1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	DIT CECI
4	RUISECH,
5	Appellant,
6	-against- NO. 104
7	STRUCTURE TONE INC.,
	Respondent.
9	20 Eagle Stree Albany, New Yor October 15, 202
10	Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS ASSOCIATE JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE CAITLIN J. HALLIGAN
15	
16	Appearances:
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CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Ruisech v. Structure Tone.

MR. LAVELLE: Good afternoon, Your Honors. May it please the court. My name is John Lavelle. I'm here today on behalf of the appellants. I would like to reserve two minutes at the end for rebuttal, if necessary.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yes.

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MR. LAVELLE: There are two major issues before the court here. The first would be the timeliness of the petition for leave to appeal. The second is more of a labor law issue with regard to whether or not what caused the plaintiff to fall was a - - something that's integral to the work.

So I'd like to discuss the timeliness issue.

First. There is an inconsistency between the First and Second Department with regard to NYSEF docking of notices of entry. In the Second Department, you can docket an appellate decision with the notice of entry on NYSEF directly. In the First Department, appellate decisions with notices of entry are actually filed on the trial docket NYSEF is - - -

JUDGE SINGAS: Counselor, is your position that you didn't receive notice. There may be an inconsistency, but I was looking through your papers, and is your position that you didn't know - - - you didn't receive notice, or just that it's maybe unfair the way - - -



MR. LAVELLE: The position is more the second,

Your Honor, more that it's unfair that the idea of a notice

of entry - - - and before a NYSEF, you get something in the

mail, so you have a document come in the mail, you open you

up and say, okay, you know, this - - - we've got to figure

this out.

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In this instance, you have an appellate motion, an appellate - - - the full briefing schedule, an appellate decision. That decision ends up in the trial court docket. And your remedy is to go back to the appellate court and then eventually to the Court of Appeals. So it's our position that that structure is inconsistent and insufficient as it's constituted.

JUDGE CANNATARO: And what - - - how - - - what's our ability to remedy that? Because it sounds like you have some sort of - - - I don't know what - - - if I want to call it a policy complaint or a mode of business complaint about the way these notices of entry are served. What's our power to help you?

MR. LAVELLE: So I believe it's an implementation of the system. In other words, at some point in the First Department, their dropdown menus, that option was removed. And that creates an inconsistency within department. So I do believe it's within the discretion of this court to enforce consistency between the departments to lead to

consistent results.

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CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: What is it that would allow electronic service of the notice of entry for appeals to the Court of Appeals?

MR. LAVELLE: There's a separate system for the Court of Appeals. So - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: No, I'm sorry. What's the stat - - so when I look at the CPLR, I think it's 2103(7), it authorizes electronic service pursuant to the rules of the chief administrator of the courts - - -

MR. LAVELLE: Yes.

That is, if you look at the - - - if you look at the statute that authorizes the chief administrator, his authority is limited to - - - it actually is only limited to certain of the trial courts at the moment. And there's pending legislation to expand that to all the trial courts. But it's to the trial courts. So I'm not sure that it's through 2103 that you can get any authority as to the effectiveness of electronic service as regards to the Court of Appeals.

MR. LAVELLE: So my response to that would be, nonetheless, there - - - each of the four departments do have a system under - - -  $\frac{1}{2}$ 

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Correct. Because - - -



because 2103 also starts by saying, unless otherwise authorized by law or court order. And there is an order from the four appellate divisions - - - joint order authorizing electronic service as to them. MR. LAVELLE: Okay. CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: But we don't have an order like that yet. MR. LAVELLE: Okay. CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So what is it that is the statutory basis to conclude that the electronic service, whether it's in the court of instance or it's in the Second Department, you know, whichever it is, is effective as regards our timing requirements? MR. LAVELLE: Because what I would say, Your to apprize the person, not only of the order, but in the

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Honor, is the - - - the purpose of that notice of entry is court that it's in. And by setting it up, the way it's structured, it creates an incongruity for litigants that I believe is unfair and should be remedied by this court.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, I understand that. I'm not sure you're answering my question, which is - - -

MR. LAVELLE: I'm doing my best, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: - - - it used to - - - I appreciate that. You did say that it used to be you got some paper?



1	MR. LAVELLE: Yes.
2	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Right?
3	MR. LAVELLE: Correct.
4	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So what is it that you
5	think, if you do think, changed that as regards to the
6	Court of Appeals?
7	MR. LAVELLE: Well, one
8	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Why shouldn't why
9	shouldn't you still be getting paper? What changed?
10	MR. LAVELLE: I don't believe you should, Your
11	Honor. So what so when NYSIF first came out, you'd
12	still be getting papers, and it was very confusing as to
13	when the clock started.
14	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Uh-huh.
15	MR. LAVELLE: Was it NYSEF time? Was it mailing
16	And those those things became confusing. But what's
17	happened, especially since COVID, as a practical litigation
18	matter, is people filings of NYSEF that the mailings have
19	pretty much stopped. So my point on this issue is because
20	it's an appellate order, an appellate motion, an appellate
21	decision, if you're going to channel it through NYSEF, it
22	should be channeled through the appellate NYSIF site as
23	opposed to the trial court.
24	JUDGE HALLIGAN: So the



JUDGE CANNATARO: Well, you have no underlying

problem with this court accepting NYSEF-based service of notices of entries. Is that - - - you're not disputing that?

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MR. LAVELLE: I'm not disputing that, no.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: So the practice in terms of abandoning mail is just because that has happened, not because of any change in the rules?

MR. LAVELLE: That's my understanding, Your

Honor. And I admittedly could be wrong on that issue, but

I mean, this is what I do all day, every day, and it

started with COVID, and it just is pretty much vanished.

Everything from BPs to other documents as well, used to get

motions this thick, and then that was eliminated,

especially during COVID. Even, you know, working copies

were eliminated by court rules as well.

So - - - and if there's anything else in the issue, I'd like to move to the second issue. So this whole integral to the work issue. So what you have here is there are channels dug out and there are these large glass petitions, 500-pound pieces of glass, and the channels are dug out first, and then the panels are moved by the workers. So it's not in the - - - what they called spoils or the debris of the channel digging is not integral to the work. That's debris, and it should be debris.

JUDGE GARCIA: So if you tripped over the



channel, that would be different, right?

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MR. LAVELLE: Of course. There's the famous case - there's an electrical conduit. It's part of the structure, trips over that. Okay. That's integral to the But in this instance it's a failure to maintain cleanliness at the site. And there was - - - there were multiple layers here. So the 241(6) claim with the industrial code sections. And then there were the 200 claims which follow a general negligence structure, and it's our position that the respondents did not meet their burden of proving that there was no constructive notice of them because they couldn't come up with anything. They couldn't - - - they said there were inspections. couldn't say when they were last there. They couldn't say when they had last been the area. There's no written document - - - there's no documentation. And in this case, for a summary judgment motion, the burden rests with them initially and then comes back to us, and they never shifted that burden.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: On the 200 negligence issue, do you think this is better looked at as a dangerous condition or manner of work?

MR. LAVELLE: Dangerous condition.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: And why is that?

MR. LAVELLE: Because it's debris left on the



ground, which is slippery condition. And it's not really a matter of work issue. It's a matter of their - - - they have to dig out these channels and there has to be certain debris from that. It's not the manner in which way they're doing it, it's the fact they fail to clean it after the channels were dug out.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: And so the failure to clean it properly is not a manner of work?

MR. LAVELLE: Correct.

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If no further questions.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: No. Thank you.

MR. LAVELLE: Thank you.

MS. SNYDER: All right. Good afternoon. May it please the court. Allison Snyder, with Barry McTiernan & Moore for defendant, Structure Tone. We're also - - - we also have - - - we're a move in - - - we have a motion to dismiss on the grounds of jurisdiction.

And just to address the issue of exactly what the basis is, as the court had requested, that the parties brief the issue of what starts the time of whether electronic service through NYSEF actually starts the time for leave to appeal. The basis for that is literally found in CPLR 5513(b). It says you compute the time from the date of service of the notice of the order being appealed with notice of entry. And in this particular case, there's

no dispute that it's in - - - it was a mandatory e-filing case. The chief - - - the chief of the court said that for cases in New York County beginning in 2012, that that - - - that those are mandatory e-filed cases. And if you look at the uniform rules, it specifically says that all - - - that for the filing and service of all documents in an action that's e-filed, that it has to be served by electronic means, and the electronic means is specifically stated, is literally just filing on the NYSEF site.

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Now, I understand that there may be some issues with some discrepancy between - - actually, the First

Department is the outlier. It's the Second, Third and

Fourth Departments that do allow you to go ahead and serve notice of - - or file notice of entry on that particular docket. But that doesn't really matter. The rules specifically say that as long as you file on the NYSEF site - - oh, actually - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Because you could still - - - in the other departments, you could file an either/or?

MS. SNYDER: Well, I - - it's true, you - - - it would be your preference, but I imagine that - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: So if the First Department changed their rule, here, they wouldn't allow it. But if they changed the rule, it would just allow it to be filed in both, right?

MS. SNYDER: Right. And it's - - - to be honest, it's - - - it's - - - I imagine it's just a matter of convenience. If you're appellate counsel, if you know that there's some discrepancy out there that the legislature doesn't see fit to change, then it's a very easy fix. When you're appellate counsel, you just appear in both the underlying action and the appellate division action, and you'll get - - - you'll get a notice.

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The one thing I just wanted to clarify, and I - - I apologize, I noticed as I went through my brief that I was very consistent in mis-citing the uniform rule that deals with notice of entry. It's 202.5-B(h)(2). And that specifically says that if you want to serve notice of entry that you - - you file it with the NYSEF site, and that shall constitute service by the filer.

And the one thing I just wanted to also clarify is that if you would go ahead and try and serve by other means, it doesn't - - - it doesn't affect the effectiveness of the service by electronic means. And the - - - there - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: What would have happened if you tried to file a notice of entry in this case on the appellate division docket?

MS. SNYDER: Well, we already know, with the - - with the first appeal, when the First - - - First



Department granted the defendant's appeal and dismissed the complaint, we went ahead and tried to do that, and the clerk rejected it, sent an email saying, we do things differently in the First Department. You go ahead - - -you're good to go ahead and file that in the - - - before the court of original jurisdiction, which we did. JUDGE CANNATARO: And would your argument be that that's the motivating rationale behind the - - - your argument that filing on NYSEF is filing on NYSEF; it doesn't matter which docket you're filing on? 

MS. SNYDER: Exactly. And the one thing I also wanted to say is that - - - is that the court specifically - - - or the rules specifically - - - the uniform rules specifically say that the county clerks are unable to accept papers - - - paper copies of any documents that in an - - in an electronically - - - in a mandatory filing case, they are unable to accept copies - - - paper copies of any document that must be filed by electronic means. And I just want to - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: So had you served notice of entry by mail in this case, which is a mandatory e-file case, right?

MS. SNYDER: Yes.

JUDGE CANNATARO: That would have been not accepted and potentially ineffective service?



MS. SNYDER: Well, I actually think that - - - no, I think that it would just be - - - the plaintiff would have an additional five days, I - - - I believe. Well, actually, I'm sorry, I take that back. I think you would have to do it by electronic means - - -

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JUDGE CANNATARO: Would a clerk take it? Is there a clerk somewhere - - in a mandatory e file case, if you tried to file the notice of entry done by mail, would there be a clerk who would take it?

MS. SNYDER: Well, I think you can go ahead and serve by whatever means you want. It's just what you do with your proof of service. And the rules specifically say that if you e-file and you also serve by mail, you don't get the benefit of the extra five days, you're - - - you're confined to the five day - - - you know - - - or if you then file proof of service - - - if you e-file proof of service, you know, that doesn't start your time running. So you can serve by whatever means you want. But I believe in a - - - I'm sorry, I believe in an e-file case, because the rules specifically say it has to be - - - all filings have to be - - - filing and service of all documents must -- - shall be by electronic means, the only effective way of doing it is by e-filing. If you then do something additional and try and file a paper copy, the clerk literally cannot accept it.



And I noticed that in the court's general rules it says that, you know, you don't have to serve notice of entry. Just if you have an order, it's effective on the date that it's issued. But if you want to go ahead and you know, file proof of service by some other means, it has to be in the court of original jurisdiction. And in an e-file case, the only way you're ever going to file that - - that proof of service is literally by filing on NYSEF, whether that's - - I guess - - I don't know why you would want it to go ahead and do that proof of service in an appellate division - - but if you want to, I guess they would take - - they would take it.

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But under 5513(b), it's clear that if the date for computing the time of service starts with notice of entry, and in an e-file case, you have to serve it by e-filing, then the time automatically commences. There's no other way that you can do it.

And the basis for our motion to dismiss was not only to raise that jurisdictional issue and make sure that - - - the plaintiff was taking the position that this - - - that the court had waived any issue over the jurisdiction, but also that the plaintiff failed to actually cite the date when he served his papers. And that's obviously essential for determining timeliness.

I found one single mention in the plaintiff's



1 papers that he had served his - - - his motion on December 2 23rd, and that's the 31st day. If you go ahead and - - -3 if we - - - if we serve notice of entry on eleven - - - on 4 November 22nd, and - - - so you begin to start counting on 5 November 23rd. The 30th day is December 22nd, and the 6 plaintiff was one day late. And that's just something that 7 he fails to mention over and over again in his brief in terms of timeliness. 8 9 And I - - - I'll go ahead and leave the labor law 10 issues to my colleagues. Thank you. 11 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: 12 MS. SNYDER: Thank you. 13 MR. JOHNSON: Good evening, Your Honors. This is 14 C. Briggs Johnson, for CBRE. You know, I just wanted to 15 highlight that regarding the notice of entry filed by one 16 party, that starts the clock as to all parties, right? 17 Because when the legislature amended CPLR 5513, it said 18 specifically that it provides for the commencement of time 19 to appeal is running from the time of service -20 JUDGE TROUTMAN: So it's not party - - -21 bipartisan; it's party by party? 2.2 No. It's a party. MR. JOHNSON: 23 JUDGE TROUTMAN: So are - - - you're saying 24 everybody gets benefit - - -



From Structure Tones notice of

MR. JOHNSON:

entry. That's correct. And as the Second Department said in the Rogowski Farm case, you know, when - - - the - - - when you look at the statutory text and you're interpreting the statute the clearest intent of what the legislature wanted to say is in the statutory text, and it says time to appeal is running from service of order with written notice of entry - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: What about Rotenberg?

MR. JOHNSON: Excuse me?

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JUDGE TROUTMAN: Rotenberg, 91 N.Y.2d 932, with respect to party-by-party approach by this court.

MR. JOHNSON: Is - - what - - what date is that decision, Your Honor? I'm sorry.

JUDGE CANNATARO: It's 1997.

MR. JOHNSON: 1997. I don't know specifically when CPLR 5513 was amended to be honest. And I think that's probably the crucial distinction, because when you say a party, it's not limited to the party serving the notice of entry, or a different party, or the party that's looking to get the benefit of the notice entry. A party is necessarily unlimited, so it would apply to any party. And you know, just as a - - - just as a - - - I guess from a standpoint of confusion and burden, right, if - - - if you have a complicated case with thirty-five parties, and it's a single order, and all twenty parties filed a notice of



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2	chaos because what notice of entry applies to me? Do I
3	have to do the notice of entry my notice of appeal to
4	their notice of entry, or my other adversaries notice of
5	entry, or the other twenty-three notices of entry? And you
6	know, you get a little bit of confusion regarding which one
7	might apply to you, but it's a single order. So I think -
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9	JUDGE CANNATARO: The CPLR was amended in '97 as
10	well, wasn't it?
11	MR. JOHNSON: 553?
12	JUDGE CANNATARO: 5513.
13	MR. JOHNSON: 13?
14	JUDGE CANNATARO: Yeah.
15	MR. JOHNSON: So I don't I don't know if
16	that decision predates
17	JUDGE SINGAS: Rotenberg came after the amend -
18	_
19	MR. JOHNSON: Rotenberg came after.
20	JUDGE SINGAS: Yeah. Where this court said that
21	even after the 1997 amendment requiring analysis about
22	whether the plaintiff's motion to appeal was timely, was
23	based on each defendant.
24	MR. JOHNSON: Okay. So I understand, I guess,
25	where you're going with that. So I'm going to turn to the

entry on different days, you're creating a little bit of



1 Labor Law 241(6) case. 2 JUDGE RIVERA: Perhaps we could go to the labor 3 law issues. 4 MR. JOHNSON: Yes. Yes. 5 JUDGE RIVERA: Very good. 6 MR. JOHNSON: So - - - so Your Honor, it - - -7 it's undisputed on this record that plaintiff's coworkers 8 created the incidental concrete debris, but it's the dust. 9 It's particles. It's granulates. Right. And it's 10 undisputed that they needed to dig the channels, and that 11 it was an inherent and unavoidable byproduct of the ongoing 12 Right. And that from - - - and - - - and we -13 there's a legion of cases from the First, Second, Third and 14 Fourth Department that say when your jackhammering a 15 sidewalk or when you're doing demolition work, if - - -16 JUDGE RIVERA: So then what - - - where do you 17 draw the distinction between what you're calling this 18 integral to work particulate matter versus debris that has 19 to be cleared off? Where would you draw that line for the 20 rule? 2.1 MR. JOHNSON: So can you - - - can you repeat the 2.2 question again? 23 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I'm - - - if you're arguing 24 this is integral to the work - - -25 MR. JOHNSON: Right.



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2	process.
3	MR. JOHNSON: Right.
4	JUDGE RIVERA: So I assume, though, at some
5	point, you agree there is something that would be debris
6	that doesn't fit that definition, so I'm trying to figure
7	out where you draw that line.
8	MR. JOHNSON: Well, yeah, Your Honor, and I
9	and I think I think, you know, that that's a good
10	point. I think the line has to be drawn, and I think it
11	has been drawn a little bit in some of the Appellate
12	Division decisions. You know, if if the if -
13	- let's say that a contractor a subcontractor is
14	jackhammering a sidewalk, right.
15	JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.
16	MR. JOHNSON: And that debris is there's
17	little part there's big chunks on the ground. Right
18	And then another electrical subcontractor comes in, his
19	work is unrelated to that
20	JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.
21	MR. JOHNSON: and he comes a day later.
22	Right. Not only did that contractor have time to remove
23	the debris, but it's unrelated to his work, right?
24	JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.
25	MR. JOHNSON: What we're talking about here is a

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - because it's created in the



- 1	foreman, an experienced construction worker whose coworkers
2	are creating, right, that debris in real time because they
3	need to put the glass into the channels.
4	JUDGE CANNATARO: And when are when are
5	they coming in to do the glass
6	MR. JOHNSON: Excuse me?
7	JUDGE CANNATARO: relative to when the
8	channel because my thinking on this is you've got
9	different trades, right?
10	MR. JOHNSON: Right.
11	JUDGE CANNATARO: You've got the the
12	channel digging trade
13	MR. JOHNSON: Right.
14	JUDGE CANNATARO: which uses jackhammers of
15	whatever they use.
16	MR. JOHNSON: Right.
17	JUDGE CANNATARO: And then the glazier trade tha
18	comes in and installs the glass. So I mean, that could be
19	one potential answer to the question you were just asked.
20	MR. JOHNSON: Sure.
21	JUDGE CANNATARO: That's the demarcation between
22	inherent in the work and just general debris.
23	MR. JOHNSON: It can be.
24	JUDGE CANNATARO: Could be.
25	MR. JOHNSON: It could be.



1	JUDGE CANNATARO: I'm sure you think it's not,
2	but it could be.
3	MR. JOHNSON: Of course. Of course.
4	JUDGE CANNATARO: So my only question is, what's
5	the time gap between when one trade stopped their work and
6	the other the glaziers came in to do the glass?
7	MR. JOHNSON: So
8	JUDGE CANNATARO: Is it a day a week?
9	MR. JOHNSON: So in this case
10	JUDGE CANNATARO: An hour?
11	MR. JOHNSON: plaintiff's employer created
12	the channels. That that's his employer's work.
13	That's his coworker's work.
14	JUDGE CANNATARO: Yeah, but it's a different
15	trade.
16	MR. JOHNSON: No, it's the same trade. It's
17	- it's his employer. He him and his coworkers are
18	creating the channels and the glass
19	JUDGE CANNATARO: The same people who installed
20	the glass dug out the
21	MR. JOHNSON: Yes. Yes.
22	JUDGE CANNATARO: the the channels.
23	MR. JOHNSON: Yes. Yes.
24	JUDGE CANNATARO: That's what the record
25	reflects?



1	MR. JOHNSON: That's what the record says.
2	JUDGE GARCIA: But say they dug the channels one
3	day, and they leave all this all over the floor, and the
4	next day they come in with the glass.
5	MR. JOHNSON: Yes.
6	JUDGE GARCIA: Same case, same result?
7	MR. JOHNSON: I'm going to say it is, but I'm
8	also going to fall
9	JUDGE GARCIA: Well, why don't we say what
10	like, answer my question
11	MR. JOHNSON: Right. So point 2B point 2B
12	of my brief, right, is this is an ongoing construction
13	project, and they're
14	JUDGE GARCIA: Yeah. But let's say in my
15	MR. JOHNSON: Yeah.
16	JUDGE GARCIA: hypothetical
17	MR. JOHNSON: Right.
18	JUDGE GARCIA: they dig the channel one day
19	
20	MR. JOHNSON: Right.
21	JUDGE GARCIA: everything stays on the
22	floor. The glaziers the people carrying the glass
23	come in the next day, and they left that on the floor.
24	MR. JOHNSON: I think it's still integral to the
25	work, because plaintiff's own testimony on this record



1	shows that these particles were so small that he could not
2	see them. We're talking about dust. We're talking about
3	very, very, very tiny particles. And when you have a
4	construction project that's ongoing
5	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Size what does the
6	size of the particle how does that bear on whether
7	it's integral to the work or not?
8	MR. JOHNSON: Because if you can't see them and
9	if a broom can't catch them, right. If and if the
10	work is still going on
11	JUDGE TROUTMAN: What about a vacuum?
12	MR. JOHNSON: Excuse me?
13	JUDGE TROUTMAN: A vacuum?
14	MR. JOHNSON: Yes. Well, perhaps a vacuum might
15	be able
16	JUDGE HALLIGAN: That might make you not
17	negligent.
18	MR. JOHNSON: Right.
19	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Or you might argue that.
20	MR. JOHNSON: Right.
21	JUDGE HALLIGAN: But how does that make it not
22	integral to the work?
23	MR. JOHNSON: I'm sorry. Say the question again
24	JUDGE HALLIGAN: If you can't see them
25	MR. JOHNSON: Right.



JUDGE HALLIGAN: - - - right, perhaps you have an 1 2 argument that you are not negligent - - -3 MR. JOHNSON: Right. 4 JUDGE HALLIGAN: - - - for vacuuming them up. Μy 5 guess is your adversary would say something different to 6 that. 7 MR. JOHNSON: Right. Right. But how does the size bear on 8 JUDGE HALLIGAN: 9 whether it's integral to the work or not? 10 MR. JOHNSON: I - - - I understand your point, 11 but I think - - - I think - - - I think to answer your 12 question, I think I'm going to turn to the - - - I - - -13 and I think we're talking about 1.7(d) of the industrial 14 code at this point. Right. Because - - - because the - -15 - and - - - or excuse me, I think I'm kind of jumping ahead 16 of your question. So I think it's integral to the work 17 because it's - - - it's an inherent and necessary byproduct 18 of the unknown work - - -19 JUDGE HALLIGAN: Yeah, but that doesn't seem to 20 bear on the size, right? 2.1 MR. JOHNSON: Sure. That's fine. That - - - and 2.2 I understand that. Right. Because when you're 23 jackhammering a sidewalk and the debris is huge, you know, 24 the courts have said that's inherent byproduct of the work



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too - -

1	JUDGE HALLIGAN: And if it was left to
2	return to Judge Garcia's question if it was left for
3	a week, would that make any difference?
4	MR. JOHNSON: I think there is case law from the
5	Appellate Division, right, where where let's
6	say there's debris around for three months. Right. You
7	leave a piece of plywood, or you have rocks there for four
8	months. You can't say that's integral to the work, right?
9	There's too much of a time gap.
10	JUDGE HALLIGAN: It may be integral
11	JUDGE RIVERA: May I ask how you're defining
12	work? What's the word
13	MR. JOHNSON: In this case?
14	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. Yes.
15	MR. JOHNSON: Well, I I used I used
16	this court's definition, which was the O'Brien case from
17	2006, which is integral to the work applies not only to
18	plaintiff's work but to the construction project generally
19	So it doesn't have to be plaintiff's work
20	JUDGE SINGAS: What about our most recent case,
21	Bazdaric? How do you reconcile that?
22	MR. JOHNSON: This case with Bazdaric?
23	JUDGE SINGAS: Yeah.
24	MR. JOHNSON: Well, I think I
25	JUDGE SINGAS: Where we said it's the task that



you're doing at the time as opposed to the general work.

MR. JOHNSON: That's a fair point. But - - - but I think, you know, the facts in this case are a lot different than Basderic. Right. Because in Bazdaric, the plastic covering was not only not a part of the functionality of the elevator, but it was undisputed at that point that it - - - it had nothing to do with the work and that there was a safer alternative. Right?

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, it had something to do with the work.

MR. JOHNSON: Right. It had - - - it had - - - but it had - - - it had nothing to do with the functionality of the elevator, in this court's own words. Right. But if - - and - - - but if we get to 1.7(d), which is foreign substance. Right. We're talking about the tarp being a foreign substance to the elevator. This debris is inherent in the work. The particles are inherent byproduct of the work. So the tarp and Bazdaric was foreign to the work. But plaintiff's coworkers are digging the channel in real time, so you can't say that the particles that were created by the jackhammering work were a foreign substance.

JUDGE RIVERA: I'm a little confused. When you say real time - - I know your red light is on here.

MR. JOHNSON: I'm sorry.



1	JUDGE RIVERA: When you're saying real time
2	MR. JOHNSON: Yes.
3	JUDGE RIVERA: do you mean that there are
4	still construction workers who are indeed creating this
5	channel while people are coming in with these 500-pound
6	plates of glass?
7	MR. JOHNSON: No. No, I didn't mean to say that
8	I didn't mean to say that.
9	JUDGE RIVERA: Oh, okay. So I misunderstood
10	_
11	MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, I meant to say that
12	that the work is still ongoing. Right. The glass
13	installation work is not yet completed. So the channels
14	are dug, and they're in the process of installing the glas
15	into the channels.
16	JUDGE RIVERA: So then that would what you
17	just explained would apply to Judge Garcia's example, wher
18	you finished with the channels Monday, and the glass is
19	coming in on Tuesday.
20	MR. JOHNSON: So
21	JUDGE RIVERA: Is that the way you meant that?
22	MR. JOHNSON: I'm I'm sorry.
23	JUDGE RIVERA: That's all part of the same work
24	task?
25	MR. JOHNSON: I I think



2 MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, I - - - I think - - - I think 3 it's all part of the same - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: Even though there's been an 5 overnight break, and you've finished one task, and you're 6 moving on to the other. 7 MR. JOHNSON: I think it's the same work. 8 think it's all part of the same work. Right. So the work 9 for that subcontractor has not finished yet. 10 JUDGE GARCIA: But couldn't you say that about basically the whole project? Like, it isn't done yet, so 11 12 we can leave the debris on the floor, and then we're going 13 to finish the project at some point? I mean, it seems to 14 me the integral to the work argument in the purest sense in 15 this case - -16 MR. JOHNSON: Right. 17 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - would be because of the 18 nature of the surface, you have to dig the channel and 19 slide the glass in at the same time almost. 20 MR. JOHNSON: Right. 21 JUDGE GARCIA: When you dig the channel, you 22 slide it in, or else it's not going to work. But that's 23 not what happened here, right? It's just you took a while 24 to get the glass out, and you had the channels dug, but you 25 hadn't cleaned up the debris yet.

JUDGE RIVERA: It's happening in real time.



1	MR. JOHNSON: Well, the record is unclear on how
2	long the debris has been there. I mean, to be honest
3	and the plaintiff doesn't know how long it was there. I
4	mean, the channels could have been dug earlier that day,
5	for all we know, but the testimony doesn't reveal itself i
6	that in that respect
7	JUDGE CANNATARO: Or a week earlier?
8	MR. JOHNSON: Excuse me?
9	JUDGE CANNATARO: Or a week earlier?
10	MR. JOHNSON: Well, that's that yes,
11	that that's a possibility
12	JUDGE GARCIA: Whose burden is it to show that?
13	MR. JOHNSON: I understand what you're saying.
14	you know, and and I would just I know my
15	time is up. If I could just $-$ - on 1.7(d), when we talk
16	about foreign substance. Right. Ice, water, grease,
17	something that is foreign to the work. Right. The tarp
18	and Basderic was foreign to the elevator.
19	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, the grease could come
20	from a piece it could have come from the equipment
21	used to dig the channel.
22	MR. JOHNSON: Excuse me?
23	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Grease could have, for
24	example, come from a piece of equipment used to dig the
25	channel.



MR. JOHNSON: Right. But grease is specifically enumerated in  $1.7\,(\mathrm{d})$  - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yeah.

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MR. JOHNSON: - - - and you know, debris that is an inherent - - - a necessary byproduct of the work is not. And especially in this case, when it's a necessary byproduct of the work. And that's the point I'm trying to make.

I appreciate your time today. Thank you.

MS. CHERKIS: Good afternoon, Your Honors. My name is Louise Cherkis, and I represent Tishman Speyer Properties, LP and 200 Park LP. And that's actually particularly important here. And the Tishman Speyer Properties LP and 200 Park LP were really not discussed at all in the brief by plaintiff before this court. And to the extent that they were mentioned at all, they were mischaracterized as being the - - having had the contract with Structure Tone. What they are is the owner of the building who was an out of possession owner, who, prior to this whole contract - - all construction being done, had a tenant, the tenant being CBRE, who - - and it is CBRE that had the contract with Structure Tone, and then

And my particular concern about this is not - - - it's - - - you start off with that and then all the



analyzes about who was there, what day, and this and that, 1 2 you were - - - you not only have that we were the out of 3 possession owner, but with regard to 200 - - - that's 200 4 Park. But with Tishman Speyer, the 241(6) complaint 5 allegations were dismissed in the lower court. The lower 6 court, meaning the trial court. And it was not appealed by 7 plaintiff. And for - - - so for plaintiff to now be coming 8 before Your Honors lumping Tishman involved with any of 9 this with 241(6) should be beyond the court even taking any 10 consideration of it, even were the court to accept plaintiff's argument with regard to the other - - -11 12 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: I understand - - - I 13 understand your procedural - - - I understand your 14 procedural point. 15 MS. CHERKIS: Yeah. 16 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: On the substantive point, do 17 you know of case law as to 241(6) that says an out-of-

possession owner is not liable?

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MS. CHERKIS: Well, here the out-of-possession -- - the - - - the out-of-possession owner here - - - well -- - well, we - - - we didn't - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: I'm not asking about the facts of the case. I'm just asking for case law. If that is - - - it might be a proposition of law that an out of possession owner of a building - - - where an in-possession



owner might be liable under 241(6) and out of possession owner might be exempt, do you know of any cases saying that?

MS. CHERKIS: Well, I - - - off the top - - - I'm - - - off the top of my head right now, standing in front of you, I'm not thinking of a case.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Okay.

MS. CHERKIS: I do believe I do have cases
written in the briefing. But I would go forward to 200 - - to 200 and - - - and in common law also where we didn't - neither one of us, we didn't create a condition. We
were the ad possession owner, the agent. We weren't - - that wasn't our agent, you know, and all that was - - - was
- - - was gone on that. We weren't involved in the project
at all.

And I also would - - - would stay - - - say with regard to plaintiff himself that the plaintiff - - - it's awkward to think that plaintiff can create an issue of fact here when the plaintiff himself doesn't not - - - does not know with regard to the channel when it was created in the first place. That's plaintiff who does not present - - - present that. And yet, he is an employee of the trade who did put in the channel itself, and he was an experienced worker who was used to the routine of putting in these glass panels once there was a cut put in.



It's - - - also, I just want to remind the court that where this happened - - - okay. He was right at the channel. He's - - he's in these minute pieces. They're just - - - they're very minute. While he had said he had seen debris before, he wasn't - - - he had never seen these minute pieces before. And I think it's - - - it all together is part of that, that this is all - - - it was all integral to the work. His role in the project would include what - - - in - - - the channels being there was an essential part of his. It's not a part of his huge to say that the whole construction project, you know, would be integral. No, it's just that he - - - to - - - for him to perform his chore, those channels had to be right there, and - - - and he was - - - and he was right there. And just - - - and again, this - - - he - - - he did not know, and - - - and he did not, and he - - - and of course, we know that he also did not - - - did not fall either - - -CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you, Counsel. you.

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MS. CHERKIS: - - - but - - - thank you.

MR. LAVELLE: The only thing that I'd like to issue - - - just to point out to the court, is under 23-1.7(d), the statute within - - - in addition to the enumerated things, says any other foreign substance which may cause slippery footing shall be removed, so it falls



1 under that category. 2 Thank you for your time. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: Could I just - - - before you said 4 5 JUDGE CANNATARO: Could I just ask you what your 6 position - - -7 JUDGE RIVERA: Go ahead. 8 JUDGE CANNATARO: Oh, I'm sorry. 9 JUDGE RIVERA: Go ahead. No. No. Go ahead. 10 JUDGE CANNATARO: Your position on Tishman's 11 liability under 200. Is - - is there an argument in 12 response to what was just stated? 13 MR. LAVELLE: No, Your Honor. 14 JUDGE CANNATARO: Okay. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. I just want to be clear. 16 Can the glass be put in this channel if there's debris in 17 the channel? Like, how - - - how do they ensure there's no 18 debris in the channel? MR. LAVELLE: That - - - that was not actually 19 20 fleshed out in the record. The one thing that is in the 21 record, though, Your Honor, is there were basically two 22 teams, one did channeling and one did glass installation, 23 and plaintiff was on the glass installation team. So there 24 is that temporal gap, which I believe should give rise to



liability. At the very least, a question of fact because

1	that's why we're here today.
2	JUDGE RIVERA: Thank you.
3	MR. LAVELLE: Thank you.
4	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you
5	(Court is adjourned)
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