Shillingsford v Geiss (2013 NY Slip Op 51110(U))

Shillingsford v Geiss

2013 NY Slip Op 51110(U) [40 Misc 3d 129(A)]

Decided on July 1, 2013

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Ella Shillingsford, Appellant, —

against

Virginia Geiss, Respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin Kelly Sheares, J.), entered December 27, 2011. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the action.

Plaintiff commenced this small claims action against defendant, her former attorney, to recover the sum of $700, which she had paid to defendant for representing her in a Family Court proceeding. After a nonjury trial, the Civil Court dismissed the action. Upon a review of the record, we find that the judgment provided the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (CCA 1804, 1807; see Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]).

The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, [*2]184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]). This standard applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d at 126).

Contrary to plaintiff's contention, her decision to proceed without counsel did not entitle her to any greater rights than those afforded to other litigants (see Sloninski v Weston, 232 AD2d 913 [1996]; Roundtree v Singh, 143 AD2d 995 [1988]; Nawal v Silva, 20 Misc 3d 145[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51875[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]). Moreover, although plaintiff testified that she had not read the terms of the retainer agreement when it was signed, she "is conclusively presumed to know its contents and to [have] assent[ed] to them" (Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v Stone, 5 AD2d 110, 114 [1957]). Plaintiff's argument that the terms of the retainer agreement were ambiguous lacks merit. As the record supports the Civil Court's determination, we find no reason to disturb the judgment.