correspondence regarding the alleged debt since 2001. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing, among other things, that defendant had failed to show that the service of process was improper. Moreover, plaintiff asserted that the four-year statute of limitations had not expired when this action had been commenced in December 2006, since the last payment on the debt was made on February 1, 2003. By order dated June 24, 2012, the Civil Court denied defendant's motion.

In moving to vacate the default judgment, defendant argued, in effect, that he was entitled to relief pursuant to CPLR 317 and/or CPLR 5015. Defendant's contention that the Civil Court lacked personal jurisdiction over him (see CPLR 5015 [a] [4]) must be determined prior to any other issue (see Caba v Rai, 63 AD3d 578, 581 n 1 [2009]). Absent proper service, a default judgment may be vacated at any time (see Roseboro v Roseboro, 131 AD2d 557 [1987]) as it is void (see McMullen v Arnone, 79 AD2d 496 [1981]).

CPLR 308 (2) authorizes service by delivery of the summons to a person of suitable age and discretion at the defendant's dwelling place or usual place of abode, and by mailing the [*2]summons to the defendant's last known residence. It is well settled that a process server's sworn affidavit of service constitutes prima facie evidence of proper service pursuant to CPLR 308 (2) (see Bankers Trust Co. of Cal. v Tsoukas, 303 AD2d 343 [2003]). The affidavit of service in the case at bar states that the summons and complaint were delivered to defendant's mother, a person of suitable age and discretion, whose physical description was set forth in detail, at the same address that defendant subsequently listed on his motion papers, followed by the required mailing. The process server's affidavit established, prima facie, that defendant had been properly served pursuant to CPLR 308 (2). In support of his motion to vacate, defendant stated that the summons and complaint had not been properly served and that he had never received any court papers. Inasmuch as defendant's jurisdictional claim was wholly conclusory, he failed to establish that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him (see CPLR 5015 [a] [4]).

Defendant also proffered no reasonable excuse for his default; therefore, relief is not warranted pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1). We note that any matter improperly raised for the first time in reply papers will not be considered (see McNair v Lee, 24 AD3d 159 [2005]). Moreover, it is noted that although defendant was served with process via substituted service, he cannot utilize CPLR 317 because his April 2012 motion to vacate the default judgment was made more than five years after the default judgment had been entered on March 8, 2007.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 28, 2014