Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Town of Wallkill, Orange County (Patrick S. Owen, J.), re ndered October 17, 2011. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, convicted defendant of speeding in posted work area.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Following a nonjury trial in the Justice Court, defendant was convicted of speeding in a posted work area (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 [f]). On appeal, defendant contends that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, that the evidence was legally insufficient and that the court was biased.

In order to determine whether a defendant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial pursuant to CPL 30.20, the following factors must be considered:
"(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay" (People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445 [1975]). Upon weighing the Taranovich factors in the case at bar, we find that defendant was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial (see People v Watts, 57 NY2d 299 [1982] People v Johnson, 184 AD2d 862 [1992] People v Dury, 179 AD2d 821 [1992]), particularly since he was not incarcerated for any period of time and he did not demonstrate that any prejudice resulted from the delay or that his defense was impaired. Furthermore, it was not an abuse of discretion for the Justice Court to have granted the People a short adjournment when the state trooper did not appear in court on the first scheduled trial date, as no protected fundamental right was affected (see People v Spears, 64 NY2d 698 [1984] People v Singleton, 41 NY2d 402 [1977] People v Struss, 79 AD3d 773 [2010] People v McRae, 62 AD3d 723 [2009]).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we are of the opinion that the proof was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt of speeding in a posted work area beyond a reasonable doubt. Radar readings are generally admissible and may independently be sufficient to prove a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 if there is reasonable proof of the device's accuracy (see People v Dusing, 5 NY2d 126, 128 [1959]). A radar device's accuracy may be established by proof that a police officer, who is a qualified radar operator, conducted tests indicating that the radar was functioning properly at the time of the incident (see Matter of Graf v Foschio, 102 AD2d 891 [1984] People v Goess, 34 Misc 3d 152[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50303[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2012] People v Susana, 29 Misc 3d 144[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 52218[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2010]). Calibration records are not needed to establish the accuracy of a radar device (see People v Goess, 34 Misc 3d 152[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50303[U] People v Susana, 29 Misc 3d 144[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 52218[U]).

Here, the state trooper's radar operation certification card, issued by the New York State Police, was entered into evidence. The trooper testified that he had conducted the appropriate [*2]calibration tests on the radar device. Thus, the trooper's testimony that, as a qualified operator, he had used a properly calibrated radar device to measure defendant's speed at 81 miles per hour in a posted 55 mile per hour work area sufficed independently to prove a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 (f) (see People v Dusing, 5 NY2d at 128; People v Goess, 34 Misc 3d 152[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50303[U] People v Susana, 29 Misc 3d 144[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 52218[U]). Furthermore, it is within the court's discretion to decide whether to admit certain documentation, such as the radar device's manual, into evidence (see generally People v Petty, 7 NY3d 277 [2006] People v Jin Cheng Lin, 105 AD3d 761 [2013]).

Moreover, even if the proof of the calibration of the radar was inadequate, a reading from an untested radar unit, coupled with a qualified officer's visual estimate, suffices to prove the offense, particularly if the visual estimate sufficiently corroborated the radar measurement to render "any perceived deficiency in the radar evidence . . . of no consequence" (People v Knight, 72 NY2d 481, 488 [1988] see also People v Goess, 34 Misc 3d 152[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50303[U] People v Susana, 29 Misc 3d 144[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 52218[U] People v Ramaker, 9 Misc 3d 131[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51592[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005]). Thus, the trooper's testimony that he had received training to visually estimate the rate of speed of a vehicle and that he had determined defendant's rate of speed to be 80 miles per hour, which was nearly identical to the 81 mile per hour rate that the radar unit had measured, was sufficient to prove a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 (f) (see People v Knight, 72 NY2d at 488). In any event, the trooper's testimony that he had visually estimated the speed of defendant's vehicle to be 80 miles per hour, which exceeded the posted work area speed limit by 25 miles per hour, was alone sufficient to establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Olsen, 22 NY2d 230, 232 [1968]).

Finally, as to defendant's claims of bias, he failed to interpose "any specific, relevant objection to the trial court's alleged bias" (People v Prado, 1 AD3d 533, 534 [2003]) and, thus, he did not preserve such claim for appellate review (see People v Bellamy, 5 Misc 3d 131[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 51347[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2004]). In any event, although defendant contends that the court's return (see CPL 460.10 [3] [d]) was incomplete, since he failed to move to amend the return (see CPL 460.10 [3] [e]), the facts set forth therein are conclusive as to all controverted matters and this court, as well as all parties, are bound thereby (see People v Prior, 4 NY2d 70, 73 [1958] People v Seseri, 22 Misc 3d 129[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50052[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2009] People v Galimore, 11 Misc 3d 143[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 50744[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2006] People v Ohberg, 6 Misc 3d 129[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50060[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005]). Thus, inasmuch as there was nothing in the return to support defendant's contention that the court acted in a manner that deprived him of a fair trial or demonstrated bias toward him, the judgment of conviction should not be disturbed (see People v Kikkenborg, 27 Misc 3d 133[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50710[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2010] People v Ohberg, 6 Misc 3d 129[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50060[U]).

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Nicolai, P.J., LaSalle and Marano, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: January 31, 2014