Appellate Division: Second Judicial Department

M190260

E/ct

RANDALL T. ENG, P.J.

REINALDO E. RIVERA

PETER B. SKELOS

MARK C. DILLON

RUTH C. BALKIN, JJ.

1999-07006 In the Matter of Joel R. Brandes, a disbarred attorney. (Attorney Registration No. 1168483)

DECISION & ORDER ON MOTION FOR REINSTATEMENT

Motion by Joel R. Brandes for reinstatement to the Bar as an attorney and counselor-at-law. Mr. Brandes was admitted to the Bar at a term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department on March 19, 1969. By opinion and order of this Court dated April 28, 2002, Mr. Brandes was disbarred upon a finding that he was guilty of five charges of professional misconduct (Matter of Brandes, 292 AD2d 129). By decision and order on motion of this Court dated October 16, 2002, Mr. Brandes's motion for reargument or for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, was denied. By decision and order on motion of this Court dated November 5, 2009, Mr. Brandes's first motion for reinstatement was denied. By decision and order on motion of this Court dated April 26, 2011, Mr. Brandes's second motion for reinstatement was held in abeyance and the matter was referred to the Committee on Character and Fitness to investigate and report on his current fitness to practice law. By decision and order on motion of this Court dated December 17, 2012, this Court, inter alia, denied Mr. Brandes's second motion for reinstatement. By decision and order on motion of this Court dated December 5, 2013, Mr. Brandes's motion for for leave to file a motion for reinstatement prior to expiration of the one-year period pursuant to 22 NYCRR 691.11(e)(1) was denied. By decision and order on motion of this Court dated April 8, 2014, Mr. Brandes's third motion for reinstatement was held in abeyance and the matter was referred to the Committee on Character and Fitness to investigate and report on Mr. Brandes's current fitness to practice law, including but not limited to, his future intentions with regard to the paralegal services portion of his Internet business.

Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, and upon the report of the Committee on Character and Fitness and the exhibits annexed thereto, it is

ORDERED that the motion is denied.

We find that Mr. Brandes engaged in the unauthorized practice of law during the period of his disbarment when he provided paralegal services via the Internet. Mr. Brandes represents that he has since ceased this portion of his Internet business because it proved unprofitable. Mr. Brandes's provision of such services through his corporation, Joel R. Brandes Consulting Services, Inc., during the period he did operate this portion of his business, violated Judiciary Law § 90(2) and this Court's order of disbarment, which, inter alia, directed that Mr. Brandes "desist and refrain from . . . practicing law in any form, [and] giving to another an opinion as to the law or its application or any advice in relation thereto."

"The practice of law involves the rendering of legal advice and opinions directed to particular clients" (Matter of Rowe, 80 NY2d 336, 341-342). Under the guise of being a paralegal, Mr. Brandes, a noted authority and expert on New York family law and divorce (see Brandes, Law and the Family New York [2d ed rev 1997] and cumulative supplements), for instance, would give advice to an attorney, who had a difficult case. Mr. Brandes would speak to the attorney over the telephone or by e-mail regarding a particular aspect of the difficult case. Upon presentation of the particulars of the case or problem, Mr. Brandes would guide the attorney to the applicable statutes and precedent cases, and offer his past experience. Such rendering of legal advice or opinion constitutes the practice of law, since Mr. Brandes in so doing, exercised professional judgment directed at the legal problem of a particular client, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Brandes had no direct contact or relationship with the client. In many other instances, Mr. Brandes contracted to draft briefs and other litigation papers for other attorneys. Given the fact that Mr. Brandes was vastly more experienced in matrimonial and domestic relations matters than the attorneys for whom he was performing services, the provision of such services can be deemed to be performing legal services for a client, namely, the attorney for whom he drafted the brief and documents. Such giving of advice and performance of legal services certainly violated the spirit, if not the letter, of Judiciary Law § 478 (see 22 NYCRR 691.10[a]).

Accordingly, we find that Mr. Brandes does not demonstrate the requisite fitness and character to practice law.

ENG, P.J., RIVERA, SKELOS, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court