People v Urias (2008 NY Slip Op 51484(U))

People v Urias (Jose)

2008 NY Slip Op 51484(U) [20 Misc 3d 134(A)]

Decided on July 16, 2008

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Jose Urias, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County (William M. Harrington, J.), rendered June 15, 2006. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of attempted assault in the third degree and harassment in the second degree.

Following a nonjury trial, defendant was convicted of attempted assault in the third degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.00 [1]) and harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we conclude that it was legally
sufficient to establish defendant's guilt of both offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.

The proof at trial showed that defendant grabbed and yanked the complainant's long hair and jerked her head back. There was also testimony indicating that it appeared as if defendant was going to hit the complainant with his other hand. At the same time, defendant was yelling at her and threatening that he was going to kill her. Complainant testified that she sustained "pain" in her neck and head, for which she took an unnamed medication for a day. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the People met their burden, with regard to the charge of attempted assault in the third degree (Penal Law 110.00, 120.00 [1]), of proving that defendant possessed the requisite intent to cause physical injury in the statutory sense of "impairment of physical condition or substantial pain" (Penal Law § 10.00 [9]; see People v Dunton, 270 AD2d 51 [2000]).

The People also met their burden of proof with regard to the charge of harassment in the second degree. Defendant's conduct clearly evinced the intent to harass, annoy or alarm the complainant, satisfying the requisite intent for harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]), of which he was simultaneously convicted. [*2]

Furthermore, in the exercise of our factual review power (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]; People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 644 [2006]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]), we find that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.