Peat v Dorilas |
2009 NY Slip Op 50457(U) [22 Misc 3d 142(A)] |
Decided on March 16, 2009 |
Appellate Term, Second Department |
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, Fifth District (James P.
Flanagan, J.), entered September 18, 2006. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded
defendant the net principal sum of $2,500.
Judgment modified by reducing the amount of the award in favor of defendant to the net principal sum of $1,452; as so modified, affirmed without costs.
Plaintiff commenced this small claims action to recover her security deposit, and defendant counterclaimed for two months' use and occupancy, at $1,250 per month, property damage, and legal fees incurred in connection with an eviction proceeding defendant had brought against plaintiff. After a nonjury trial, the District Court awarded plaintiff her security deposit of $1,250, and awarded defendant $2,500 in use and occupancy for September and October 2005, $300 for property damage, and $950 for legal fees, for a net judgment in favor of defendant in the sum of $2,500.
The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see e.g. Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). This standard applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see e.g. Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]). Furthermore, the determination of the trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference as the court has the opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, thereby affording the trial court a better perspective from which to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses (see e.g. Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]).
The District Court credited defendant's claims of damage to the premises and of expenses incurred in the prior eviction proceeding. The District Court also credited defendant's claim that plaintiff did not quit the premises in September and that he had to have plaintiff evicted on [*2]October 5, 2005. Those findings were based in part on the credibility of the witnesses, and, as they are supported by the record, they will not be disturbed. However, even accepting the court's finding that plaintiff did not quit the premises until October 5, 2005, plaintiff is only liable for use and occupancy through that date, not for the entire month of October (Wahl v Warren, 19 Misc 3d 130[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50537[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2008]).
Therefore, to the extent the judgment awarded defendant use and occupancy beyond October 5, 2005, it did not provide the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (UDCA 1807; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d at 126). Instead, plaintiff is liable for use and occupancy only for five days in October, or for 5/31 of $1,250 ($202), which is $1,048 less than the amount awarded. Thus, we modify the judgment by reducing the net principal amount awarded to defendant by $1,048 to the sum of $1,452.
Tanenbaum, J.P., Molia and LaCava, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 16, 2009