Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Town of LaGrange, Dutchess County (Stephen L. Greller, J.), rendered January 9, 2007. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of speeding.

Judgment of conviction affirmed.

At the outset, it should be noted that the justice's return does not respond to defendant's factual allegation in the affirmation of errors that, prior to trial, the court offered defense counsel the opportunity to have defendant plead to a reduced charge, as to which the Trooper's assent would also have been required. Thus, we deem said allegation admitted (see People v Feldes, 73 NY2d 661 [1989]). However, plea bargaining is "a practice vital to the efficient administration of the criminal justice
system" (People v Avery, 85 NY2d 503, 506 [1995]), and there is no reason to assume that because the court suggested a plea bargain, it would have been biased, prejudiced or unable to render an impartial verdict predicated upon the evidence adduced at trial (see People v Jenkins, 44 AD3d 1, 7 [2007] ["Plea agreements should be tailored to the particular circumstances of the defendant's case' (citation omitted) which is what Supreme Court, the People and defendant, attempted to do"]; People v Gonzalez, 5 AD3d 168, 168 [2004] ["There was nothing coercive, biased or otherwise improper about the court's exploration of 'the strength of the People's case, the potential sentence to which defendant was exposed . . . and the favorableness of the plea bargain' (citation omitted)"]).

With regard to defendant's contention that the court acted like a prosecutor not only in suggesting a plea bargain but also through direct questioning of the People's sole witness, it should be noted that the justice's return denies that this was the case. Moreover, in People v DeLeyden (10 NY2d 293, 294 [1961]), the Court of Appeals observed, "... in this nonjury trial, [*2]which was prosecuted by a Deputy Sheriff, it was not error for the Justice to question the witness in order to elicit sufficient facts to enable him to reach a decision." Furthermore, defendant's contention in this regard is inconsistent with other contentions set forth in the affirmation of errors, namely, that the trooper testified in narrative form, read from a script and prosecuted his own case in violating the advocate-witness rule.

A trial court has the discretion to allow testimony in a narrative form (People v Osuna, 103 AD2d 719, 720 [1984], affd 65 NY2d 822 [1985]). Because of the petty nature of the case and the absence of an assistant district attorney or the Town Attorney to propound questions, we do not deem the trial court to have abused its discretion in allowing such testimony (People v Soddano, 86 NY2d 727, 728 [1995]; People v DeLeyden, 10 NY2d at 294; People v Dudas, 1 Misc 3d 132[A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51623[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2003]).

The other issues raised herein are either unpreserved or similarly lacking in merit.

Tanenbaum, J.P., Molia and Scheinkman, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: April 21, 2008