People v Smith
2011 NY Slip Op 06536 [87 AD3d 920]
September 22, 2011
Appellate Division, First Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, November 9, 2011


The People of the State of New York, Respondent,
v
Mikal Smith, Appellant.

[*1]

Leonard J. Levenson, New York, for appellant.

Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Britta Gilmore of counsel), for respondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (A. Kirke Bartley, J.), rendered March 16, 2009, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of burglary in the third degree, robbery in the second degree, criminal impersonation in the first degree and petit larceny, and sentencing him, as a second violent felony offender, to an aggregate term of nine years, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of vacating the burglary conviction and dismissing that count of the indictment, and otherwise affirmed.

Except as to the burglary conviction, the verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. Defendant, together with an accomplice, impersonated police officers in order to effect physical control over the victim. They compelled him to submit to a patdown, and in the process they took property from his person. This satisfied the force element of second-degree robbery (see People v Lomba, 183 AD2d 672 [1992], lv denied 80 NY2d 906 [1992]; People v Lazarcheck, 176 AD2d 691, 692 [1991], lv denied 79 NY2d 1003 [1992]). The theft was not merely a larceny by trick, because the removal of property was accomplished not only by impersonating police officers, but also by physically restraining the victim during the patdown.

The evidence did not satisfy the unlawful entry element of burglary. Defendant only entered the common areas of an apartment building. There was no evidence that the general public was excluded from these areas (see People v Maisonet, 304 AD2d 674 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 584 [2003]). At the time of the robbery, the victim's building had no doorman, buzzer or intercom system, and the front door to the building was always unlocked. There was no evidence of any "no trespassing" signs. The fact that defendant had no legitimate reason to be [*2]in the building did not establish unlawful entry (id.; see also Penal Law § 140.00 [5]).

We have considered and rejected defendant's remaining claims. Concur—Saxe, J.P., Friedman, Acosta, DeGrasse and Abdus-Salaam, JJ.