People v Weisz (Michael) |
2012 NY Slip Op 51301(U) [36 Misc 3d 132(A)] |
Decided on June 29, 2012 |
Appellate Term, Second Department |
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Appeal from judgments of the Justice Court of the Village of Woodsburgh, Nassau County
(Carol F. Isaac, J.), rendered March 18, 2010. The judgments convicted defendant, after a
nonjury trial, of turning in violation of a sign prohibiting turns on a red light, failing to signal and
failing to wear a seatbelt, respectively.
ORDERED that so much of the appeal as is from the judgment convicting defendant of failing to wear a seatbelt is dismissed as abandoned; and it is further,
ORDERED that the judgments convicting defendant of turning in violation of a sign prohibiting turns on a red light and failing to signal are affirmed.
Defendant was charged in separate simplified traffic informations with turning in violation of a sign prohibiting turns on a red light (Woodsburgh Village Code § 140-40), failing to signal (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 [b]) and failing to wear a seatbelt (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1229-c). Following a nonjury trial, defendant was convicted of the charged offenses.
At the outset, we note that the simplified traffic information charging defendant with turning in violation of a sign prohibiting turns on a red light improperly cited the offense as violating Woodsburgh Village Code § 140-4, rather than the appropriate section, § 140-40. However, the accusatory instrument was nevertheless jurisdictionally sufficient, as the factual [*2]allegations clearly advised defendant of the charge (see People v Love, 306 NY 18, 23 [1953]; People v Norman, 1 Misc 3d 127[A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51537[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2009]).
Defendant's argument that the prosecutor improperly asked leading questions in violation of defendant's due process right to a fair trial is unpreserved, as defendant failed to assert a constitutional objection to these inquiries at trial (see People v Angelo, 88 NY2d 217 [1996]; People v Milan, 45 AD3d 255 [2007]; People v Schindler, 27 Misc 3d 127[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50578[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2010]). To the extent that defendant's claim is preserved as a state law evidentiary issue, we find that the prosecutor's questions were not so egregious that it could be said that the Justice Court improvidently exercised its discretion in permitting them (see People v Jenkins, 21 Misc 3d 134[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52196[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2008], citing People v Weaver, 302 AD2d 872, 873 [2003]).
Defendant's contentions regarding the legal sufficiency of the evidence are likewise unpreserved (see CPL 470.05). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant had turned in violation of a sign prohibiting turns on a red light (Woodsburgh Village Code § 140-40). The testimony of the police officer established that the light was red when defendant turned at the intersection, in spite of a clearly visible sign proscribing turns on red lights at that location. The evidence was also legally sufficient to establish that defendant had failed to signal before turning (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 [b]). The police officer testified unequivocally that he had observed defendant as he had approached the intersection and as he had turned the vehicle, and defendant had never signaled his intention to turn by illuminating the turn signal on the vehicle or by using hand signals.
Accordingly, the judgments convicting defendant of turning in violation of a sign prohibiting turns on a red light and failing to signal are affirmed.
Molia, J.P., Iannacci and LaSalle, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: June 29, 2012